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5 Feb-M-TB-1-1-Bratzel(Schaeffer)
Court V-A, Case No. 12C
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of
the United States of America against Wilhelm von Leeb, et aI.,
defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 5 February 1948, 09301630, the Honorable John C. Young presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V-A.
Military Tribuml V-A is now in session. God save the United States of
America and this honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT:
present?

Has the Marshal ascertained if all of the defendants are

THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all defendants are present in the
court room, with the exception of the defendant von Roques, who is absent
in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT:
THE MARSHAL:

You have no formal report from the hospital at this time?
No, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Pending the receipt of a formal report the proceedings in
this cause will go forward. After some considerable delay following the
constitution of this tribunal and the selection of its personnel, this
case now stands for trial. I will repeat what I had to say, in case it
may not have been he ard [sic]. After some considerable delay following
the constitution of this tribunal and the selection of its personnel,
this case now stands for trial. It is understandable that such delay
has occasioned some impatience on the part of the members of the tribunal
but notwithstanding such impatience they realize and have recognized that
in a matter of the magnitude and importance of the action upon which we
are entering, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible
to have forecast the exact time when it might be undertaken. Some of
counsel who will be engaged in the defense in this case have been engaged
until last night in another case of equal importance and the Tribunal,
recognizing such fact, delayed opening this case that they might be free
to render a full and proper service to their clients in the case they
have just concluded and also to render a like character of service to
their clients in this case from its very beginning. The judges on this
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case are aware of the gravity and importance of the issued involved in
this case and in others like it. Thye [sic] are aware of the
responsibility that rests upon them to ascertain, by the exercise of all
the care of which they are capable and by use of all the ability they
possess, what are the asserted facts relied upon to sustain the
Prosecution's case, what are the asserted facts relied upon by defendants
to sustain their defense, and out of this conflict - for there is
always such a conflict in any legal forum - determine what are the true
facts, and then to determine the law applicable to the true facts as they
find them, and then render the tribunal's judgment accordingly.
The three judges who sit do not alone constitute the tribunal. Counsel
for the Prosecution, counsel for the Defense, and the Secretary and
other administrative and executive officers also are constituent and
necessary parts of the tribunal, without which it could not, in any true
sense, function as a court of law or render a judgment that would even
approximate justice. Believing that all the constituent branches that
make up the complete tribunal understand their functions and sense their
responsibilities, it is the hope of the judges, and speaking for them, I
urge upon all of you, that each separate functioning branch of
the
tribunal cooperate to the fullest extent possible with all other
branches of the Tribunal to the end that there maybe a proper and
expeditious presentation both of the case and the defense, to the end
that there may come out of this case the result that should be sought by
all right-thinking men in any judicial forum: a judgment that on the
facts and the law as nearly as possible approximates justice.
There are three preliminary and interlocutory matters
requiring disposition before the commencement of the trial. Each of
these is covered by a written order of which doubtless both the
Prosecution and Defense will be given copies, but that the issues may be
determined at the proper time in this proceeding, I shall read the
orders, which are short, as prepared for the record.
The first is an order on the motion attacking the competence of the
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tribunal. The Court's order is as follows, omitting for the reading the
formal caption on the order:
"The motion for the discharge of defendant von Leeb and the other
defendants in this case, filed the 30th of December, 1947, on the ground
of the incompetence of this Tribunal to try said defendants has been ably
briefed by learned cou[n]sel for the movants, who are to be commended for
their industry and ingenuity. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court
of the United States in re: Yamashito, 327 U.S. Reports, page 1, held
that Part III, Article 63 of the Geneva Convention, relied upon by
movants as supporting their motion, was applicable only to judicial
proceedings directed against a prisoner-of-war for offenses committed
while a prisoner-of-war. While this case may not be an authority binding
us, we think the reasoning of the case is sound and therefore we concur
in and adopt it as the law of this case. This makes it unnecessary to
consider the other matters raised in opposition to the motion. Said
motion is not well taken and the same should be and is overruled."
Here are the written orders -- or is the written order for the Secretary
on that motion.
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The second is an order on the motion for dismissal of defendant Lehmann
from this cause. Omitting tho formal parts of the order, it is
as follows:
"Defendant Lehmann's motion for discharge, filed the 6th of January,
1948, is not well taken. The fact that said defendant was arrested,
detained, investigated, interrogated, and then released, does not operate
as a bar to a prosecution subsequently initiated, Article III, Section 1
(d) of Control Council Law No. 10 relates to the procedure to be followed
by the occupying authority and does not confer any substantive rights on
the accused or make applicable the defense asserted by the motion. The
motion is over-ruled."
Here are the written copies of the order for the Secretary's file,
The third is the order on the report of defendant von Leeb's medical
examination pursuant to application for the same by his counsel. Omitting
the formal parts, the order is as follows:
"Pursuant to application by his counsel, Dr. Hans Laternser, for medical
examination of defendant von Leob to ascertain whether said
defendant's health is such that he is fit to stand trial, the Tribunal on
the 9th of January, 1948, directed that such medical examination be made
and the findings reported to the Tribunal. Compliance with said
directive has been had. The said report does not disclose a health
condition of said defendant such as to unfit him to stand trial for and
to present his defense to the offenses charged. It is therefore ordered
by the tribunal that said defendant von Leeb shall stand trial for
the offenses charged against him in the indictment in this case."
Those are the copies of the order for filing in the
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Secretary's

records.

Late on February the third there was filed in this cause an application
on behalf of defendant Walter Warlimont with respect to the appointment
of counsel. The tribanal has given some consideration to that, but is
not at this time prepared to announce its decision. That decision will
be announced very shortly, and pending our determination on any further
action in the matter, his present counsel will continue to represent him
before this Tribunal. That concludes, so far as the court is advised,
the preliminary matters that should be disposed of in this session. If
there are no other matters the prosecation may proceed with the opening
statement.
GENERAL TELFORD TAYLOR: If it please Your Honors. Your Honor, the
Prosecution will observe the injunctions of the court laid down this
morning, and as to the matter of expedition, it is our estimate that we
can put in the Prosecution's case in less than twenty trial days.
Your Honors,
This year is the three hundredth since the end of the Thirty Years War,
which once was thought the most destructive in the history of man, and
Nuernberg lies among its battlefields; a few miles from here Gustavus
Adolphus and Wallenstein in fought at the "AIte Feste". These thirty
years left much of Germany devastated, and dislocated its economy for
decades. But all that misery was the merest trifle compared to the havoc
recently wrought in six short years, throughout Europe and the Orient.
The comparison between 1648 and 1948 is not original, and few will openly
dispute its cogency. Men at war have ceased to toy with popguns and have
taken to hurling
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thunderbolts, and civilization can no longer afford, such self—
mutilation. It was the acute awareness of these truths, forced upon us
by the first World War, which has led to the general
condemnation of those who wilfully launch a war of conqoest
[sic] as criminals in the deepest and most serious sense.
These proceedings at Nuernberg, in which crimes against peace
are charged, are vitally important because the principles to be
applied
here are man's best protection against his own capacity for selfdestruction. When we say that aggressive war is a crime, we mean it to
exactly the extent to which we are prepared to treat it a [sic] criminal
in a judicial proceedings. No principle deserves to be called such
unless men are willing to stake their conscience on its enforcement.
In this proceeding, we ask the Tribunal to test the conduct of men who
stood at the top of the German profession of arms. In most countries,
arms is one among a number of callings. It is a respected and honorable
occupation, and it will be an absolutely necessary profession as long as
organised force plays an important part in the affairs of men. But it is
the true and high purpose of this profession to protect, not to
subject. The military art is never to be practiced for its own sake; the
death and destruction which the use of arms entails is redeemed and
ennobled only when the sword is the guardian and restorer,
not the destroyer, of peace.
But in Germany, however, the military profession was not merely
only among many. The German officer was accorded a very unique and
exalted role. A century and a half ago, the Frenchman Mirabeau
wrote that "Prussia is not a state that possesses an Army; it is an army
that has conquered a nation." And it is because of the dominant part
which military matters have played in the life and thought of Germany
ever since the
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time those words were written, that this twelfth and last case before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals may well prove of greater importance to
Germany then any other case heard in this courtroom. In saying this, we
by no means, mean to depreciate the significance of the issues at state
in other cases which are being or have been held here. But the evidence
here is closely related to one of the strongest currents in German
thought, which may be aptly entitled "Arms and the German".
The defendants are charged not only with the unlawful use of war,
but also with its abuse. The laws and customs of war, which mitlgate its
ravages, have never won more than lip loyalty from the German
militarists. The German military manual openly scoffs at the Hague
Convention as being derived from "humanitarian considerations which
not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby
emotion." The terrible consequences of this ruthless nihilism are not,
even today, fully grasped. Millions of innocent civilians were
slaughtered by troops under the command or control of the defendants and
their colleagues, not in pursuit of any legitimate military objective,
but in furtherance of the basest Nazi racial and social myths. The
defendant von Kuehler, for example, as the documents prove, observed
Christmas Day in Russia 1941 by authorizing the killing of 230 incurable
invalids in an asylum at Makarjewo, on the basis of a subordinate report
which stated that:
"the inmates of the asylum no longer represent objects with lives worth
living according to the German conception.
We have said that the military profession was esteemed above all others
by many Germans and the German officers' corps
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included men of great ability and high character. To those men we mean
no dishonor in this proceeding. The issues here are far too grave to
warrant any tricks of advocacy; the evidence is quite compelling enough
and will provide its own eloquence. Those monitor's of the
German officers' corps who have the capacity for clear vision and the
courage to face the facts will welcome this opportunity for emergence
of truth.
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In presenting the evidence under Count One of the indictment, the
prosecution plans to deal summarily with the years prior to the advent of
Hitler. But we must not overlook the fact that most of these defendants
were not Nazis in the usual sense of the word, and that they are charged
with the commission of crimes, not as party members, "but as military
leaders. The moral outlook and purposes which resulted in those crimes
were not invented "by Hitler," but were developed "by the defendants and
their prodecessors in the German officers' corps. Mr. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes has observed that, in sone circumstances, "a page of
history is worth a volume of logic." And we believe that the story of the
German Arny since the first World War, very briefly treated, will do much
to illuminate the issues in this case.
The most fundamental circumstance in Germany's military structure during
the Weimar Republic was, of course, the Treaty of Versailles. Under part
V of the Treaty, the Military, Naval and Air Clauses, precise limitations
were prescribed for the size and nature of the German armed forces, and
compliance with these provisions was to be ensured by Inter-Allied
Commissions of Control. Such Commissions Military, Naval and Aeronautical
O [sic] arrived in Germany in September, 1919.
The air clauses of the Treaty need not detain us long. Military and naval
aviation was completely prohibited "by providing that "the armed forces
of Germany nust not include any military or naval air forces".
The naval clauses were, of necessity, more elaborate. Like military
aircraft, submarines were completely prohibited. As for surface crafts,
the Navy was restricted to six each of "battleships and light cruisers,
and twelve each of destroyers and torpedo boats. The tonnage of newlybuilt units was limited: "battleships 10,000 tons, light cruisers 6,000
tons; and the rate at which naval units could be replaced was also
specified. The personnel of the German Navy was not
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to exceed 15,000 officers

and men.

But most important for our purposes are the military clauses. By
Article 160 it was stipulated that, after 31 March, 1920,
the German
Army should not exceed ten divisions -- seven infantry and three cavalry
divisions, comprising not over 100.000 officers and men, and grouped
under not more than two corps headquarters. The so—called "Great German
General Staff" was to be dissolved and not "reconstituted in any
form". The Army was not to be designed for any warlike purpose; it was
expressly stated in the Treaty that
The Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintance [sic] of order
within the territory and to the control of the frontiers.
Other provisions were intended to ensure that the "100,000 man
Reichswehr" should not be used as a means of training a large reserve.
Compulsory military service was abolished. Newly appointed officers had
to agree to serve for twenty—five years, and enlisted men for twelve
years.
The armament and munitions limitations were equally important. Tanks and
poison gas were prohibited. Precise schedules fixed the maximum amounts
of guns and small arms of specified calibres, and stocks of ammunition,
which were permitted to be maintained.
Within Gernany, arms could be
manufactured only at certain factories listed by the Allied Powers;
all other munition plants were to he "closed down".
And, finally, special safeguards were provided by the demilitarization of
the Rhineland. In Gemany west of the Rhine, and east of the Rhine to a
depth of fifty kilometers, no armed forces were to be maintained or
assembled. Forts and field defense works were likewise forbidden within
this area.
The organization of the German armed forces under the Republic reflected
these arms limitation clauses. Tere was no Geman Air Force. The Army
and Navy were brought together in a single cabinet ministry, which was
pacifically named the Reich Defense Ministry. the Reichswehrministerium.

5 Feb-M-DJG-3-3-Daniels
Court 5A,
Case 12
Sovereign authority over the Reichswehr was divided between the President
of Germany and the Cabinet, acting through the Chancellor and the Reich
Defense Minister. The President was the supreme commander of the armed
forces. But because of the parliamentary form of government, the
development and execution of government policies was in the hands of the
Cabinet. Therefore all Presidential orders pertaining to the arned
forces had to be countersigned by the Reich Chancellor or the Reich
Minister of Defense.
The 100,000 man Army and the 15,000 man Navy were established on 1
January, 1921. The Army was headed by a general with the title "Chief of
the Army Command" and the Navy by an Admiral entitled "Chief of the Navy
Command". These commanders and their staffs were established within and
as part of the Reich Defense Ministry, and in a governmental sense they
were subordinate to the Reich Defense Minister; "out, in the military
chain of command, their supreme commander was the Reich President. The
Reich Defense Minister himself had only a small staff, and most of the
actual work of the armed forces was done by the staffs of the army and
navy chiefs.
Because the first Reich President (Ebert) and the first two Defense
Ministers (Nosske and Gessler) were all civilians, the army and navy
chiefs were the military commanders-in—chief of the two services. Their
staffs were organized much as were the army and navy staffs in other
countries. In view of the prohibition of the Versailles Treaty there was
no army general staff by that name; but, the functions of an army
general staff were performed by the so—called "Troops Department"
(Truppenamt) of the Army Command.
Like any general staff, the
Tnippenant had sections for operations, training, intelligence, and
organization.
In the field, Germany was divided into seven military districts
(Wehrkreise) corresponding to the seven infantry divisions allowed by the
Treaty. In each Wehrkreis was an infantry divisional headquarters which
also controlled all military activities within the Wehrkreis,
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such as recruitment, pensions, training, etc. Again following the treaty
limitation of the Army to two corps headquarters, the Wehrkreise of
eastern Germany were grouped under a "group headquarters"
(Gruppenkommando) at Berlin, and those in western Germany under a similar
headquarters at Kassel. There were also three cavalry divisional
headquarters without territorial jurisdiction.
Restricted by the Treaty provisions described above, the Reichswehr of
the Weimar Republic bore little outward resemblance to the mighty army of
the Kaiser. But the purpose, the intelligence, and the energy and
determination to salvage as much as possible from the wreckage and start
to rebuild Germany's military might were not lacking, either in the Army
or the Navy. They found their most effective focus in the brain of the
Chief of the Army Command, General Hans von Seeckt.
There is no occasion now to debate the merits or demerits of the Treaty
of Versailles. The important fact here is that, whatever they might say
publicly, von Seeckt and the other military leaders of Germany
unqualifiedly rejected the Treaty, and all their plans were directed to
its overthrow. Their immediate purposei therefore, was to bring about as
soon as possible a state of affairs which would permit Germany to
recreate her once formidable military engine.
Von Seeckt's plan of campaign to achieve these ends was flexible, but was
based upon about half a dozen basic principles. The first of these
principles, assigned to preserve the Army's prestige in the eyes of the
German people, was intensive cultivation of the legend that the German
Army was not defeated in the first World War. Thus, when Fieldmarshal
von Hindenburg appeared before a legislative committee of inquiry in
November, 1919, he testified that
"In spite of the superiority of the enemy in men and material, we could
have brought the struggle to a favorable issue if determined and
unanimous cooperation had existed between the Army and those at
home....The German Army was stabbed in the back. It is plain upon whom
the blame lies. If any further proof were necessary to show it, it is to
be found in the utter amazement of our enemies at their victory".
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Secondly, the traditions of the old imperial army were to be preserved.
There was to be no "democratizing" of the new Reichswehr.
Prussian concepts of discipline and "honor" persisted, and the
prerogatives of the officers' corps were safeguarded. As a practical
matter, the officers' corps remained closed to Jews. Despite the fact
that the Reichswehr's oath of allegiance was given to the President of
the Republic, the spirit of the officers' corps continued to be
autocratic; monarchism was tolerated and was not uncommon.
Seeckt's third basic principle was that the Reichswehr should hold itself
aloof from and above internal party politics in Germany. The Weimar
Republic was a frail ship on a stormy sea. The economic aftermath of
war, and in particular the disastrous inflation of 1922 and 1923, caused
great unrest. Cabinets rose and fell and Chancellors came and went amid
unstable political conditions. Rather than risk the Army's prestige in
this maelstrom of party politics, von Seeckt wisely held the Army apart
from any party and discouraged political party activity within the
officers' corps.
But this is not to say that the Army was not a political fact or that von
Seeckt had no political attitude. Quite the contrary; the Army was above
politics because in a sense, it dominated them. Sedulously and
skillfully, von Seeckt brought about, among the leading politicians of
all parties, a feeling that the government was dependent upon the
Reichswehr for its protection and to insure its continued
existence. When industrial unrest and workers' demonstrations were
quelled by the Reichswehr, von Seeckt appeared as the guardian of the
Republic against Communism. When the much more serious threat of
reactionary revolution culminated in actual attempts to overthrow the
Republic - such as the Kapp Putsch of 1920 and the Hitler—Ludendorf
Putsch in 1923 - the Army again emerged in the role of saviour despite
the fact that military leaders were among the participants.
Fourthly, von Seeckt brought about close relations between the
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Reichswehr and the Soviet Union's Red Army. The fact that the officers'
corps was reactionary was not allowed to obstruct this policy. Since the
Army's principal purpose was the overthrow of the Versailles Treaty, von
Seeckt sought alliance with the one major European power that had no
interest in upholding it. The Treaty of Rapallo, signed by Germany and
the Soviet Union in 1922, set the official seal upon the unofficial close
relations which already existed between the military leaders of the two
countries.
Fifthly, von Seeckt saw that the Reichswehr could best compensate for its
small size by keeping in the forefront on questions of military
technique. The greatest emphasis was put on the Improvement of weapons
and equipment, and on experience in handling the newer weapons, such as
tanks. German officers were sent to Russia to train with the Red Army in
the handling of heavy artillery, tanks, and other weapons forbidden to
Germany under the Treaty.
The training of German officers with the Red Army was, indeed, only one
of many ways in which the arms provisions of the Treaty were evaded and
violated by the Reichswehr. And von Seeckt's sixth and last principle
was that the Treaty imposed no obligation on the Wehrmacht to comply with
its provisions, and should be violated in every way which would further
the rebuilding of Germany's armed night. Contempt for the binding
character of treaties was not an invention of Adolf Hitler.
For the time being, of course, rearmament had to be clandestine. In this
hidden rearmament, von Seeckt found willing allies in various high
political officials and in the huge armament firm of Krupp. With the
assistance of Chancellor Joseph Wirth and the Reich Finance Ministry,
government funds were secretly made available to Krupp for illegal gun
design and development activities directed by the Reichswahr. These
informal arrangements were embodied in a "gentleman's agreement" on 15
January, 1922 between army and navy representatives and the Krupp firm
which, as Krupp records show, was
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.....the first step taken jointly by the Reich Defense Ministry and
Krupp to circumvent, and thereby to break down, the regulations of the
Treaty of Versailles which strangled Germany's military freedom.
The Navy did not lag behind. In 1922, with the approval of the Chief of
the Navy Command (Admiral Bohnke), Krupp and other shipyards established
a German submarine construction office in The Hague, under cover of Dutch
incorporation. The purpose of this company (called the I.v.S.) was, as
German naval records reveal
to keep together an efficient German submarine office and, by practical
work for foreign navies, to keep it in constant practice and on top of
technical developments.
By the time of von Seeckt's retirement in October, 1926, Germany's
military and political situation was greaty improved. Hindenburg, the
nation's idols had become President after Ebert's death in 1925. With
Hindenburg's support, Gustav Stresemann achieved a measure of
political stability within Germany; and, abroad, he joined in the Locarno
Pact under which allied evacuation of the Rhineland began in 1926, and
Germany was admitted to the League of Nations.
Within Germany, the prestige of the Army had been restablished. The
election to the presidency of Hindenburg -— a retired field-marshal and,
in public estimation, Germany's greatest military hero — strengthened the
Reichswehr enormously in a political sense. More practical military
advantages accrued from the Locarno Pact; in the course of the Locarno
settlement, Stresemann's arguments that the InterAllied Control Commissions should be wound up and withdrawn
prevailed. In January, 1927, the last staff members of the Commission
left Germany, and thereby Allied supervision of compliance with the arms
limitation clauses of the Treaty came to an end.
New faces appeared in the highest positions at about this time. As Chief
of the Army Command, von Seeckt was succeeded by General Heye, who, in
turn, gave way to General Kurt von* Hammerstein-Equord in November, 1930.
In 1928, Admiral Erich Raeder became Chief of Navy Command, a position he
was to hold for 15 years. In 1929,
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the growing influence of the Army was again shown when the civilian
Minister of Defense, Gressler, was replaced by Groener who,
though
nominally a civilian, was a retired general and one of the leading
military figures of the first World War.
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Behind many of those personnel changes, and taking a constantly larger
share in gliding the destinies of the Reichswehr, was General Kurt von
Schleicher. A regimental comrade of Hindenburg's son Oskar, von
Schleicher had become a protege and favorite of the old Reich President
as well as of Groener. In 1928, in order to provide the Minister of
Defense with better staff assistance and to improve coordiation [sic] of
matters of interest to both the Army and Navy, a new staff section was
established directly under the Minister of Defense called the Armed
Forces Section (Wehrmachts Abteilung). Von Schleicher became its chief,
and utilised this position and his personal contacts with Hindenburg,
Groener, and Hammerstein to achieve great political and military
influence. In 1929, this section was renamed Ministeramt, the Ministry
Department, and von Schleicher was given the title of Deputy Minister of
Defense.
Von Schleicher, as is well known, became the last chancellor of the
Weimar Republic, save only Hitler himself, who destroyed it, although
Schleicher had been an early supporter of Chancellor Bruenig, his
attitude changed after Hindenburg's election to a second term as
President, in April, 1932. Soon thereafter, he persuaded Hindenburg to
sack Bruening and appoint Franz von Papen, who became Chancellor, in June
1932. Schleicher himself relinquished his military rank and became the
Minister of Defense in Papen's cabinet.
The elections of November, 1932, and Papon's own instability
brought about the fall of his cabinet, and in December von Schleicher
became Chancellor. His tenure was short; Papon who had charmed
Hindenburg, struck a bargain with Hitler; on 28 January, 1933, Hindenburg
dismissed Schleicher, and on 30 January Hitler became Chancellor in a
coalition cabinet
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with Papen as Vice-Chancellor.
But if the era of von Schleicher had been one of political
vicissitudes, the Reichswehr itself had been further strengthen[ed.]
Although von Schleicher himself become enmeshed in party politics, the
Army as a whole did not, but continued on the general lines laid down by
von Seeckt. In particular, clandestine rearmament in violation of the
Versailles Treaty continued with quickened pace, and whith [sic] the
strong moral support of Hindenburg's secret approval.
It was, of course, well understood by all concerned that this secret
rearmament was not only a violation of international laws but was also
forbidden by Germany's internal law. The legal expert of the Reich
Defense Ministry, in an opinion written in January, 1927, declared that
"....the Peace Treaty of Versailles is also a law of the Reich, and
by reason of this, it is binding on all members of the Reich at home.
This commitment ranks superior even to the provisions of the Constitution
of the Reich....."
And another memorandum prepared during the same month within the Troops
department of the Army Command, stated:
When, years ago, preparations for mobilization were started, and after
the clarification of the international and constitutional aspects of the
affair, and in full recognition of the fact that in no respect was any
legal foundation present, other moans were knowingly and purposefully
used. A few serving officers were asked whether they would be prepared,
and whether their conscience would permit them, to participate
in activities which wore necessary from the point of view of their
Fatherland, but contrary to its law. The military offices as such were
by-passed. High-
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ranking officers did not particpate [sic] openly, so that they did not
have to boar the odium of a conscious breach of the law.
In important
fundamental matters, they issued directives sub rosa to individual
confidential agents.
It may also be noted that this accelerated secret rearmament began during
the years 1926-1929, when international relations seemed comparatively
harmonious. As part of the Locarno settlement, the Inter—Allied
Commissions of Control were withdrawn, but to the German Government and
the Reichswehr this meant merely that they could now proceed with
clandestine activities without fear that the Commissions might find them
out. As Krupp records reveal, the Commissions, departure was regarded as
"an important step on the road towards freedom" because "after the
departure of the Commission" the Army and Krupp "had more of a free
hand" to carry on the prohibited artillery development work which they
were engaged in together. They also found, it possible to commence tank
and armoured car development work. The Reich government now dared to
assist more extensively; a secret document of the German Navy tells us
that, beginning in 1927 "...German rearmament was put on a basis which
was more and more expanded by the sharing of responsibility by the Reich
Government...." It tells us further that a "secret special
budget" was set up to cover unlawful military expenses, which increased
from 6,800,000 Reichsmark in 1928 to 21,000,000 in 1933.
By the time the Weimar Republic was nearing its end, the Reichswehr had
ample cause for satisfaction with the progress it had made in rearmanent
despite the Versailles Treaty. At Christmas time in 1932, Colonel
Zengauer, a department chief in the Army Ordnance Office, accompanied

5 February-M-IL-4-3-Daniels
Court V-A Case XII
[ctd. Block quote] ranking officers did not particpate [sp] openly, so that they did not have to
bear the odium of a conscious breach of the law. In important fundamental matters, they issued
directives sub rosa to individual confidential agents. [end block quote]
It may also be noted that this accelerated secret rearmament began during the years 1926-1929,
when international relations seemed comparatively harmonious. As part of the Locarno settlement,
the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control were withdrawn, but to the German Government and the
Reichswehr this meant merely [typed over capital L] that they that they could now proceed with
clandestine activities without fear that the Commissions might find them out. As Krupp records
reveal, the Commissions’ departure was regarded as "an important step on the road towards
freedom" because "after the departure of the Commission" the Army and Krupp "had more of a free
hand" to carry on the prohibited artillery development work which they were engaged in together.
They also found, [should be no ,] it possible to commence tank and armoured [sp] car development
work. The Reich government now dared to assist mere extensively; a secret document of the German
Navy tells us that, beginning in 1927 "...German rearmament was put on a basis which was more
and more expanded by the sharing of responsibility by the Reich Government...." It tells us
further that a "secret special budget" was set up to cover unlawful military expenses, which
increased from 6,800,000 Reichsmark in 1928 to 21,000,000 in 1933.
By the time the Weimar Republic was nearing its end, the Reichswehr had ample cause for
satisfaction with the progress it had made in rearmament despite the Versailles Treaty. At
Christmas time in 1932, Colonel Zengauer, a department chief in the Army Ordinance Office,
accompanied
34
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The season’s greetings to Krupp with the information that
[block quotation] The department is convinced that, thanks to your active cooperation and
valuable advice, our armament development in 1932 has made great progress, which is of great
significance to our intent or rearming [sp] as a whole. [end block quotation]
When this was written, Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor was only five weeks in the
future. Many terrible changes were in store for Germany, but it is a mistake to overlook that
the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich had numerous common denominators, and that the
Reichswehr was the most important link between the two. What the German military leaders
accomplished under the Republic was a vitally important part of the process of German rearmament
for aggressive war. This will become increasingly clear as we examine the development of events
under Hitler and the Third Reich.
With the Court’s permission, Mr. McHaney will continue with the reading of the
statement.
MR. MCHANEY: May it Please the Tribunal, Your Honors:
The events leading to Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor on 30 January 1933 need not
here be set forth again. We do not charge that the Reichswehr bears any special responsibility
for Hitler’s selection. We may, indeed, criticize the military leaders for not actively opposing
the appointment of a man whose criminal program had been so brazenly proclaimed; but however
blameworthy this failure was, it is not charged as criminal in the indictment.
But Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor was only dictatorship in embryo. The infant was actually
born only with the suspension of the Constitution, the suppression of all civil liberties, and
the abolition of political opposition.
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Thereafter there came a stormy childhood and a violent adolescence before
the terrible full maturity of the Third Reich was reached. During this
time, the Wehrmacht’s leaders did not stand aside. They took a leading
part in the development of the Third Reich, and the Wehrmacht was a key
pillar in the finished structure. And in so doing, the German military
leaders, including these defendants, committed crimes against peace by
preparing and launching aggressive wars.
In conclusion we will make a few observations on why this happened.
For the moment we will restrict ourselves to an account of what actually
happened. And we will start with t a description of the changes in the
structure of the Wehrmacht which followed Hitler’s accession to power, in
the course of which we shall see how the individual defendants fitted
into the structure.
In Hitler’s cabinet, the position of Minister of Defense was for
the first time bestowed on a general, Werner von Blomberg, who remained
on active service. The principal staff divisin of the Ministry- the
Ministeramt, which under Schleicher had acquired such importance- was now
renamed the Armed Forces Department (Wehrmachtsamt). As its chief,
Blomberg appointed General von Reichenau, who had been his chief of staff
in East Prussia, and who was known as pro[-]Nazi.
Admiral Raeder’s tenure as Chief of the Naval Command continued
undisturbed. General Hammerstein, however, was personally anti-Nazi and
endured the Hitler regime for only a year. It must not be thought,
however, that at this stage Hitler was strong enough to dictate the
selection of the Army’s leader. Hammerstein’s successor as Chief of the
Army
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Command, General Werner von Fritsch, was the choice of Hindenburg and the
officers’ corps; he perpetuated von Seeckt’s reserved attitude toward
party politics.
Within the Army, policics [sp] were determined largely by von
Fritsch and the senior generals. Among these, the most senior were von
Rundstedt and the defendant von Leeb, the commanders-in-chief of the two
"gruppenkommando" headquarters at Berlin and Kassel. Slightly younger was
a group of twelve or fifteen generals, including the defendants con
Kuechler and Blaskowitz, who were Wehrkreis Commanders at the time of
Hitler’s accession to power, or became such within a few years
thereafter. Hoth, Reinhardt, von Salmuth, and Hollidt were all in their
forties and all became generals between 1934 and 1938. Reinhardt, as a
colonel, was chief of the Training Section of the Army from 1934 to 1937,
and thus played a part in the high-level military planning. Reinecke was
on special duty in the War Ministry beginning in 1934. Warlimont occupied
an important past in the Army Ordnance [sp] Office from 1933 to 1936, and
then was sent as Military Plenipotentiary to General Franco in Spain.
We may pass for the moment the defendant von Roques, Woehler, and
Lehmann, who did not play important parts until 1938 or later. The
remaining two defendants- Sperrle and Schniewind- were among the most
senior officers of the Air Force and the Navy, respectively. Sperrle was
a regular army officer who went on special duty with the newly-created
Air Ministry in 1934 and became the commander of the so-called "Condor
Legion" in Spain in 1936. By 1937 he had been promoted three times in
three years to the rank of lieutenant general. Schniewind was at sea as
captain of a cruiser when Hitler came to power, but in 1934 became chief
of staff of
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the fleet. In 1937, he was made chief of the Navy Armament Office.
Thus were the defendants situated during the early years of the Third
Reich, when Germany’s military power grew with such startling swiftness.
In point of fact, the speed of rearmament was so bewildering largely
because few people realized how completely the Reichswehr had prepared
for rearmament under the Weimar Republic. Technologically, very little
ground had been lost; Gustav Krupp has told us that
[Block quote] After the assumption of power by Hitler, I had the
satisfaction of being able to report to the Fuehrer that Krupp’s stood
ready, after a short warming-up period, to begin the rearmament of the
German people without any gaps of experience. [end block quote]
A secret history of artillery design states that, as a result of
clandestine activities under the Weimar Republic.
[Block quote] Of the guns which were being used in 1939-1941, the most
important were already fully developed in 1933 ..... For the equipment
which was tested in secrecy, the Army Ordinance Office and the industry
stood ready to take up mass production, upon order from the Fuehrer. [end
block quote]
In this regard, the Fuehrer was not bashful. The Reich’s military
estimates for 1933 showed an extraordinary increase over prior years.
Already by October, 1933, a top secret document of the Army Ordinance
Office listed fifteen major projects, including the manufacture of 135
tanks, which were being carried out in violation of the Versailles
Treaty. In this same month, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations
and the Internatkinal Disarmament Conference.
Hitler’s effect on rearmament, in short, was like
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uncapping a gusher. In June, 1934, the construction of submarines and
heavy battleships was under way. Guns and tanks were beginning to pour
away from the Krupp and other arms factories. There is no need to fill in
the detail now; much of this part of the story is contained in the record
and judgment [sp] of the first International Military Tribunal, and will
be more fully set forth in the document we will offer in this case.
In March, 1934, the Army started a program for the construction of 650
tanks, to be completed by March, 1935. The second date is significant; in
that same month Hitler publicly repudiated the Versailles Treaty. In the
twinkling of an eye, the Reichswehr was history and the Wehrmacht a
foreboding reality.
As a matter of fact, the Reichswehr had not fooled everyone; to
those "in the know" German rearmament had been an open secret for some
time. But by 1935, matters had an embarrassment even to the most
shameless. So in March, 1935, the mask was thrown off; this event was
called Germany’s "recovery of military freedom" (Wehrfreiheit). The
sequence of events is thus set forth by the IMT:
[Block quote] On 10 March 1935, the defendant Goering announced that
Germany was building a military air force. Six days later, on 16 March,
1935, a law was passed ...... instituting compulsory military service and
fixing the establishment of the German Army at a peace-time strength of
500,000 men. In an endeavor to reassure public opinion in other
countries, the Government announced on 21 May 1935 that Germany would,
though renouncing the disarmament clauses,
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[ctd. Block quote] still respect the territorial limitations of the
Versailles Treaty, and would comply with the Locarno Pact. Nevertheless,
on the very day of this announcement, the secret Reich Defense Law was
passed and its publication forbidden by Hitler. In this law, the powers
and duties of the Chancellor and other Ministers were defined, should
Germany become involved in war. [end block quote]
These events resulted in important changes in the top organization
of the Wehrmacht. In 1935, the Ministry of Defense was renamed the War
Ministry (Reichskriegs Ministerium) Blomberg became Minister of War and
Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefchlshaber) of the Wehrmacht. His immediate
subordinates, von Fritsch and Raeder, became Commanders-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy respectively. Goering, who had been Minister for Aviation
since 1933, now took the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; in
his military capacity only, but not in his ministerial status, he was
under von Blomberg.
For Erich Raeder and his staff-now renamed Supreme Command of the Navy
(Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine or OKM)- the events of March and May 1935
were like a shot in the arm. The primary goal was recreation of the
German submarine fleet, and now the illegal submarine activities of past
years paid enormous dividends. The secret history of the German Navy
credited these early projects with having made possible the "astonishing
facts" that
[Block quote] ....... it was possible to put the first submarine into
service only 3 ½ months after the restoration of military sovereignty
declared on 16 March 1935, that is on 29 June, and then at intervals of
about 8 days to put new submarines continuously into service, so that on
1 October 1935, twelve submarines with fully trained
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[ctd. Block quotation] personnel were in service. [end block quotation]
A program for the construction of battle cruisers and capital ships was
also formulated and set under way. In 1937, the same year that the
defendant Schniewind became Chief of Naval Armament, Germany entered into
the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, under which both powers bound themselves
to interchange full details of their building programs. But this was only
a feint to gain time; as the IMT found, Germany had no intention of
abiding by the naval agreements, and promptly and deliberately violated
them.
The German Air Force- newly born in 1935- occupied a special position
among the three services. The top staff of the Air Force (Oberkommando
der Luftwaffe, or OKL) was part of Goering’s own Air Ministry, not part
of the War Ministry. Goering recruited his staff from civilian aviation
administrators such as Erhard Milch, famous pilots such as Udet, and by
transfer to the Air Force of regular army officers such as Kesselring,
Wever, and the defendant Sperrle.
The infant Luftwaffe soon found opportunity to try its wings in
actual combat. The Spanish Civil War broke out in July, 1936, and in
September, the defendant Warlimont arrived in Spain as Plenipotentiary
Delegate of the Wehrmacht.
Although diplomatic reasons underlay German aid to France, the Wehrmacht
was especially interested in the opportunity it afforded to test German
equipment and German battle tactics with new weapons. The Army sent only
a few troops, but the substantial quantities of guns and ammunition. The
Navy played a relatively minor part, though the pocket battle[-]cruiser
"Deutschland" and two light cruisers patrolled the Spanish Coast. But the
Luftwaffe played a major role.
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In November, 1936, the defendant Spernle [sp] arrived in Franco Spain at
the head of the so-called "Condor Legion", which included a large number
of bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance squadrons and several antiaircraft batteries. An article by the defendant Sperrle reveals the great
value of the Spanish experience to the Luftwaffe in its subsequent
aggressive campaigns, especially in Poland and France. In October, 1937,
Sperrle was relieved in Spain and given command of one of the three "air
groups’ [needs ", not ‘] into which the Luftwaffe was divided.
Spectacular as were the achievements of the Nacy and the Luftwaffe,
the Army’s expansion wasof [needs space] greater importance. As in the
case of the Navy, the top staff was renamed the "Oberkommando des Heeres"
(OKH). With the need for camouflage removed, the Troops Department now
emerged as the General Staff of the Army.
The subdividing of Germany into seven Wehrkreise was abolished in
1935, and the three obsolete cavalry divisions dissolved. Germany was
newly divided into thirteen Wehrkreise, each with a corps headquarters.
Nurnberg was the center of the Wehrkreis [sp] XIII, and the building
directly across the street from the Palace of Justice is the former
headquarters of the XIIIth Army Corps. Subordinate to each corps were
three (occasionally two) infantry divisions. In controlling the
motorized, light, and armoured (panzer) divisions respectively. Above the
corps headquarters, the two old "gruppenkommandos" were replaced by three
territorial "army group" (heeresgruppe) headquarters, commanded by the
three most senior generals – von Rundstedt, von Book, and the defendant
von Leeb. A fourth non-territorial army group under von Brauchitsch
controlled the motorized, light, and armoured divisions.
In March 1936, the last safeguard of the Versailled Treaty was
swept away. A year earlier, a plan for the military reoccupation of the
Rhineland had been prepared by the Ministry of War. On 7 March 1936, in
open defiance of the Treaty, the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland
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was entered by German troops. Once again, the secret rearmament
activities of earlier years gave the German military leaders courage; the
German Navy’s secret history states
[Begin block quote] On 7 March 1936, during the critical moment of
the occupation of the demilitarized zone on the Western border, eighteen
submarines in service were available, seventeen of which had already
passed the test period and in case of emergency, they could have been
employed without difficulties on the French coast up to the Gironde. [end
block quote]
In announcing this action to the Reichstag, Hitler endeavored the
assuage the hostile reaction which he no doubt expected to follow from
this violation of the Treaty by saying: "We have no territorial claims to
make in Europe". But events which were to give the lie to this assurance
were not far in the future. Between May 1935 and the end of 1937, the
German Army more than quadrupled; by the time of the annexation of
Austria, it comprised 32 infantry, 4 motorized, 4 armoured, 3 light, and
1 mountain division, or 44 in all.
The impressive revival of the Wehrmacht’s strength was achieved by
Germany’s military leaders with the full support of German industry and,
after January 1933, under the political leadership of Adolf Hitler and
the Nazi Party. And before we describe the conquest of Poland and the
other countries overrun by the Wehrmacht, we may well pause to examine
briefly the development of relations between the Wehrmacht, we may well
pause to examine briefly the development of relations between the
Wehrmacht and the Nazis, for it was the alliance between Hitler and the
Wehrmacht- an alliance which was established and preserved despite some
points of difference and much ill will between the Nazi Party and the
German officers’ Reinecke put it in the notes for one of his lectures
[Begin block quote] "The two pillars of the Third Reich are the
Party and the Armed Forces and each is thrown back on the success or
downfall of the other. [end block quote]
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The basis for this alliance between Hitler and the Wehrmacht was
not openly acknowledged during the early months of the Hitler regime.
Indeed, when Blomberg took office in the Hitler-Papen cabinet [sp], he
attributed his selection to Hindenburg, not to Hitler, and, with a bow to
von Seeckt, promised to preserve the Reichswehr as "an instrument of the
state above all parties." But this promise rapidly became meaningless as
German party politics succumbed to the rigor mortis of dictatorship.
After the election of 5 March 1933 Hitler had numerous opposition members
in [i typed over an o] the Reichstag the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933,
which gave his cabinet full legislative power, even above the
Constitution. A month later Goering established the Gestapo, and in July
all parties other than the NSDAP were declared criminal. During the
remainder of 1933, the vise of tyranny was tightened by the prostitution
of the judiciary, strangling of the trade unions, and the subjection of
the rpess to Goebbels and Dietrich. It had been all very well for von
Seeckt to maintain a haughty superiority to "party politics" under the
Weimar Republic, but by the latter part of 1933 there was no such thing
left in Germany, and there was only one over[-]riding and all-important
political issue: whether to fight against the militaristic tyranny that
was settling over Germany, or to join with Hitler and the Nazis in
establishing the dictatorship of the Third Reich. The leaders of
Wehrmacht gave their answer cautiously but, in the end, decisively.
Indeed, in some circles of the Wehrmacht, there was rather more
enthusiasm than caution. In February 1933, Hitler’s very first month as
Chancellor, both Blomberg and Reichenau made public statements favorable
to the Nazi cause, and on 31 March 1933, Blomberg, speaking for the
Wehrmacht, saluted Hitler as "the leader of the German destiny". Later
the same year, Hitler reciprocated these manifestations of good will. On
1 September 1933, the day of the annual Nazi Party rally at Nurnberg,
Blomberg waspromoted [needs a space] to the rank of a full general
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(Generaloberst) and the defendant Leeb was appointed Commander-in-Chief
of Gruppenkommando 2.
But Blomberg and Reichenau had been specially favored by Hitler,
and the latter [first t typed over something] was a well known Nazi
sympathizer. As yet, the old line conservative generals- such as the
Commander-in-Chief, von Fritsch and the Chief of the General Staff,
Lieutenant-General Beck- had not taken a position. Hitler’s support of
rearmament was favorably received throughout the Wehrmacht, but there was
trouble with some of Hitler’s followers, notably the Storm Troops
(Sturmabteilung, or "SA") under the leadership of the notorious Roehm.
This, the so-called "radical wing" of the Nazi Party, wanted to break the
grip of the officers’ corps by incorporating the SA into the Reichswehr.
But this threat to the privileged status of the offers’ corps was
eliminated during the so-called "Roehm purge" in June 19th, when Roehm
and his followers were murdered in an orgy of political assassination.
This put the quietus on the military hopes of the SA, and was so welcome
an event to the Wehrmacht that they were prepared to overlook the brutal
murder during the "purge" of tw of their own colleagues- Generals von
Schleicher and von Bredow.
And so when Hindenburg died on 2 August 1934, and Hitler pro[]claimed himself Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces, Hitler had already won powerful support among the leading
generals, and the remainder were by no means prepared to take a stand
against him. That some day, on the ordersof [needs a space] Blomberg, all
members of the Wehrmacht took the following oath to Hitler:
[Begin block quote] I take this holy oath before God, that I will
render unconditional obedience to the Fuehrer of the German Reich and of
the German people, Adolf Hitler, and as a brave soldier will be prepared
at any time to sacrifice my life for this oath. [end block quote]
But it was the repudiation of the arms limitations of the
Versailles Treaty in May 1935 which finally sealed the bargain between
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Hitler and the military leaders. We have already traced their clandestine
rearmament activities during the fifteen years which preceded this event,
and have seen with what unalloyed enthusiasm they welcomed open
rearmament in the spring of 1935. And it was in the fall of 1935 that the
old line generals threw off their previous reserve and spoke out
enthusiastically and devotedly for the Fuehrer. The occasion was the
125th anniversary of the German War and which had closed in 1920 as
required by the Versailles Treaty. On 15 October 1935, great ceremony
attended the reopening of the academy. The Fuehrer himself was in
attendance with Goebbels and Dietrich at his heels; the aged Fieldmarshal
von Mackensen and General von Seeckt emerged from retirement; among the
active military leaders in attendance were Blomberg, Fritsch, the Chief
of the General Staff Beck, Goering and Milch from the Luftwaffe,
Rundstedt, Witzleben, and the Commander of the War
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Academy, Lieutenant-General Liebmann. The occassin was graced by
speeches, not only by Blomberg, but also by Beck and Liebmann, both of
whom were foremost and highly respected examples of the so-called "old
school" among the German military leaders. Addres[-]ing the students of
the Academy, Beck reminded them "of the duty which they owe to the man
who recreated the Wehrmacht and made it strong again and who finally
stuck off the fetters of Versailles, and to the new State which assured
us a foundation stronger than ever in a united nation". Addressing the
Fuehrer on behalf of the officers’ corps, General Liebmann declared:
[Begin block quote] We know and we are convinced in our deepest
being that we have solely your determined will and your infallible
leadership to thank for our freedom and-like the German people- we and
the entire German Armed Forces will show our thanks to you, our Fuehrer,
through unflinching faith[-]fullness and devotion. [end block quote]
There ensued a period which might be described as honeymoon between
Hitler and the Wehrmacht. The military leaders were thorough[-]ly
occupied with the recreation of Germany’s military might and Hitler, for
the most part, did not interfere with their activities. Hitler took the
occasion of his own birthday (30 April) in 1936 to promote Blomberg to
the highest military rank of fieldmarshal [needs a space]- the first
German fieldmarshal [needs a space] appointed since the first World War;
simultaneously, Fritsch and Goering were made full generals and Raeder a
Generaladmiral [needs a space]. The attitude of the German officers’
corps towards Hitler during these years has been well summarized by the
defendant Blaskowitz;
[Begin block quote] The rearmament of Germany, at first (1933-35)
secret and later unconcealed, was welcomed by me. All officers of the
Army shared this attitude and therefre had no reason to oppose Hitler.
Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired. [end block
quote]
In such happy collaboration with Hitler, the officers’ corps
proceeded to make the Wehrmacht once again might for war. Shortly before
their creation was put to use, however, a serious crisis occurred. Most
of us are too much inclined to think of Hitler’s dictatorship as
untroubled; in point of fact, Hitler was constantly
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Encountering crises, some of which seriously threatened his political
mastery. Early in 1938, the relations between Hitler and the Army were
gravely affected by what has become known as the "Blomberg-Fritsch
affair". This episode resulted in important changes in the top organ[]ization of the Wehrmacht, and had other far-reaching consequences.
The principal actors in this drama were Hitler, Himmler, Goering
and, within the Army, Blomberg, Fritsch, Beck, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm
Keitel, who had succeeded Reichenau as Chief of the Armed Forces
Department of the War Ministry, and several of the senior generals of the
Army, including Rundstedt, Reichenau, Brauchitsch, and the defendant
Leeb.
The immediate cause of the crisis was that on 12 January 1938,
having previously obtained Hitler’s blessing, Fieldmarshal [needs a
space] Blomberg, a widower, married a young lady whose lineage was not
sufficiently arist[-]ocratic to meet with the approval of the German
officers’ corps. Hitler and Goering witnessed the ceremong [ceremony],
and all seemed serene, but very shortly thereafter rumors were circulated
in high places attacking the lady’s reputation. Criticism of the marriage
within the officers’ corps grew louder and louder. On the basis of these
rumors, Hitler and Goering forced Blomberg to resign on 25 January 1936,
and two days later the Blombergs left Germany for Italy on what was at
the same time honeymoon and exile.
It is not altogether clear whether or not Hitler himself was
anxious to get rid of Blomberg, who was primarily the victim of German
military class-consciousness. But there is little doubt that Hitler, as
well as Goering and Himmler, wanted to be rid of the Commander-in[-]Chief
of the Army, General von Fritsch, whose arrogant behavior had rubbed
Hitler the wrong way, and who made no secret of his lack of respect for
the military abilities of Goering and Himmler. Two days after Blomberg’s
dismissal, Hitler, in Goering’s presence, summarily relieved Fritsch as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, using as a pretext an absolutely false
and unspeakably malicious accusation that Fritsch had been guilty of
unnatural sez [?] offenses. Fritsch was held in house arrest
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pending investigation, and a few weeks alter was completely exonerated by
a military court martial, but in the meantime he had been replaced as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army by von Brauchitsch, and Fritsch remained
in retirement until the attack against Poland a year and a half later.
This preposterous and contemptible affair threw the Army into an
uproar, and had fantastic overtones. A fiery young naval lieutenant names
von Wangenheim flew to Rome, sought out Blomberg, and offered him a
pistol in order that his suicide might vindicate the honor of the Wehr[]macht. The worldly fieldmarshal [needs a space] handed back the pistol
with the observ[-]ation that Wangenheim "apparently had entirely
different opinions and a different standard of life than he himself". But
the effect of Fritsch’s dismissal was fundamentally much more important,
inasmuch as a large part part [only needs one ‘part’] of the officers’
corps thoroughly approved Blomberg’s dismissal, whereas everyone knew
that Fritsch- the very model of a very German general and the idol of the
Wehrmacht- had been most shamefully treated.
Furthermore, important issues underlay Fritsch’s dismissal. The
officers’ corps had not forgotten Roehm and the SA, and now Himmler and
the SS loomed as a menace to the Army’s military monopoly. Some of the
loading generals, such as Leeb and von Kressenstein, were strong
advocates of religious training for the troops, which did not fit the
neo-paganism of the SS. Furthermore, Goering, capitalizing on the
exploits of his Luftwaffe in Spain, was demanding a larger voice in
military affairs than von Fritsch was disposed to accord him. It was
plain that the whole Fritsch-Blomberg affair was a frame-up, and that
Goering and Himmler were back of it. This was a direct and sinister
attack against the Army lead[-]ership, for the purpose of subjecting it
to domination by Hitler, Goering, Himmler, and other party bigwigs. The
Army’s efforts to meet this chall[-]enge failed miserably; in this
failure personal ambition, lack of solid[-]arity, and moral instability
all played a part.
Having dismissed Blomberg and Fritsch, Hitler was faced with the
question of their replacement, and in solving this problem appears to
have relied chiefly on Goering and a newcomer to the top level,
Lieutenant[-]General Wilhelm Keitel, who, as Chief of the Armed Forces
Department, had
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been Blomberg’s chief assistant in the War Ministry since 1935, and whose
son had married Blomberg’s daughter. On 27 January, Hitler informed
Keitel that he himself would take over personal command of the Wehrmacht,
with Keitel as his chief assistant. The War Ministry and the title
"Minister of War" were abolished. All this was accomplished by a Hitler
decree on 4 February 1938. The Armed Forces Department of the War
Ministry was taken over by Hitler as his personal military staff and
designated "Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [needs "] (Oberkommando
der Wehr[-]macht or "OKW"); the rest of the Ministry passed out of
existence. Keitel was given the title "Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces", and thereafter functioned more or less as Hitler’s
executive officer for armed forces matters.
Hitler did not immediately select a successor to Fritsch as
Command[-]er-in-Chief of the Army. The defendant Leeb and Rundstedt were
the most senior generals, but Hitler at first leaned rather toward his
old time favorite, Reichenau. Rundstedt or Leeb would have been
acceptable to the officers’ corps, but there was strong opposition to
Reichenau. On 3 February 1938, Hitler finally decided to appoint
Lieutenant General von Brauchitsch, at that time Commander-in-Chief of
the army group for motorized and armoured troops. Brauchitsch was held in
high esteem among the leaders of the officers’ corps, but several
circumstances connected with his selection boded ill for the unity and
independence of the Army. Firstly, Brauchitsch allowed himself to be
chosen as successor to a man who had been most samefully [?] and
wrongfully dismissed. Secondly, Brauch[-]itsch himself was suffering
domestic complications, and permitted himself to undergo the indignity of
having these carefully reviewed by Hermann Goering. Worse still, this
very private problem was solved only with the assistance of Keitel and
Goering, who were instrumental in per[-]suading his wife to consent to a
divorce, so that Brauchitsch could re[-]marry. Thirdly, while Brauchitsch
was given the rank of full general which Fritsch had held, Goering was to
receive the rank of fieldmarshal [needs a space] which Blomberg had held,
and would thereby outrank the Commander-in-Chief
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of the Army. Finally, as a condition of his appointment, Brauchitsch was
required to agree to a large number of important changes in the top
leadership of the Army. At first, Brauchitsch balked at this last con[]dition, but on the afternoon of 2 February, in conference with Goering
and Keitel, Brauchitsch gave way.
The result of all this was that the German newspapers for 6
February 1938 did not carry only the news of the creation of OKW, and of
Goering’s and Brauchitsch’s promotions; they also carried the news that
the defen[-]dant Leeb had been relieved as Commander-in-Chief of Army
Group 2 and retired, along with six other high ranking generals,
including such re[-]spected figures as von Krossenstein and von Kleist,
and six Air Force generals. This third humiliation of the old line Army
leadership was part of the price which Brauchitsch paid for his personal
advancement.
Indeed, the Army’s failure to cope more successfully with this
crisis showed up its weaknesses all too clearly. Von Fritsch himself,
able soldier that he was, seems to have been preoccupied with the attack
on his personal character, and to have taken no effective action against
the more fundamental challenge to the army leadership. He realized well
enough that Himmler was back of it, but his unimaginative reaction was to
send Himmler a written challenge to a pistol duel, and it is even
doubtful that the challenge ever reached Himmler.
It is difficult to see how Hitler could have withstood a unanimous
stand by the military leaders, but there was no unanimity. Many of them,
such as Brauchitsch, Reichenau, Keitel, List, von Schobert, Guderian, von
Manstein and others, were too ambitious to reject the promotions and new
appointments which came to them in the course of the affair. A few weeks
later, on 1 March 1938, the two most senior officers-Von Rund[-]stedt and
Von Beck- accepted promotion to the rank of full general. Even such men
as Beck and Adam, who later resigned, seem to have been content for the
moment to block Reichenau’s candidacy as Commander-in-Chief and secure
the promise of a court martial to clear von Fritsch’s name.
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In summary, the most significant lesson of the Blomberg-Fritsch
affair is that the alliance between the Wehrmacht and Hitler was so
strong that even this rude blow failed to shatter it. The Wehrmacht had
seen the Nazis overthrow the Weimar Republic, establish a ruthless
dictatorship, and throw their political opponents into concentration
camps. They had seen their colleagues Schleicher and Bredow murdered, and
now they saw Fritsch fall victim to a foul attack, and seven of their
most respected leaders rudely pensioned off. But they also saw in Hitler
the leader of a party which had established a strong and seemingly
permanent government, and which gladly furnished the funds for rearmament
without the necessity of explaining and justifying everything to the
Reichstag. They saw the factories of Germany humming and pouring out the
armaments which they needed to reconstitute the Wehrmacht. They saw the
man and the party who had created political conditions favorable to the
flowering of enormous military might. They had learned that Hitler, like
them[-]selves, had scant respect for the sanctity of treats, and could be
counted on to pursue a "realistic" foreign policy. They knew that, in
Hitler’s mind, all this rearmament was not aimless; they knew of and
shared Hitler’s ultimate intention to put the Wehrmacht to use. All these
[‘t’ typed over an ‘o’] things were more important to the Wehrmacht than
the future career of Fritsch or the unpleasant habits of Himmler.
Basically, the reason that the Army did not take a firm stand behind
Fritsch was that they did not want to take a decisive stand in opposition
to Hitler. Whatever differences they had with Hitler were largely on
questions of method and timing; they were no fundamental differences of
purpose.
In the eyes of the German people and among the troops, the Army’s
prestige was saved by Hitler’s announcement that Blomberg and Fritsch had
retired voluntarily for reasons of health, and by highly complimentary
letters from the Fuehrer to each of them. Bitter feelings caused by the
affair lingered on in some circles of the officers’ corps, but the
funda[-]mental basis for the Wehrmacht’s participation in and support of
the Third Reich was not seriously shaken. And the alliance between the
Wehrmacht
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and Hitler was to survive other serious tests in the fateful years 1938
and 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: At this time the Tribunal will take its customary
fifteen minute forenoon recess.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 1115 hours.
(A recess wastaken [needs a space])
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THE MARSHAL:
DR. GOLLNICK:

The Tribunal is again in session.
(Attorney for Defendant Sperrle)

If the Tribunal please, I should ask to have permission to make a very
short and urgent motion which I have to put in behalf of my client. He
feels at the moment unable to follow the proceedings and to attend
them. May I state in this connection all I know about his state of
health. For years he has been suffering from weakness of the heart
muscle and circulation trouble. His state of health has deteriorated
considerably in the last few years. He has frequently suffered from
fainting fits, and since October, 1947, he has been in the police prison
hospital; he is suffering from dizziness; there are disturbances in
connection with his equilibrium; there is a constant humming in his ears
and his ability to concentrate is gravely impaired by these
symptoms. According to the Doctor's statement, he is suffering also from
arteriosclerosis and from stomach ulcer trouble. At the time he is
suffering from a severe headache and also heart trouble; he is unable to
attend the proceedings. He wishes to undergo medical treatment
immediately so as to get some relief for his troubles.
I, therefore, ask the Tribunal to see to it that he be excused from
attending the proceedings and that he may be allowed to return to the
hospital, and that the physician may examine him immediately to determine
as to how far he is able to follow the proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT:

For how long does Counsel desire that he be excused?

DR. GOLLNICK: For the time being, for today.
upon the Doctor's opinion.

It will depend, of course,

May I also say that he wishes to be excused from attending the trial as
frequently as possible because he feels unfit. Of course, this will
depend upon the expert opinion of the examining physicians as to whether
his state of health warrants a merely temporary suspension or whether it
will necessitate his complete absence from the trial. He wishes, of
course, to stand trial, but, of course his wish is limited by his present
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state of health.
THE PRESIDENT: Inasmuch as your application is only that he be excused
for today, the application that he may be excused for today will be
granted; and, any future excuses will depend, of course, upon the reports
that we may have from time to time from the medical authorities, and,
you, as his counsel, can keep us advised, and we will try to work it out
the best way we can and in accordance with your wishes.
The record will then show that on application of counsel for Hugo
Sperrle, defendant, that he is excused from further attendance today at
the request of his counsel.
DR. GOLLNICK:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution may proceed with the reading of the
opening statement.
MR. McHANEY: If Your Honors please, Mr. Niederman will continue with the
statement of the Prosecution.
BY MR. NIEDERMAN:
COUNTS ONE AND FOUR: FLOWER WARS (BLUMENKRIEGE)--AUSTRIA AND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1938-1939)
One reason that the unpleasant memory of the fate of Blomberg and Fritsch
faded so rapidly was that the Army immediately became preoccupied with
far weightier matters. At least as early as 5 November 1937, at a
meeting with Blomberg, Fritsch, Goering, Raeder, and Foreign Minister von
Neurath, Hitler had announced his intention to conquer Austria and
Czechoslovakia at the first suitable opportunity. At this secret
meeting, Hitler stated:
"It is not a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally
useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material
producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not
overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one
or two generations....The history of all times--Roman Empire, British
Empire--has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by
breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable;
neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the
attacker always comes up against the proprieter [sic]....The question for
Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the
lowest cost....
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The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never
without risk.....
The intention to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was made clear in the
following words:
"For the improvement of our military-political position, it must be our
first aim in every case of entanglement by war to conquor [sic]
Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat
from the flanks in case of a possible advance westwards....The annexation
of the two states to Germany militarily and politically would constitute
a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing
of fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of
reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about twelve divisions."
These intentions were, of course, in flagrant violation of Hitler's
announcements in 1935 and 1936 that he had no intention of attacking
Austria or Czechoslovakia, and of the agreement of July 1936 between
Germany and Austria under which Hitler recognized "the full sovereignty
of the federal state of Austria". Nonetheless, on the 13 December 1937,
Hitler approved a report concerning the military execution of the
intentions outlined by him at the conference in November.
Throughout 1937, agents of the German Foreign Office had been undermining
the Austrian government and directing the activities of the outlawed
Austrian Nazi Party. On 12 February 1933, Schuschnigg, the Chancellor of
Austria, was peremptorily summoned to meet with Hitler at the
Obersalzberg. When Schuschnigg arrived at the Berghof, he found HItler
flanked by the military, including the defendant Sperrle, and Keitel and
Reichenau. In a diary kept by General Alfred Jodl, one of the defendants
convicted by the IMT, who throughout much of this period was Chief of
Operations under Keitel, the entry for 11 February states:
"In the evening and on 12 February General Keitel, with General von
Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg.
Schuschnigg with G. Schmidt are being put under heaviest political and
military pressure. At 23 hours Schuschnigg signs minutes."
A speech delivered in March 1942 by a high ranking Austrian Nazi,
Gauleiter Dr. Rainer, gives a fuller account of the nature of this
meeting:
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"The Fueher did not conduct the negotiations as Schuschnigg
expected.....The Fuehrer.....shouted at him and reprached him with all
the dirty tricks Schuschnigg had committed during the years
past....Ribbentrop told me he really pitied Schuschnigg....Schuschnigg
tried to object to something, but got so terribly shouted at that he fell
back into silence. Then the meal was taken."
Now the defendant Sperrle will no doubt tell the Tribunal, as he has
already so candidly informed the prosecution, that he had no notion what
he was doing at the Berghof, and that the extent of his activity in this
extortion was limited to a friendly cup of tea. Sperrle had only a few
months prior to the Obersalzberg meeting returned from Spain, where the
bombers of his Candor Legion were being tried out with deadly success in
support of the France forces. It is considerably less than likely that
Hitler summoned this man to the Berghof for the purpose of partaking of
tea. Rainer's speech puts the matter beyond all doubt:
"....the Fuehrer called Sperrle who had just relinquished the command in
Spain. The Fuehrer asked him speak about the Luftwaffe.
Schuschnigg was given a very impressive picture of the German
Army. Keitel too was present."
After Schuschnigg left the Obersalzberg, military pressure against
Austria was maintained by sham military activities near the Austrian
border organized the Sperrle and several army generals, and a few days
later Schnuschnigg granted amnesty to a number of Austrian Nazis. A
month later, on 12 March, German troops occupied Austria, and the
following day Austria was annexed to Germany.
The defendants will no doubt emphasize that they had no advance knowledge
of the occupation of Austria. This is totally irrelevant, since Hitler
himself knew of his own intention less than forty-eight hours in
advance. The occupation was not carefully planned in advance, but was
precipitated unexpectedly. On 9 March, Schuschnigg had announced his
intention of holding a plebiscite on the question of Austrian
independence. Hitler decided to act at once, and on 10 March, in a
flurry of extemporized military preparations, the nearby troops were
mobilized, and Sperrle assembled a miscellaneous assortment of combat and
transport
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planes at airports in Bavaria. Backed by these forces, Hitler's agent
Keppler presented an ultimatum to the President of Austria, Miklas, and
informed him that 200,000 German soldiers were at the Austrian border
ready for invasion. Face with these threats, the Austrian government
succumbed on 11 March, and the next morning the Wehrmacht rolled into
Austria. This was the first of the so-called "flower wars", so called
because, according to Nazi propaganda, the German troops were greeted
with flowers instead of bullets.
B.

The Sudentenland

That Austria succombed to threats without the actual use of military
force must not obscure the fact that her annexation was accomplished by
military conquest. The Wehrmacht had made it possible. And the role of
the Wehrmacht was even more decisive in the case of
Czechoslovakia. Following the usual Nazi diplomatic pattern, categorical
assurances were given by Germany to the Czech government at the time of
the "Anschluss". But two months later, at a military conference in May
1938, Hitler ordered the preparation of plans for military action against
Czechoslovakia not later than October 1938. Two days later, Hitler
issued a revised directive which began with the statement: "It is my
unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the
near future."
Pursuant to this directive, plans for the attack were developed which
envisaged the formation and employment in the attack of several "armies"-a unit which did not exist in the peace-time structure of the German
Army but was the standard large unit for war operations. Despite his
curt dismissal at the time of the Blomberg-Fritsch affair, the defendant
Leeb emerged from retirement to take command of the 12th Army; the 3d
Army was commanded by Kuechler with Hollidt as his Chief of Staff, and
Salmuth was Chief of Staff of the 2d Army. Sperrle developed plans for
the employment of Air Fleet 3 in the attack.
The plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia led to another crisis between
Hitler and some of the senior generals. It was not that there
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was any disagreement with the objective of conquest of Czechoslovakia or
any doubt about the ability of the German Army to do this; once again, it
was entirely a question of timing. A number of generals were firmly
convinced that, if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia, France and
England would honor their guarantee to Czechoslovakia and would attack
Germany in the West. Germany's western fortifications were by no means
completed, and while the growth of the Wehrmacht had been phenomenal, it
had not yet nearly approached its peak. The leaders of the Wehrmacht did
not want to see the fruits of their labor, as yet unripe, spoiled by
being plucked too early. Brauchitsch, Beck, Adam, and others presented
these views to Hitler, but were met with the rejoinder that France and
England would not intervene in a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia.
This conflict in points of view never reached a showdown, as the
immediate crisis was resolved through the conclusion of the Munich Pact,
under which Czechoslovakia was required to cede the Sudetenland to
Germany. German occupation of the Sudetenland was carried out in part by
troops under the command of the defendants mentioned above.
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In the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, Hitler had made great
diplomatic capital out of the fact that the inhabitants of the areas
forcibly annexed by Germany were of Germanic origin. Two days before the
Munich Pact was signed, Hitler, in a public speech carefully calculated
to induce the western powers to appease Germany once more, described the
Sudetenland as "the last territorial claim which I have to make in
Europe". Hitler continued:
I assured (Mr. Chamberlain), moreover, and I repeat it here, that when
this problem is solved, there will be no more territorial problems for
Germany in Europe.
And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves
its problems, that is to say, when the Vzechs have come to an agreement
with their other minorities, peacefully, without oppression, I shall no
longer be interested in the Czech State. And that is guaranteed him. We
don't want any Czechs at all.
But the stress which Hitler laid on the "Germanic" character of Austria
and the Sudetenland was just as spurious and insincere as his declaration
that Germany hand no more territorial claims. The defendants knew that
Hitler never intended to honor these promises. As early as 11 October,
he asked the generals what additional forces would be necessary to break
Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. In December 1938, a directive
was prepared under the defendant Warlimont's supervision in the OKW which
was later initialed by the defendant Schniewind, and which stated"
Reference "Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia" the Fuehrer has
given the following additional order:
The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the assumption
that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.
To the outside world, too, it must clearly appear that it is mearely
[sic] an action of pacification and not a war-like undertaking.
In the meantime, the hatchet men of the German Foreign Office were busily
fomenting separatist sentiment in Slovakia. By March 1939, Hitler was
ready to strike again. Under strong pressure from Hitler, Slovakia
declared herself independent, and at the same time the
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President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, was summoned to Berlin and, in the
presence of Goering and Keitel, was threatened with immediate invasion
and the destruction of Prague from the air by the planes of Sperrle's
Luftflotte. Under this terrible threat, Hacha agreed to the
incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich as a protectorate;
the following day, German troops under the command of the defendant
Blaskowitz marched in, and Sperrle's air forces took over the Czech
airfields. This was the last of the "flower wars", but we do not believe
that Blaskowitz will tell us that there were many flowers thrown as he
marched into Prague.
Immediately after the Munich settlement, the Wahrmacht was already
looking ahead to the conquest of Poland, and the establishment of an
"independent" Slovakia in March 1939 was a calculated step in that
direction. The Wehrmacht had advised the Foreign Office in October 1938
that "a week and independend [sic] Slovakia would be the best solution"
in order to "avoid the creation of a common frontier between Poland and
Hungary" which the Wehrmacht thought "undesirable." Why it was thought
"undersirable" [sic] became abundantly clear on 1 September 1939, when
the German Fourteenth Army invaded Southern Poland from Slovakia.
No such disagreements between Hitler and the generals preceded the attack
on Poland as had accompanied the Munich crisis. The Wehrmacht had been
greatly strengthed during the intervening year. The submarine fleet
under Admiral Doenitz was larger, and the Luftwaffe was very much larger;
a fourth luftflotte based in Vienna had been added after the conquests of
Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The army had made great strides. Two new corps headquarters in Austria
and seven new divisions had already been set up by the end of 1938 as a
result of the Austrian-Sudeten annexations. By September, 1939 the
German Army comprised at least seventy-five divisions and was still
growing very rapidly. In relation to the armies of neighboring
countries, of course, the German Army's expansion was even more
formidable, as the substantial and well-trained Czechoslovakian Army had
been
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disbanded without the firing of a single shot.
As we approach the outbreak of war, we may profitably fit the de[]fendants into place once more; all of them have risen in the military
hierarchy since our last recapitulation. During the second World War, the
German Army conducted three major campaigns: the campaign of Sept[]ember, 1939 against Poland, with a holding action in the west; the con[]quest of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940; and the
overrunning of Western Russia in 1941. It is, perhaps, not generally
realized that all three campaigns were conducted by very much the same
set of army group and army commanders. Indeed, the army group command[]ers were identical in all three campaigns. Three army groups led the
German troops in each of these campaigns, and the three commanders[-]inchief of these army groups were the three most senior generals of the
German Army- the defendant von Leeb, and von Rudstedt and von Bock.
For the opening campaign, Leeb’s role, though defensive, was
vitally important. He was given command of all the German forces in the
West, with the mission of holding any attack which the French and British
might launch. His headquarters was called "Army Group C", and under him
were two armies- the First and Seventh- facing France and the Maginot
Line, and a third and weaker army- the Fifth- to the north on the Belgian
and Dutch frontiers. The defendant Hollidt, by then a brigadier general,
was Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army. The bulk of the air forces
supporting Leeb in the west were those of Luft[-]flotte Three, commanded
by the defendant Sperrle.
The invasion of Poland was accomplished by two army groups- Army
Group North under Bock, and Army Group South under Rundstedt. The latter
had retired from active service in November, 1938, but was recall[-]ed to
active duty in June, 1939 to prepare for the campaign. Under him were
three armies. The Fourteenth Army, commanded by List, was deployed in the
so-called "independent" state of Slovakia; the defendant Woehler, by then
a colonel, was List’s operations officer. Well to the north, in Silesia,
was the Eight Army under the defendant Blaskowitz. Between
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the two was the heavily armored and motorized Tenth Army, under
Reichenau, which was to push into Poland as rapidly as possible while the
armies of List and Blaskowitz protected its flanks. The defendant Hoth,
then a lieutenant general, was a corps commander under Reichenau, and
Reinhardt, a major general, commanded an armored division.
Bock’s northern army group, with the defendant Salmuth, a major
general, as chief of staff, comprised two armies. The Fourth Army, under
von Kluge, was to push eastward from Pomerania into the Polish Corridor.
The Third Army, under the defendant Lieutentant-General von Kuechler, was
stationed in East Prussia. The Third and Fourth Armies were supposed to
act as a pincers, and trap as much as possible of the Polish Army between
them in the Corridor.
In November, 1938, the defendant Schniewind was appointed Chief of
Staff of the Naval War Staff, a position roughly comparable to that of
Chief of the General Staff of the Army. In 1939, he became a Vice
Admiral. At the outbreak of war, the Navy had two principal missions.
Naval surface craft participated in the reduction of the Polish port of
Gdynia on the Baltic Sea, and German submarine warfare in the Atlantic
began immediately upon the outbreak of war.
In the OKW, the defendants Reinecke, Warlimont and Lehmann all held
important positions by the time the war broke out. Lehmann, still a
civilian, had been Chief of the Legal Department since 1938. Warlimont, a
colonel, was Chief of the National Defense Section which was the section
chiefly concerned with military plans within the Operations Staff
(Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab, or "WFST"), of which Jodl was Chief. Rein[-]ecke,
a brigadier general, was Chief of the General Office (Allgemeines
Wehrmachtamt- "AWA") with a general supervision over prisoner of war
affairs, as well as over most of the OKW’s fiscal and administrative
work.
Although the plan to invade Poland did not take concrete form until
1939, the return of the Free City of Danzig to the Fatherland had long
been contemplated. Two months after the signing of the Munich Pact and
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the public statement by Hitler that there were no more territorial
problems for Germany in Europe, an OKW directive emanating from War[]limont’s section ordered that "preparations are also to be made to
enable the Free City of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by sur[]prise." In December, 1938, Brauchitsch sent instructions to Kuechler in
East Prussia to prepare for the surprise occupation of Danzig. The
defendant Schniewind also received these directives.
After the conquest of Czechoslovakia, German pressure against
Poland developed rapidly. In March 1939, Hitler instructed Brauchitsch
that the military aspects of the Polish question should be studied. He
added:
[Begin block quote] A solution in the near future would have to be based
on especially favorable political conditions. In that case Poland shall
be knocked down so completely that it need not be taken into account as a
political factor for the next decade. [end block quote]
Thereafter, military preparations were in the hands of the
Wehrmacht. On 3 April 1939, Keitel issued a new directive to the
Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force concerning "Fall
Weiss" (the code name for the invasion of Poland) which stated:
[Begin block quote] The Fuehrer has added the following directions
to Fall Weiss:
1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can
be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards.
2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw
up a precise time-table for synchronized timings between the three
branches of the Armes Forces. [end block quote]
Warlimont assisted in drafting this directive and was active in the high
level planning of this and all subsequent aggressions. The initials of
the defendant Schniewind appear on the copy of the directive receiv[-]ed
by the Navy.
On 23 Navy, Hitler held on important military conference with the
Chiefs of the Wehrmacht and their staffs to present his views on the
future tasks of the armed forces. In addition to Goering, Raeder,
Brauchitsch, Milch and others, the defendants Schniewind and Warlimont
were present. There Hitler laid bare the criminal conspiracy against
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the peace of the world in words which no man could fail to understand:
[begin block quote]
A mass of 80 million people has solved the
ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems to be
solved..... This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or
attacks upon foreign property.....
The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved,
apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without
the shedding of blood.....
Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question
of expanding our living space in the East and of secur[-]ing our food
supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be
expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural
fertility, thoroughgoing German exploita[-]tion will enormously increase
the surplus.....
There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left
with the decision: To attack Poland at the first suit[-]able opportunity.
We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our
task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.
[end block quote]
Here then was a naked statement of Hitler’s determination to wage
aggressive war; it was made directly to his military leaders. This
criminal plan could not have been carried out without their whole-hearted
cooperation.
The target day for the attack was 1 September 1939. In the inter[]vening months, military preparations for "Fall Weiss" proceeded apace.
The overall operational planning was developed by Rundstedt, with von
Manstein as his Chief of Staff. On 28 April, Schniewind wrote to the Navy
Commander in the East concerning the occupation of Danzig, advis[-]ing
the latter to consult with Kuechler, Commander of the 3rd Army in East
Prussia. On 14 June, Blaskowitz issued a detailed battle plan for Fall
Weiss to his subordinate units, stating in part that? [: instead of ?]
[begin block quote] The operation, in order to forestall an orderly
Polish mobile[-]zation and concentration, is to be opened by surprise
with forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on
alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the
Polish frontier-guards and surprise that can be expected with certainty
are to be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the army as
well to counteract the marching up of the Polish Army.
Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by
quick acting and ruthless attacks. [end block quote]
Again on 15 June, Brauchitsch issued orders to Blaskowitz and Kuechler,
among others, stating that the object of Fall Weiss was "to destroy the
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Polish Armed Forces" and that "high policy demands that the war should be
begun by heavy surprise blows." Numerous planning and operational
conferences took place throughout the summer of 1939. All the defendants
(except von Roques, who had not yet returned to active service) partici[]pated significantly in planning and initiating the war; with the Polish
campaign itself, the defendants Kuechler, Blaskowitz, Hoth, Reinhardt,
von Salmuth, Schniewind, Warlimont and Woehler were most directly con[]cerned.
There is no evidence that any substantial number of Germany’s
military leaders felt any qualms or compunction about the ruthless and
aggressive attack which they were planning. If any were hesitant, they
were in a decided minority. With the western fortifications strengthened,
the Czech Army eliminated, and the Wehrmacht itself burgeoning like
tropical vegetation, the whole spirit of the officers’ corps was far more
bellicose than the previous year. Furthermore, recovery of the territory
lost to Poland
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after the First World War had been a cardinal objective of the German
officers’ corps for many years. Once again, the defendant Blaskowitz had
summarized their viewpoint:
[Begin block quote] From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical
territorital [territorial] questions occupied attention in Germany. These
were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Saar and Ruhr, and Memel.
I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff and front officers,
believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the
question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if
necessary by force of arms. About ninety percent of the German people
were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to
wipe out the political and economic loss resulting from the creation of
the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia
surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty though a
sad necessity.......
After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question
would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we
believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance
of their ally. As a matter of fact, we felt that, if political
negotiations came to naught, the Polish question would unavoidably lead
to war, that is, not only with Poland herself, but also with the Western
Powers.
When, in the middle of June, I received an order from the OKH to prepare
myself for an attack on Poland. I knew this war came even closer to the
realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the
Fuehrer’s speech on 22 August 1939 on the Obersalzberg when it clearly
seemed to be an actuality....... [end block quote]
At the meeting on the Obersalzberg to which Blaskowitz refers,
Hitler reiterated his inflexible decision to crush Poland even at the
risk of war with England and France. This conference was attended by all
the Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff down to Army level, and their
equivalents in the Navy and Air Force, including the defendants Leeb,
Blaskowitz, Kuechler, Sperrle, Schniewind, Warlimont and Salmuth. Hitler
began by stating that "It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had
to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring."
He went on the recapitulate the reasons which seemed to him to dictate
the advisability of an immediate war against Poland rather than its
postponement; his own political ability was stressed as
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the first consideration, and the loyalty of Mussolini as the second.
Hitler went on "The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask
only benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s
personality." This "benevolent neutrality" was, of course, what Hitler
had counted on achieving by German intervention in support of Franco
during the Spanish Civil War.
After reviewing other factors which he considered to favor an
immediate attack, Hitler said:
[Begin block quote] The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become
our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my
great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in
Munich.
I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the English offer. Russia
has not interest in maintaining Poland....I brought about the change
toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got
into political conver[-]sation. Proposal of a non-aggression pact. Then
came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step,
which brought it about that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready
to sign. The personal contact with Stalin is established. The day after
tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the
position in which I wanted her. [end block quote]
This was indeed music to the generals’ ears. Always pursued by the fear
of a two-front war which had proved so disastrous twenty years earlier,
the news that Russia would remain neutral quieted their last misgivings.
Furthermore, the German officers’ corps had always depre[-]cated Hitler’s
violent language against the Soviet Union. As a document signed by the
defendant Warlimont and four other leading German generals states:
[Begin block quote] Good relations with Russia.....were valued very
highly in the Army which had many points of close contact with the Red
Army. It was considered a disappointment, therefore, that the Government
evidently had not been in a position to fight the battle against
Communism at home in such a way that friendly relations with Russia
might,

5 February 48-M-ATD-10-3-Bratzel (Int. Weber)
Court 5A, Case 12
[continue block quote] nevertheless, be maintained- as had been the case
in the years following the Rapallo Treaty. The violent language against
Russia in Hitler’s and Goebbels’ speeches was by no means approved. [end
block quote]
Two days after the meeting on the Obersalzberg, England entered
into an agreement of mutual assistance with Poland which embodied
informal assurances previously given. This, together with Italy’s
unwillingness to embark on war, caused Hitler to hesitate momentarily,
but as soon ashe [needs a space] realized that England and France would
not consent to the destruction of a third European country by Germany, he
issued "Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War", previously prepared
in Warlimont’s office, and on 1 September the Wehrmacht unleashed the
Second World War by invading Poland, thus also precipitating war with
England and France. The defendants and their co-participants and Hitler
[l typed over a b?] were all in agreement; as Hitler had said on the
Obersalzberg:
[Begin block quote] In starting and making a war, not the Right is what
matters, but Victory. [end block quote]
If the court please, Mr. Rapp will continue.
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors please:
Poland was overrun and conquered within a few weeks, and there[]after the Wehrmacht found itself in avery [needs a space] favorable
military situation. The Soviet Union was neutralized by diplomatic
agreement, and the Polish Army was no more. The Wehrmacht had suffered
only insignificant losses during the Polish campaign, and these were more
than compensated by the valuable experience which had been gained among
both the leaders and the rank and file. Furthermore, the Wehrmacht was
still growing; the peak of Germany’s military effort had by no means been
reached.
But if Hitler had hoped that the Western powers would sue for
peace, he was disappointed, and the question arose "What to do next?" the
bulk of the army was rapidly moved to the Western Front, leaving only a
few troops in Poland to cover the Eastern Front and perform occupational
duties. For the second time in twenty-five years the German
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Army faced the French across the Rhine, and the hapless Low Countries lay
athwart the German line of advance in Northern France. And in this
situation, the Army High Command and the Fuehrer once again fell into
disagreement.
Hitler wanted to strike in the West at once. On 9 October, he
circulated a memorandum to Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goering and Raeder
stressing that Germany’s war aim "is and remains the destruction of our
Western enemies" and pointing out that "the successes of the Polish
campaign have made possible.....a war on a single front, awaited for past
decades......"
But the generals thought otherwise. Now that they were at grips
with France and England, they wanted to mobilize greater strength before
attacking the Western powers, and preferred to spend the winter training
the newly recruited divisions and testing their battle plans in war
games. Opposition to Hitler’s demand for an immediate showdown was
absolutely unanimous; even the ambitious and impulsive Reichenau, loyal
Nazi that he was, wanted to wait until spring. Jodl’s diary describes a
conference on 25 October 1939 attended by Hitler, Brauchitsch, Halder
(who had replaced Beck as Chief of Staff of the Army General staff in
November 1938), Bock, Kluge and Richenau [Reichenau]:
[Begin block quote] Reichenau emphasizes bad weather, we gain better
training during wintertime, we must be able to draw out operations over
the winter.
Fuehrer says yes, but the enemy gains strength and one winter night
England and France will be on the Maas without firing a shot and without
our knowing about it.
Reichenau says I prefer that.
Bock: We still lack a great deal of replacement material. [end block
quote]
In a determined effort to swing the generals around to his opinion,
Hitler called another meeting of all commanders-in-chief and chiefs of
staff at the Obersalzberg on 23 November 1939, and delivered aharangue
[?]:
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[Begin block quote] If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to
the superiority of our armed forces......... Now the Eastern Front is
held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed
previously at unattainable......Everything is determined by the fact that
the moment is favorable now; in six months it might not be so any
more.....My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England
at the most favorable and quickest moment. [End block quote]
But the generals were totally unconvinced. In a fury, Hitler announced
that he would proceed anyhow, and set December 9 as a tentative date for
the attack. But, for one reason or another, the attack was post[-]poned,
time after time, for five months, and did not take place until May, 1940.
While the generals and Hitler were squabbling, the master minds of
the German Navy were not idle. In September, 1939, a German admiral named
Carls pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder, the
advantages which the Navy would derive from an occupation of the
Norwegian coast. His interest aroused, early in October Raeder addressed
a questionnaire to the Naval War Staff, of which the defendant Schniewind
was Chief of Staff, directing that the following points be studied:
[Begin indented block quote] (1st) What places in Norway can be
considered as bases?
(2nd) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway’s will, if it
is impossible to carry this out without fighting?
What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?......
What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war at
sea in gaining bases in North Denmark, for instance Skagen? [end block
quote]
A week later, Raeder brought the matter up with Hitler, who agreed
"to give the matter consideration". Early in December, 1939, the
Norwegian traitors Quisling and Hagelin came to Germany and conferred
with Hitler, Raeder and Alfred Rosenberg. During the ensuing months,
Schniewind maintained contact with Hagelin, and information so
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Received was passed on by Schniewind to Warlimont in the OKW.
In January, 1940, Hitler finally decided to adopt the Navy’s
proposal for a military occupation of Denmark and Norway. The project was
given the code name "Weser exercise"; itsoverall [needs a space]
preparation was entrusted to the OKW, and the naval planning to OKM. The
basic OKW order, prepared under Warlimont, was issued on 27 January 1940.
Schniewind and Warlimont both played leading roles; Jodl’s diary entry
for 29 February 1940 states:
[Begin indented block quote] 29 February- Fuehrer also wishes to
have a strong task force in Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail,
showing how individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock
troops. Warlimont, Chef Landesverteidigung, instructed to make out
immediately the order of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and Director of
Armed Forces to make out a similar order re[-]garding the strengthening
of the staff. [end block quote]
On 1 March 1940 Warlimont prepared and issued a Hitler order for
the completion of preparations. General von Falkenhorst was placed in
charge of the combined unit which was to carry out the operation. At the
same time, a naval working staff was formed under Schniewind, and on 12
March 1940, Schniewind issued orders concerning alternate landing
locations for the invasion of Norway in the event the first locations
should prove unusable. On 3 April 1940, the OKW forwarded a letter to
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop’s Office, prepared and initialed by the
defendant Warlimont, which requested the cooperation of the Foreign
Office with the various Military Commanders who were to be appointed in
Denmark and Norway and stated:
[Begin indented block quote] The military occupation of Denmark and
Norway has been, by command of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the
High Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht [end
block quote]
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has therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions
connected with the carrying out of this operation. [should be a
continuation of block quote]
The invasion of Denmark and Norway had, of course, been preceded by
the usual Judas’ kiss of treaties and assurances. In May, 1939, Germany
and Denmark had signed a non-aggression pact. In April and September
1939, Germany had solemnly promised "to respect the territory of the
Norwegian state." Norway had not been a t [space between ‘at’] war with
any nation for one hundred twenty-six years, and Denmark’s peace had been
undis[-]turbed since Germany had alst [?] attacked her in 1856. None of
the defend[-]ants- least of all Schniewind and Warlimont- can have failed
to realize the aggressive and treacherous character of Germany’s invasion
of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940.
Throughout the winter of 1939-1940, the major German attack in the
west was repeatedly scheduled and postponed. The reasons for the
postponement were various. The plans called for a weather forecast of
five or six days’ clear whether [weather], and the forecase [forecast]
was never quite favorable enough. In January 1940, a German airplane
carrying important documents relating to the attack made a forced landing
in Belgium. There was disagreement within the Army High Command as to
whether to follow the classic "Schlieffen" Plan, which had been used in
the First World War, or whether to adopt new tactics. All these factors
played a part in the delay, but it may well be doubted whether Hitler
really wanted to override the unanimous judgment of the generals and take
sole respon[-]sibility for a premature attack; at all events, the attack
was not finally mounted until 10 May 1940.
Whatever may have been the differences between Hitler and the
generals as to timing, they were completely agreed that the Low Countries
shoudl [should] be overrun as part of the overall plan of campaign.
Existing treaties and guarantees meant nothing. The independence of
Belgium rested upon international guarantees which had never been broken
save by Germany herself in 1914. During the Weimar Republic, Germany had
entered into arbitration treaties with all the Low Countries, and between
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1937 and 1939 the Third Reich had given assurances to those countries at
least eleven times. The German generals had some cause to recollect the
unfavorable effect on world opinion which Germany’s breach of Bel[-]gium
neutraility had caused in 1914, but they had learned nothing. All their
plans for a campaign in the west were based on the invasion and
occupation of the Low Countries, in violation of treaties and agree[]ments. And they were in no doubt as to Hitler’s point of view. On 23 May
1939, at the conference attended by Schniewind and Warlimont when Hitler
announced his intention to attack Poland, Hitler said:
"Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied......Declaration of
neutrality must be ignored [‘g’ typed over ‘n’ and ‘n’ typed over
‘g’].....Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we
must occupy Holland with lightning speed.....Considerations of right and
wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter.....If Holland and Belgium
are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also divided, the
fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have
been secured."
German reassurances to Belgium and the Netherlands were reaffirmed
on 6 October, at the conclusion of the Polish campaign. But, the very
next day, Brauchitsch ordered von Bock to take command of an army group
and to prepare for the immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory;
copies of this order were received by the defendants Leeb and Salmuth,
among others. And finally, during Hitler’s speech on 23 November 1939 on
the Obersalzberg,m when he endeavored to persuade the generals to attack
immediately in the west, he said:
"I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and
quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is
meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. The arguments we
will choose for that breach of neutrality shall not be as idiotic as they
were in 1914."
In deploying the German forces for the attack in the west, Leeb’s
Army Group C its position along the French border, opposite the
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Rhine River and the Maginot Line. Immediately to Leeb is north, Runds[]todt’s Army Group A constituted the center of the German line, and on
his right, Army Group B under Bock constituted the northern wing. The
original plan of attack, embodied in "Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of
the War", dated 9 October and prepared in Warlimont’s department, called
for an attack based on the old "Schlieffen" Plan, with the dif[-]ference
that this time both Holland and Belgium were to be overrun, whereas in
1914 Holland had been left untouched. Under this plan, the main
concentration of forces was in Bock’s northern army group, which was
expected to swing rapidly through Holland and Belgium and down the French
Channel coast.
During the winter, this planw as [plan was] abandoned, and by March
a new plan had been adopted under which the main concentration
("Schwerpunkt") of forces was entrusted to Rundstedt’s Army Group A in
the center. This plan called for a strong attack through Luxembourg and
the Belgium Ardennes with the purpose of breaking through the Maginot
Line near Sedan. It was expected that, as soon as Bock’s Army Group
pushed into Holland and Northern Belgium, the bulk of the French and
British forces would be drawn north for the defense of the Low Countries,
that Runds[-]tedt’s attack through Sedan, if pressed rapidly through the
Channel coast, would result in splitting the Allied forces, and that
those cut off to the north could be annihilated. And this, indeed, is
what actually happened, with the exception that the evacuation from
Dunkirk saved a substantial part of the British Army from destruction.
When the attack was finally delivered, Bock’s army grou [group], of
which the defendant Salmuth was still Chief of Staff, comprised the
Eighteenth Army under Kuechler, which invaded Holland, and the Sixth Army
under Reichenau, which pushed into Northern Belgium. Rundstedt’s army
group included the Fourth, Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies under Kluge, List
and Busch respectively, and an armored group under Kleist. Hoth’s XV
Corps was part of Kluge’s Fourth Army. Reinhardt, a divisional commander
in the Polish campaign, had now been given command of the XXXXI Corps in

5 Feb 48-M-FjC-11-4-Daniels
Court V-A Case XII
Kleist’s armored group. Air support for Rundstedt’s attack was fur[]nished by Sperrle’s Luftflotte 3.
In reserve were the Second and Ninth Armies. Blaskowitz, who had
been made a full general after the Polish campaign, brought the Ninth
Army to the front as part of Rundstedt’s army group after the
breakthrough, but was relieved shortly thereafter. Hollidt, by then a
major general, was the Ninth Army’s Chief of Staff.
After the first phase of the campaign in the Low Countries and
Northern France had been successfully concluded, France’s downfall was
achieved in the second phase. Up to this time Leeb’s Army Group C had
played a purely defensive role, but in this second phase Leeb’s forces
attacked directly into France through the Maginot Line. The operation
progressed so well that by 10 June the vulture Mussolini decided to feed
of the kill, and Italy mounted an attack on France from the south. A few
weeks later the campaign was concluded, and for the second time in
twenty-five years Germany’s brazen violations of neutrality and blatant
contempt for international agreements shocked and antagonized the
civilized world. Once again the German people were fated to pay a heavy
price for their leaders’ mental and moral shortcomings. There are some
things that German Generals will never learn.
Germany’s campaign in the west was concluded with the signing of an
Armistice at Compiegne on 22 June 1940, and the fighting ceased three
days later. The Wehrmacht had achieved an amazing military success, which
Hitler could not fail to acknowledge. Indeed, Hitler gracelessly overdid
matters; a session of the Reichstag on 19 July 1940, in celebra[-]tion of
German victory, was made the occasion for such an orgy of promo[-]tions
that many of the newly appointed field marshals and full generals must
have felt that many of the newly appointed field marshals and full
generals must have felt that Hitler had only succeeded in cheapening the
high ranks bestowed. No less than nine Army and three Air Force officersaround dozen in all- were made field marshals that day. This was quite
un[-]precedent; during the entire First World War only five (other than
the royal princes) had received the coveted baton. In addition to the
de[-]fendant Leeb, the highest rank was now conferred on Bock,
Brauchitsch,
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Keitel, Kluge, List, Reichenau, Rundstedt and Witzleben. In the Luft[]waffe the defendant Sperrle and Kesselring were given double promotions
from lieutenant general to field marshal, and Milch also made the grade.
To keep matters straight, it was, of course, necessary to give Hermann
Goering an even higher rank; this dilemma solved by calling him a
"Reichs[-]marshal". The honors of a full general were dispensed even more
liber[-]ally. The defendants Kuechler and Hoth were joined by twelve
other Army officers and five Air Force officers, or nineteen in all.
After the fall of France, it became increasingly clear that the
British were not in the least disposed to quit, and the Wehrmacht again
confronted the problem "What next?" Three alternative courses of action
found support within the Wehrmacht. The first was to prepare for an
amphibious invasion of England. Under the code name "Sea Lion" plans were
drawn up for a cross-channel attack. The second, favored by Brauchitsch,
was to strike England in the Mediterrranean by reducing Gibraltar with
the assistance of a friendly Franco, and supporting an Italian offensive
against Egypt. The third, suggested as [s typed over an x] early as 22
July at a conference between Hitler and Brauchitsch, was the conquest of
the Soviet Union.
The plan of invading England was plagued from the outset with
inter-service friction and the slender resources of the German Navy. The
diary of General Halder, the Chief of the Army General Staff, under date
of 6 August 1940 states:
"We have here the very strange situation where the Navy is full of
misgivings, the Air Force is very reluctant to put a hand to an
assignment which is entirely up to them at the outset, and the OKW, which
for once has a real Combined Forces operation, just plays dead. The only
driving force in the whole matter is supplied by us the Army, but alone
we won’t be able to swing the job."
By November 1940 [needs to be indented] "Seelowe" had been abandoned [a
typed near the ‘a’ in abandoned], and was never revived. The interesting
idea of concentrating the Axis attack in the Mediterranean
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never got beyond the speculative stage. Hitler and Franco were never able
to agree on a program for the reduction of Gibraltar, and German action
against Egypt, despite Rommel's spectacular successes, was never put on a
large-scale basis.
It became increasingly apparent, therefore, that an offensive
against the Soviet Union was most likely to be the next step. There can
be no doubt that Hitler intended from the outset to discard the treaty of
1939 with the Soviet Union as soon as it had served its use[-]fulness.
Russia's annexation of Bessarabia at the end of May 1940 had
already caused Hitler and the generals uneasy moments. As early as 31
July 1940, during a conference with the Army and Navy High Commands at
the Berghof, Hitler expressed skepticism concerning the success of an
attack on England, and went on to say:
"England's hope lies in Russia and America. If hope of Russia is
taken away, America too is lost for England, because elimination of
Russia is followed by a tremendous build-up of Japan's power in Eastern
Asia. Russia is England's and America's dagger against Japan. Current
tendency in Japan is inconvenient for England. Japan, like Russia, has a
program that is to be carried out before the war ends. Russia is the
factor on which England is counting the most. Something must have hap[]pened in London: The English were completely down, now they have been
revived. Russia is somewhat disturbed about the rate at which the Euro[]pean situation develops. All Russia has to do is to say to England that
it does not care to have a great Germany, and the English immediately
hope with the strength of drowning men, that the situation will be
radic[-]ally changed within 6 or 8 months.
With Russia smashed, England's last hope would be gone. Germany
than [then] will be the master of Europe and the Balkans. It follows from
this reasoning that RUssia must be done away with. Spring 1941.
The sooner Russia is crushed, the better off we are. Operation
achieves its purpose only if Russian State is shattered to foundation
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with one blow. Territorial gains alone will not do. So it is better to
wait a little longer, but sustain the resolution to eliminate Russia.
This is necessary also because of location on Baltic. Have no use for a
second first-rate power on Baltic. May 41. Five months' time to finish
job. This year would be the best, but unified action would not be
possible.
THE PRESIDENT: The time has arrived when I think we should take the
noon recess. I would call the attention, both of cousel [counsel] and the
spectators, that this afternoon this session will continue, not here, but
in room 70.
The Tribunal now will be in recess, to reconvene at room 70 at 1:30
p.m.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
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[Begin being centered] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1330 hours, 5 February 1948) [end being
centered]
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will proceed with the reading of the
statement.
MR. RAPP: Very well, Your Honor.
And so, during the fall of 1940, as the plans for Seelowe" [needs
beginning quotation marks] were shelved and the Luftwaffe met defeat in
the Battle of Britain, Hitler and the military leaders turned their
thoughts increasingly toward the ago-old German dream of an empire in the
east—toward the Soviet-Union. But as the events developed , [no space
required between ‘developed’ and the comma] two small Balkan states
stumbled into the path of this new and gigantic aggressive war—Greece and
Yugoslavia. Through no doing of their own they became the next to suffer
the living hell of German attack andoccupation [needs space between ‘and’
and ‘occupation’]. On 23 October 1940, Mussolini launched a surprise
attack against Greece from Albania in an effort to expand Italian
dominion in the Mediterranean. But the strike went amiss; the valiant
Greeks gathered their forces and drove the Italian invader back toward
the Albanian frontier. By the end of 1940, the Italian forces had taken a
considerable mauling from the Greeks.
There is every indication that Hitler strongly disapproved of
Mussolini’s Greek adverture [adventure], and that the German generals
were not displeased at the discomfiture of their Italian ally.
Nevertheless, the possibility that the British would establish a foothold
in Greece made it desirable for Germany to come to the aid of the
Italians. By december [needs to be capitalized] 1940, Hitler had
definitely decided to send a German force into Greece. An order dated 13
December 1940 and drafted by Warlimont stated:
[Begin block quote] "The result of the battles in Albania is not yet
decisive. Because of the dangerour [dangerous] situation in Albania it is
doubly necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create air bases
under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above
all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields. [end block quote]
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[continue block quote] "My plan , [needs no space between ‘plan’ and
comma] therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in
Southern Rumania within the next months, (b) after the setting in a
favorable weather, probably in March, to send the task force for the
occupation of the Aegean [possibly an ‘A’, possibly not] North coast by
way of Bulgaria, and ifnecessary [needs space between ‘if’ and
‘necessary’] to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The
support of Bulgaria is to be expected." [end block quote]
In pursuance of this plan, Fieldmarshal [needs space between
‘Field’ and ‘marshal’] List’s 12th Army head[-]quarters established
itself in Rumania shortly thereafter, and early in March it corssed
[crossed] the Danube into Bulgaria to deploy for the attack against
Greece. One of the divisions in List’s Army was the 50th Infantry
Division, commanded by the defendant Hollidt.
In the meantime, Ribbentrop secured the adherence of Yugoslavia to
the Tri-Partite Pact, formally given inVienna [needs space between ‘in’
and ‘Vienna’] on 25 March. But the next day, a coup d’etat in Belgrade
overthrew the government, and the new government repudiated the Axis
pact. German reaction was swift and merciless. On 27 March Hitler
conferred with the military leaders and pointed out that Yugoslavia was
now an uncertain factor, not only with respect to the coming attack on
Greece but even more so with respect to the planned invasion of the
Soviet Union. The notes on this conference, initialed by Warlimont,
state:
[begin block quote] "The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for
possible loyalty declarations f the new government, to make all
preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national
unit.... The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable
for it are ready... Politically it is expecially [especially] important
that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness
and that the military destruction is done in a lightning-like
undertaking." [end block quote]
As a result of all this, a coordinated plan of campaign against
both Greece and Yugoslavia was immediately devised. Naval support
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for the operation against Greece was arranged by the Naval War Staff
under Schniewind. On 29 March further OKW orders drafted by Warlimont
were distributed to Reinecke and Lehmann, among others.
The attack was set in motion on 6 April 1940, when part of List’s
forces in Bulgaria (including Hollidt’s 50th Division) moved southward
into Greece and westward into Yugoslavia. Simulaneiously
[simultaneously], Belgrade was ruthlessly bombed. Two days later, an
armored force under Kleist detached itself from the 12th Army and
attacked from thenorthwest [needs space between ‘the’ and ‘northwest’]
from Bulgaria toward Belgrade. On 10 April, HYugoslavia was attacked from
the north by the German Second Army, which had been deployed in Austria
and Hungary. A special task force had also been assembled in Eastern
Rumania under the defendant Reinhardt, by then a lieutenant-General. On
11 April this force struck south toward Belgrade, and less and fortyeight hours later Reinhardt’s and Kleist’s forces met in Belgrade. Within
a few days, the bulk of the Yugoslav forces had capitulated, and within a
matter of weeks Greece had also succumbed. Leaving behind a few divisions
for occupation duties, the bulk of the German forces were rapidly pulled
out of the Balkans in order to make them available for the campaign
against the Soviet Union.
In the meantime, plans for the gigantic military undertaking
against the Soviet Union had been virogously [vigorously] pushed. On 6
September 1940, troop movements from France to the East were begun in
accordance with an order issued by Brauchitsch to Leeb, Kuechler, and
Salmuth, among others. An OKW directive from Warlimont’s department
instructed counter-intelli[-]gence agents how to camouflage the build-up
on the eastern border. A few days later, a military mission was sent to
Rumania to lay the groundwork for a joint attack against Russia from that
country. Political discussions which took place with Molotov in Berlin
late in 1940 did nothing to change Hitler’s intentions, and on 18
December 1940, he issued the basic strategic directives to the Wehrmacht
for "Case Barbarossa", the code name for the attack againstthe [needs a
space between ‘against’ and ‘the’] Soviet Unin, which
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stated:
The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia
[additional indent follows this bracket in the original text] in a quick
campaign before the end of the war against England. Preparations were to
be completed by 15 May 1941. As we have just seen, the campaign in Greece
and Yugoslavia intervened, and caused a five weeks’ postponement, a
circumstance which turned out to be of great importance.
In the planning and execution of the aggressive war against the
Soviet Union, all of the defendant participated except Sperrle and
Blaskowitz. The former remained as Commander in Chief of Luftotte 3 and
incharge [needs a space between ‘in’ and ‘charge’] of the air war in the
West. In October 1940, Blaskowitz was appointed Commander in Chief of the
First Army, which was deployed in Southern France, and he too remained in
the West until the end of the war.
For the initial onslaught against the Red Army, seven armies and
four armoured groups were deployed along the Russian border from East
Prussia to Rumania. Once again, the attack was directed by three army
groups, with the same three army group commanders as in the two previous
major campaigns. The jumping off point for Army Group North, commanded by
Leeb, was East Prussia. On this occasion, Leeb’s role was by no means
defensive; his mission was to push through the Baltic territories and
capture Leningrad. Under him were the 18th Army commanded by Kuechler,
the 16th Army under Busch, and the 4th Armored Group under Hoeppner; the
defendant commander a corps under Hoeppner.
Army Group Center under Bock comprised the Fourth and Ninth Armies
under Kluge and Strauss respectively, and the Second andThird [needs a
space between ‘and’ and ‘Third’] Armored Groups under Guderian and the
defendant Hoth respectively. Army Group South under Runstedt comprised
the 6th Army under Reichenau, the First Armored Group under Kleist, the
17th Army under Stuelpnagel, and the 11th Army under von Schobart, with
the defendant Woehler as Chief of Staff. The 11th Army was assembled in
Rumania, and was to
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attack through Bessarabia and eastwards along the Black Seanorth [needs a
space between ‘Sea’ and ‘north’] coast in conjunction with Rumanian
forces. Schobert’s army included the XXX Corps under Salmuth, and the
50th Division under Hollidt. And now for the first time we encounter the
defendant von Roques, who had retired from active service in 1933, but
was calledup [needs a space between ‘called’ and ‘up’] again in April
1940. In 1941, with the rank of lieutenant-general, he was apointed
[appointed] Commander of the Rear Area of Rundstedt’s Army Group South.
Inthis [needs a space between ‘in’ and ‘this’] capacity, he was
responsible for the security of communications and supply routes behind
Rundstedt’s army group.
The defendant S chniewind [Schniewind], who had become a full
admiral in 1940, was in charge of the naval planning for "Barbarossa". A
few days prior to the actual attack, however, he was appointed Commanderin-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, and therefore was not closely concerned
with the actual execution of the Russian campaign. The defendants
Reinecke, Warli[-]mont and Lehmanncontinued [need a space between
‘Lehmann’ and ‘continued’] in the same positions at OKW that they had
previously occupied.
Throughout the spring of 1941, all the defendants (except Sperrle
and Blaskowitz) were engaged in intensive preparations for their part in
the attack. For example, on 21 March, the OKH requested all army groups
or army commanders andchiefs [need a space between ‘and’ and ‘cheifs’] of
staff to attendaconference [‘attend’ ‘a’ ‘conference’] on "Barbarossa" as
well as to have breakfast with the Japanese Ambassador. By 12 March, Hoth
[?] had issued deployment orders to his Panser Group 3 and Reinhardt was
preparing a plan of attack for his XXX XI Corps. Kuechler had been
ordered by Leeb to take the necessary measures for an assault on the
Baltic Islands. Frequent entries in the diary of the Naval War Staff give
evidence of the activity of its Chief of Staff Schniewind. He was so
eager to join battle that, as early as 22 April 1941, he requested
permission from the OKW to use arms against Russian naval units since
camouglafe of preparations could be perfect anyway. On 28 April,
Warlimont prepared a memorandum concerning questions which should be
discussed with the Finnish delegation on the Russian invasion. Subsequent
discussions led to the conclusion of a Finnish-German military agreement,
under which Finland would join in the war against Russia.
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Pursuant to this agreement, the German 20th Mountain Army was sent to
Northern Finland; however it did not come under the orders of the Finnish
army, but remained under the direct command of OKW.
In presenting the evidence under counts Two and Three of the
Indict[-]ment, we will have ample occasion to observe that the German
plans with respect to the invasion of the Soviet Union went very much
further than the usual type of military plans. It was Hitler’s intention
that, as the German armies proceeded into Russia, all vestigas [?] of the
pre-existing government should be wiped out, and all Jews and important
political functionaries exterminated; that a complete new system of local
and re[-]gional government should be set up; and that the Russian economy
should be mobilized for Germany’s war needs in complete disregard of the
re[-]quirements of the indigenous population. Since Germany’s purposes
were so broad, and indeed so deeply criminal, much more elaborate orders
and directives had to be prepared in advance of the attack against the
Soviet Union than on previous occasions. Thus, for example, on 13 March
Keitel signed a directive, prepared in Warlimont’s department, which
stated:
[begin block quote] .... In the area of operations, the
Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with
special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks
which re[-]sult from the struggle which has to be carried out between two
opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the
Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own
responsibility. The executive power vested in the Supreme Comman[-]der of
the Army and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this.
It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the
execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed.
Details shall be arranged directly through the OKW with the Reichsfuehrer
SS. [end block quote]
The "special duties" referred to meant the mass murder of Jews, the
intelligentsia, the communist functionaries by the Einsatzgruppen
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of the Security Police and SD. This , [no space needed between ‘this’ and
‘,’] as our proof will show , [no space needed between ‘show’ and ‘,’]
was only one phase of thecriminal [needs a space between ‘the’ and
‘criminal’] plans laid by these defendants and their col[-]laborators to
destroy ruthlessly Russian soldiers and civilians who might be expected
to oppose the "New Order" for Europe. Only a few weeks later, Warlimont
and Lehmann drafted an order pursuant to which tens of thousands of socalled political commissars of the Red Army were killed in cold blood by
the Wehrmacht or handed over to the Einsatzgruppen for execution. It was
these same two worthies who prepared the order removing enemy civilians
from German military juris[-]diction and permitting German soldiers to
engage in wanton slaughter at the whim of any officer and without fear of
any punishment. Before ever a shot was fired, orders were issued for the
screening of Russian prisoners of war under the jurisdiction of the
defendant Reinecke for the purpose of weeding out and executing all
"suspicious elements". We shall speak of these matters in more detail at
a later point.
By the end of April, plans had so far
fixing of DDay [?] for 22 June. The Russian
everything in their power to avoid conflict
for 6 June in the diary of the German Naval

progressed as to permit the
government had meantime done
with Germany. Thus, the entry
War Staff stated:

[begin block quote] Ambassador in Moscow reports..... Russia will
only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much
more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made
quietly- as far as can be recognized only de[-]fensive. Russian policy
still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to
Germany..... [end block quote]
But the die had long since been cast; the leaders of the Third
Reich were determined to destroy Russia and nothing could dissuade them
from their criminal aims. On 14 June , [no space between ‘June’ and ‘,’
needed] the military leaders , [no space needed between ‘leaders’ and
‘,’] include[-]ing Leeb, Kuechler, Hoth, and Warlimont reported to Hitler
the state of preparations for "Barbarossa", and eight days later the
attack was launched. In the proclamation published shortly after the
border had
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been crossed, Hitler stated:
[begin block quote] I have decided to give the fate of the German
people and of the Reich and of Europe again into the hands of our
soldiers. [end block quote]
Six months later, Germany’s axis partner Japan attacked the United
States at Pearl Harbor and in the Far East. German policy was generally
opposed to involvement of the United States until 1941. During that year,
however, strenuous efforts were made to bring Japan into the

5 Feb-A-MJ-14-1-Love
Court 5-a, Case 12
conflict on German’s side and policies were urged upon her which were
almost certain to involve the United States in the war. Follow[-]ing a
conference between Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in
February 1941, Keitel issued an order, drafted in Warlimont’s office and
initialed by Schniewind, directing the Armed Forces to col[-]laborate in
a "comprehensive and generous manner" with Japanese re[-]quests for
military information and stating that:
[begin block quote] It must be the aim of the collaboration based
on the Tri[-]Partite Pact to induce Janan as soon as possible to take
active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be
tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United
States of America will be diverted to the Pacific. [end block quote]
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Manila, Germany
declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941, pursuant to
committments [commitments] previously given the Japanese.
***** ***** [centered]
In concluding our outline of the evidence under Counts One and
Four, the prosecution wishes to recall the International Military
Tribunal’s declaration that the deliberate launching of a war of
aggression "is the supreme international crime differing only from other
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the
whold [?]. It is the responsibility of the prosecution to prove that
these grave charges have not been lightly brought. For the matter at hand
here is far weightier than any which we- as judges, lawyers, or soldiersare ever likely to facr [?] again. As Mr. Henry L. Stimson has profoundly
observed [‘s’ typed over ‘d’]:
[begin block quote] ....the Second World War brought it home to us
that our re[-]pugnance to aggressive war was incomplete without a
judgment of its leaders. What we had called a crime demanded punish[]ment; we must bring our law in balance with the universal moral judgment
of mankind....
The law made effective by the trial at Nurnberg is righteous law long
overdue. It is in just such cases as this one that the law becomes more
nearly what Mr. Justice Holmes called it: "the witness and external
deposit of our moral life." [end block quote]
If your Honors please, Mr. Dobbs will continue:
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MR. DOBBS:
[centered] COUNTS TWO AND THREE: WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY [end centered]
We now turn to the War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in which
all the defendants participated in the course of waging wars of
aggression. Under Count Two of the indictment, the defendants are charged
with the commission of crimes against enemy belligerents and prisoners of
war, while Count Three charges them with crimes against civilians of
countries overrun by the Wehrmacht.
Every war involves killing. Any war means death and pain and grief.
For centuries the civilized nations of the world have attempted to reduce
the death and suffering by observing the laws and usages of war. By
international conventions and agreements, such as the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, and by general custom, certain practices are internationally
regarded as cruel, inhumane and criminal. Such barbarities include the
killing of surrendered belligerents, the re[-]fusal of quarter, and
torture or other ill treatment of belligerents or the inhabitants of
occupied countries. Such acts are crimes and, if they result in death,
are murders.
It will be said that in time of war some such crimes must occur in
every army. That, undoubtedly, is true. But as Justice Jackson has said,
"It is not because they yielded to the normal frailties of human beings
that we accuse them. It is their abnormal and inhuman conduct which
brings them to this bar." The prosecution will not present isolated cases
of spontaneous brutality by German soldiers. Instead, it will portray a
deliberate policy – emanating from the highest levels of the Wehrmacht –
of murder and ill treatment of civilians and prisoners of war, applied in
every theatre of war and by all of these defendants. This policy is
rooted in the contempt[-]uous and scornful attitude toward the laws of
war which has character[-]ized the German officers’ corps for decades
past. At the very outset,
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we mentioned the scoffing attitude toward the Hague Conventions ex[]pressed in the German military manual; on this matter, a distinguished
American commentator has written: J.W. Garner in the German War Code.
One can scarcely determine from a reading of the German manual
whether the rules of the Hague Convention were ever intended t bind
belligerent in the conduct of war. In fact, they are rarely mentioned and
when they are referred to it is usually in derision. A good many of its
rules are clearly in conflict with the Convention and various regulations
annexed to the Convention are cynically dismissed with the statement that
they are excessively humane, or that they are good in theory but will
never be observed by belligerents in practice, etc. The fact is, the
General Staff does not look with favor upon the movement to reduce the
law of war to written form, for the reason that the effect would be to
limit the arbitrary powers of military commanders and thus to put an
obstacle in the way of military success.
The First World War accomplished nothing in the way of changing the
attitude of the German officers’ corps toward the laws of war. A most
reveling memorandum from the files of the Reich Defense Ministry written
in September 1924 by Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Stuelpnagel, embodies
his suggestions as to what attitude the Wehrmacht should take toward a
revision of the Hague rules, in the event of a new Hague Conference.
After conceding grudgingly that it would be wise to participate in such a
conference, inasmuch a "refusal to accept an invitation....would only be
used to Germany’s detriment for propaganda purposes by our ex-enemy
nations, and would again be misrepresented as malicious intentions on the
part of Germany, " the author stated that "the first nasic [?] question
to be answered is: What attitude should the German delegation take at a
new Hague Conference?" In view of the small size of the German armed
forces at that time and the re[-]strictions of theVersailles Treaty, the
writer thought that the answer to this question depended upon whether
"the possibility of a struggle for liberation exists in the not too
distant future." His
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memorandum continued:
[start dotted underline] "Can we, in consideration of the present
political situation, at all afford to advocate a ruthless use of force?
[end dotted underline] Is this not likely to result in another hatecampaign against Germany, in new and mere intensive measures of control
and a closer coordination of our enemy nations? The ex-enemy powers,
quite aware of their present military superiority, will undoubtedly
advocate a strictly regulated conduct of war and lay the greatest stress
upon observance of all laws of humanity."
The evidence under Counts Two and Three will abundantly demon[]strate the poisonous effect of these views on German methods of war[]fare during the Second World War, and especially their shocking and
disastrous impact upon the civilian populations of countries oc[-]cupied
by Germany. For the most part, these cirminal [criminal] policies were
embodied in orders and directives framed at the very top level of the
Wehrmacht, usually with direct participation by Warlimont and Lehmann,
and, within his fields of work, of Reinecke also. These orders were
distributed through regular military channels to the highest field
commanders, including all of the other defendants in this case, and were
by them passed down to the lower formations, where the orders were
actually carried. Out.
In outlining the charges under Counts Two and Three, it will be
most convenient to deal first with the criminal orders and di[-]rectives
which were chiefly intended for the conduct of the war and the German
military occupation in Western and Southern Europe, and secondly with
those which were especially connected with the war against the Soviet
Union. In all theatres of war, of course, these criminal orders and the
crimes which resulted therefrom [there from] sprang from the same
disregard for the laws of war and the dictates of humanity were common to
all theatres. Nevertheless, there were certain significant distinctions,
arising chiefly out of differences in the technique
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of warfare in the west as compared to the east, andout [and out] of the
dif[-]ferent occupational tactics which the Germans shoes [chose] to
apply as among the various occupied countires [countries].
Finally, after sketching the chief categories of crimes in the west
and in the east, we will outline the Wehrmacht’s participation in the
German slave labor program, which was a malignant common denominator of
German occupation policy in all countries.
Under Count Two of the indictment, the principal charge of war
crimes committed in Western and Southern Europe relates to the so[]called "Commando" and "Terror Flier" orders. Under Count Three of the
Indictment, we will no [?] chiefly concerned with criminal measures taken
by the German Army in the occupied countries, involving the execution of
hundred of thousand of hostages, and the secret de[-]portation and
execution of many others under the notorious "Night and Fog Decree"
(Nacht und Nebel Erlass).
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In the autumn of 1942, the Nazis were still at the climax of their
power and the Allies in the initial stage of their preparations for the
invasion which was to follow two years later. In August of that year,
British and Canadian commandos raided Dieppe. It was the first time since
Dunkirk that Allied Forces had crossed the channel in strength to probe
the German fortifications in the west, as a first rehearsal for the still
distant invasion of "Fortress Europe".
In the following months, small groups of Allied soldiers dressed in
uniform and carrying weapon openly—so-called "commando" units-- were
landed on the continent, mainly in France and Norway, to accomplish
special combat missions which consisted predominantly in the destruct[]tion of highly important military installations. The Wehrmacht’s answer
to these legitimate acts of warfare was the notorious "Com[-]mando
Order", which directed the summary execution of captured commando troops,
even if fully uniformed. When the defendant Warlimont came to his office
at the OKW on 8 October 1942, he found on his desk Hitler’s directive for
the drafting of the "Commando Order" together with the text of the
official German radio announcement of 7 October 1942 which read as
follows:
[begin indented block quote] All terror and sabotage troops of the
British and their accomplices who do not act like soldiers but like
bandits have in future to be treated as much by the Ger[-]man troops, and
they must be slaughtered ruthlessly in combat wherever they turn up. [end
indented block quote]
Immediately after receipt of the text of the radio announcement,
Warlimont gave the following instructions with respect to its enforce[]ment:
[begin block quote] 1) Transportation into order-form.
2) ....this order too, must – in accordance with the Legal Department and
counter-intelligence – be very carefully considered and correctly worded.
Distribu[-]tion only as for as the Armies, from there only orally. To be
destroyed after reading..... [end block quote]
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By 9 October, the defendant Lehmann had completed a draft of the
order, which was transmitted by Warlimont to the OKW Intelligence
Department under Admiral Canaris for his comments. Canaris voiced strong
objection; his words deserve to be quoted because they show not only that
the utter illegality of the Commando Order was well known to those who
prepared and executed it, but also that some of Hitler’s military leaders
dared to voice their opposition when they were so minded. In a memorandum
received by Warlimont, Lehmann and Reinecke, Canaris stated:
[begin indented block quote] ....Sabotage units in uniform are
soldiers and have the right to be treated as PWs.... Reprisals on PWs,
according to the agreement ratified in 1934 are absolutely not permitted.
[end indented block quote]
The respect for international law was not unique to Canaris in the
days when the Germans were themselves making widespread use of paratroops
for sabotage purposes. As early as June 1938, the defend[-]and
[defendant] Sperrle had stated in a plan for the employment of his Air
Fleet 3 against France in case of her intervention against the seizure of
Czechoslovakia that:
[begin indented block quote] It is intended to use parachute
sabotage troops.... For the purpose of destroying suitable targets,
against which bombing raids cannot guarantee decisive success. [end
indented block quote]
And in June 1940, the OKH advised all Army Groups and Armies that:
[begin indented block quote] "German parachutists are elements of
the German Wehr[-]macht ("Regular Troops"). They are legal combattants
[combatants] and they carry out justified acts of warfare. Where they are
committed (whether at the front or behind enemy lines or way in the rear)
does not affect their quality as com[-]battants [combatants]. Their
position as justified by martial law re[-]mains unchanged." [end indented
block quote]
But the accepted German view underwent a marked reversal when the
shoe was on the other foot. Lehmann put forward the following
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pseudo-legal justification as an excuse for murdering commandos"
[begin block quote] "Whoever performs acts of sabotage as a soldier with
the idea in mind to surrender without a fight after the act is
successfully completed does not conduct himself as an honorable warrior.
He misuses the rights of article 23c, Hague Convention since such methods
of warfare had not been though of at the time this article was
formulated."[end block quote]
On 17 October 1942, Jodl submitted the final draft of the "Com[]mando Order", prepared by Warlimont and Lehmann, to Hitler and on the
following day it was issued stating in part:
[begin block quote] ....From now on all enemies on so-called commando
missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they
are to all appearance soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether
armed, in battle, or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It
does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and
airplanes for the actions or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even
if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give
themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle....
If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc.,
fall into the hands of the Armed Forces by some other means, through the
police in occupied territories, for instance, they are to be handed over
immediately to the SD....[end block quote]
Because commando operations were most prevalent in the western and
southern theatres of war, it was in these theatres that the order was of
most importance. It was, however, distributed by the OKW to all three
branches of the service – Army, Navy and Air
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Force – and to all theatres under the OKW, including Norway, Africa, the
Balkans, the Mediterranean, and France and the Low Countries. It was
passed to Himmler’s SS and Police Force, and the OKH sent the order down
to all army groups and armies in the east. From them [then] it went down
to the divisions and lower units. Each and every defendant in the dock –
except Leeb, who had retired some months earlier - was familiar with the
Commando Order, and each of them, like every other German officer, knew
perfectly well that it required the commission of murder. Pursuant to
this order, British and Norwegian commandos were executed in Norway in
1942 and 1943, American commanders were shot in Italy in 1944, and other
Allied soldiers were murdered in these countries and elsewhere.
The first executions of captured commandos occurred not more than a
fortnight after the order was issued. On 21 November 1942, Warlimont
received the following report from Air Fleet 5 in Norway:
[begin block quote] Following supplementary report is made about landing
of a British freight glider at Hagers in the night of November 11:
[further indented block quote] a) No firing on the part of German
defense.
b) The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed after touching the ground,
7-man crew dead. The attached freight glider also crashed, of the 17-man
crew, 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage force. Fuehrer order has been
carried out. [end further indented and indented block quote]
And so the reports came in – British, American, French, Norwegian,
Greek commandos slaughtered in battle, slaughtered in cap[-]tivity; the
laconic reports tell a story of foul murder. A teletype signed by
Warlimont to the Commander in Chief Southeast directed:
[begin block quote] ....The English radio operator Carpenter and the
Greek sailor Lisgaris captured at Alimnia are no longer needed and are
released for special treat[-]ment according to Fuehrer Order.
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"Special treatment" is a German euphemism for murder; another is
"dealt with". On 15 December 1942, the following was circulated in 320
copies over the signature of Fieldmarshal [Field marshal] von Rundstedt?
[begin block quote] We must count to an increased extent on various
attempts by the enemy to damage our shipping lanes and other important
military objects. Proof of that is the landing of English saboteurs from
an English submarine at the mouth of the Gironde River on 8 December
1942. Even though one gang was caught and dealt with, further sabotage
troops, nevertheless have reached Bordeaux and succeeded in damaging
valuable freighters by explosives with attached magnets, on 12 December
1942. [end block quote]
Yes, those British commandos were "dealt with"; they were shot down in
cold blood after capture and interrogation. Their relatives did not even
have their anxiety ended by a death report. In an interpretation of the
Commando Order given to the OKW Department for Prisoner of War Affairs
under Reinecke, Warlimont said:
[begin block quote] The WFST/Jodl’s and Warlimont’s section of
OKW/considers it to be out of the question hereafter, that saboteurs
should be treated as soldiers, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s orders,
which would be the case if their death should be reported to the enemynatin in accordance with the regulations valid for fallen enemy soldiers.
Thus the WFST is of the opinion that no reports of deaths should be made.
[end block quote]
Reinecke’s Prisoner of War Department received reports on the
execution of commandos and on occasion, when a commando was committed to
a prisoner of war camp by mistake, he was later turned over to the SD for
execution. For example, Stalag 7a, under the jurisdiction of Reinecke,
was directed to surrender a British commando to the SD on
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16 April 1944.
On 22June [22 June] 1944, Warlimont gave an enlightening
explanation of the "German concept of usage and customs of warfare" in a
memorandum to the Legal Department under Lehmann:
[begin block quote] The Fuehrer order is to be applied even if the enemy
employs only one person for a task. Therefore, it does not make a
difference if several persons or a single person take part in a commando
operation. The reasons for the special treatment of participants in a
commando operation is that such operations do not correspond to the
German concept of usage and customs of warfare. [end block quote]
Nor did the murder of Allied commandos cease with the invasion of
France by Anglo-American forces on 22 June 1944. On 23 June, Rundstedt
request OKW to clarify the applicability of the order in view of the
large-scale landing. In a reply the following day, Warlimont directed
that the Commando Order should be enforced against all paratroopers found
outside of the immediate combat zone. Daily reports on the number
"liquidated" were also required. This order was sent through military
channels on 29 June to the defendant Blaskowitz, then Command-in-Chief of
Army Group G in Southern France. He in turn passed the order down to
units subordinated to him, including the First Army, whence it reached
the LXXX Corps under the First Army. The order passed down by Blaskowitz
explicitly required all executions of commandos to be re[-]ported through
Army channels. A few days later, on 3 July 1944, thirty odd British and
American commandos were captured by troops of the LXXX Corps and
summarily executed.
When any Allied method of warfare started to prove effective
against the Wehrmacht, the usual first reaction of its leaders was to
declare such methods of warfare criminal and threaten with death the
enemy troops engaged therein. A year after the successful commando raids
aroused the German wrath, the growing strength of the Allied Air Forces
began to be acutely felt. In view of the wondrous shortness of
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the German memory, we will do well to remind ourselves that in the field
of aerial attacks against enemy cities, the Allies were imitators, not
originators; Warsaw, Rotterdam, London and other cities were flattened or
badly scarred long before any German city suffered severely. None[]theless, by the fall of 1943 Allied attacks in Germany aroused indignant
screeches from Goebbels and Himmler. The former used the press and other
means to incite the German civilian population to lynch American and
British fliers who had been forced to parachute from disabled planes over
Germany, and Himmler directed the German police not to protect Allied
fliers from these lynching-bees.
As was often the case, the German soldier was more chivalrous when
acting on his own initiative than when following the orders of his high[]est superiors. On several occasions Wehrmacht troops protected Allied
fliers from civilian attacks, as indeed the laws of war required, for the
airmen were unarmed, endeavored to surrender, and were entitled to the
status of prisoners of war.
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1
in connection with this decree, that the evidence is quite overwhelming
of a systematic rule of violence, brutality and terror." The
circumstances surrounding the issuance and enforcement of the Night and
Fog decree were the subject of extensive testimony before Military
Tribunal No. III in Case No. 3 (United States vs. Alstoetter, et al).
That Tribunal stated, in its Judgment:
[begin block quote- single spaced] "The Night and Fog Decree (Nacht und
Nebel Erlass) arose as the plan or scheme of Hitler to combat so-called
resistance movements in occupied territories. Its enforcement brought
about a systematic rule of violence, brutality, outrage, and terror
against the occupied by the Nazi armed forces.2
. . . . . .
".... Civilians of occupied territories accused of alleged crimes in
resistance activities against German occupying forces were spirited away
for secret trial by special courts of the Ministry of Justice within the
Reich; .... the victim’s whereabouts, trial, and subsequent disposition
were kept completely secret, thus serving the dual purpose of terrorizing
the victim’s relatives and associates and barring recourse to
evidence, witnesses, or counsel for defense. If the accused were
acquitted, or if convicted, after serving his sentence, he was handed
over to the Gestapo for "protective custody" for the duration of the war.
These proceedings resulted in the torture, ill treatment, and murder of
thousands of persons.3 [end block quote]
On 12 December 1941 the OKW, through Keitel, issued the Night and Fog
Decree, which had been prepared by the defendant Lehmann in the OKW Legal
Department. It provided in part as follows:
[begin block quote- single spaced] "I. In case of criminal acts committed
by non[-]German civilians and which are directed against the Reich or the
occupation power endangering their safety or striking power, the death
penalty is applicable in principle.
"II. Criminal acts described in paragraph I will, in principle, be tried
in the occupied territories only when it appears probably that death
sentences [end block quote]
__________________________
1.

Vol. 1, Trial of the Major War Criminals, p. 232

2.

U.S. vs. Alstoetter; et al; mimeographed transcript;p.10715

3.
U.S. vs. Alstoetter, et al, mimeographed transcript,p.10714
[numbers actually indented]
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[continue block quote] are going to be passed against the offenders, or
at least the main offenders, and if the trial and the execution of the
death sentences can be carried out without delay. In other cases the
offenders, or at least the main offenders, are to be taken to Germany."
[end block quote]
In a covering letter, also written by the OKW Legal Department, the
purpose of the decree was given:
[begin block quote] Efficient and enduring intimidation can only be
achieved, either by capital punishment or by measures by which the
relatives of the criminal and the population do not know the facts of the
criminal. This aim is achieved when the criminal is transferred to
Germany. [end block quote]
A copy of this order, which was made effective in France, Holland,
Norway, Bohemia and Moravia, and the Ukraine, was received by the
defendants Warlimont and Reinecke.
About two months prior to the issuance of this decree, the
defendant Lehmann had been informed by Keitel that Hitler desired new
means to be found for combating the growing resistance movement in
France. Lehmann was a guiding spirit in the formulation, issuance, and
execution of the Night and Fog decree. Some of its unfortunate victims
were tries in secret court sessions, and in many instances no indictment
was served. But many victims were not afforded even this miserable
semblance of a trial; they were simply shipped directly to a
concentration camp. "NN" prisoners, as they were called, were held in
Mauthausen, Auschwitz, Flossenburg, Dachau, Ravensbrueck, Buchenwalk and
numerous other concentration camps. There they were starved, tortured and
killed. Those in charge of the camps were instructed that absolute
secrecy of detention was to be observed and the prisoners were denied all
means of communication with the outer world.
Nor was there any deliverance for the wretched victims after trial
and acquittal or after conviction and completion

5 February-A-IL-Sampson
Court V-A Case XII
Such soldierly conduct could not be tolerated by OKW; on 9 July 1944 an
order prepared by Warlimont’s section was issued by OKW which directed
that Wehrmacht troops should not protect so-called Ango-American [AngloAmerican] "terror-fliers" against action by the civilian population. This
order stated in part:
[begin block quote] "It has happened recently that soldiers have turned
against the population to protect Anglo-American terror flyers and have
thereby aroused their justified indignation. I request to make sure
speedily that this will be prevented ....
"No German fellow country-man can be capable of understanding such
conduct of our armed forces. Also, the population of the occupied
territories is not to be prevented from resorting to self-help in
justified indignation at Ango-American [Anglo-American] terror
flyers...." [end block quote]
This order, together with a similar order by Hitler and murderous
incitement by Goebbels through the press, led to the slaughter of
numerous Allied airmen in flagrant violation of the rules of war.
[begin block quote] Mr. Barbour will continue with the reading.
3.

Count Three: Civilians—"Night and Fog" Decree

MR. BARBOUR: May it please the Tribunal: [end block quote]
The Wehrmacht’s policies and practices in governing the occupied
countries were characterized by a blind and unimaginative faith in the
use of ruthless force and methods of intimidation and terrorism. This
policy was not only brutal and criminal; it was senseless and bound to
end in failure. Catastrophe was the price that the leaders of the Third
Reich had to pay for their arrogant disregard of Law and for their
failure to realize that in the end stupid violence is a weapon which
recoils upon its user. The so[-]called "Night and Fog" ("Nacht und
Nebel") decree was the foundation of a system which embodied these
principles to perfection. It was the means through which the Wehrmacht
sought to "pacify" the countries of Western Europe. The INT found,
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of their sentence. Thus, on 6 November 1943, Lehmann’s Legal Department
issued the following directive over Keitel’s signature:
[begin block quote] "Perpetrators who have been acquitted in the course
of judicial proceedings by the army or against whom proceedings have been
suspended or who have fully served a term of imprisonment during the war
imposed by an army court, are to be handed over to the Secret State
Police for detention for the duration of the war." [end block quote]
As the war continued, the "Night and Fog" decree was supplemented
by the so-called "Terror and Sabotage" decrees. On 1 July 1944, the
defendant Warlimont informed Lehmann that "because of incidents that have
occurred at Copenhagen, the Fuehrer has ordered an immediate cessation of
court martial proceedings against members of the civilian population in
the occupied territories." Thereafter, by decrees in the formulation of
which both Lehmann and Warlimont participated, civilians charged with
acts of violence were to be summarily shot without trial if apprehended
"in the act", and, if arrested later, were to be turned over to the
Security Police, a delivery tantamount to execution.
The defendant Lehmann can hardly tell us that he was unaware of the
most goulish aspects of this murderous business. On 26 April 1944, his
department received the following communication:
[begin block quote] "The Prosecutor-General in Cattowice [?] has drawn
attention to the fact that the corpses of NN-prisoners (Night and Fog
prisoners) who were sentenced to death by the Special Court in Oppeln [?]
and who were executed, and burned by the Gestapo. He expresses his doubts
whether, because of the large number, of cremations performed in the
district of Cattowice on account of the numerous deaths occurring in
Concentration Camp Auschwitz and on account of the numerous executions of
Polish members of bands, the separation of the ashes of the individual
dead is guaranteed." [end block quote]
4.

Count Three: Civilians – Hostages and Reprisals.
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We have seen in the previous section the criminal measures devised
by the Wehrmacht for the imprisonment, deportation or execution, without
trial or with only the form of a trial, of persons suspected of hostile
action against the German authorities. The other principal method adopted
by the German authorities. The other principal method adopted by the
German occupational authorities was equally savage and senseless; it
consisted in the indiscriminate murder of many thousand of innocent
civilians – murder committed under the pretext of calling such persons
"hostages" – in the absurd belief that the civilian population would be
"pacified: by such measures. In fat, as could have been foreseen, such
wholesale executions served rather to arouse and enrage the inhabitants,
who thus saw thousands of their friends and relatives executed, even
though they had not lifted a finger against the occupying authorities.
While terroristic measures of this kind were not confined to any
particular occupied country, they were applied with particular severity
in Western Europe and in the Balkans. Particularly in Greece and
Yugoslavia, fantastically high execution ratios – ranging up to the
execution of one hundred hostages for the killing of one German -- were
applied. During the fall of 1941, such ratios were adopted as standard
German Army policy. On 16 September 1941, an OKW order, prepared in
Warlimont’s department and initialed by him, called attention to
disturbances which had occurred in the occupied countries and stated:
[begin block quote] "a. It should be inferred in every case of resistance
to the German occupying forces, no matter what the individual
circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.
"b. In order to nip those machinations in the bud the most drastic
measures should be taken immediately and on the first indication, so that
the authority of the occupying forces may be [end block quote]
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[continue block quote] maintained and further spreading prevented. In
this connection it should be remembered that a human life in the
countries concerned frequently counts for nothing, and a deterrent effect
can be attained only by unusual severity. The death penalty for 50-100
Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable
atonement for one German soldier’s death. The way in which sentence is
carried out should still further increase the deterrent effect." [end
block quote]
While this order laid great stress on Communist responsibility for these
uprisings, it was by no means intended that the hostages executed should
in all cases be Communists. Quite the contrary. On 28 September 1941,
another OKW order – against emanating from Warlimont’s department – laid
down the following:
[begin block quote] "Because of attacks on members of the Wehrmacht which
have taken place lately in the occupied territories, it is pointed out
that it is opportune for the Military Commandors [Commanders] to have
always at their disposal a number of hostages of different political
persuasions, i.e.,
1)

Nationalists,

2)

Democratic Middle Class,

3)

Communists

"It is of importance that among these are leading personalities or
members of their families. Their names are to be published. N case of an
attack, hostages of the group corresponding to that to which the culprit
belongs are to be shot." [end block quote]
The execution of hostages in Greece and Yugoslavia is one of the
major charges against the defendants in Case No. 7, now pending before
Military Tribunal No. 5. In the present case, we will present evidence of
similar crimes in other occupied countries, including France. For
example, during July and August 1944, numerous hostages were executed in
the area of Army Group G, commanded by the defendant Blaskowitz. A month
earlier, despite the fact that units of the French resistance forces
fulfilled all the conditions for recognition as properly constituted
armed forces, and had been proclaimed part of the Allied Forces,
Blaskowitz issued to
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his subordinate units an order that "members of the French resistance
movement ar to be treated as guerillas." That, of course, meant immediate
execution upon capture.
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B. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Committed in Eastern
Europe.
In turning from the western to the eastern theatre of war, we will
find nothing to mitigate the black crimi[-]nality of the Commando Order
and the Night and Fog Decree. Quite on the contrary. In Western and
Southern Europe, the Wehrmacht was at least anxious to keep up the
appear[-]ance of compliance with the laws and customs of war. But during
the warfare in the east, the leaders of the Wehr[-]macht were totally
inhabited by considerations of law and humanity. Hitler and the generals
laid their plans for the war against Russia on the basic assumption that
every Slav is subhuman and every Jew is subhuman and criminal as well.
The Russians, therefore, were to be treated like beasts, and the Jews
were to be killed like dangerous beasts. Orders and directives in line
with these malignant views and policies were prepared by the military
leaders, and distributed throughout the Wehr[-]macht. In the formulation
and enforcement of these orders, the German warlords sank far below the
imagined qualities of the peoples they affected to dispise [despise], and
brutalized the German soldiers who trusted their leader[-]ship. Germany’s
treatment of the Jews of Europe and the Slavs of Eastern Europe is the
blackest page in the his[-]tory of European civilization.
The murderous measures laid down within the German Army in advance
of the attack on Russia were directed both at the soldiers of the Soviet
Army and at the Russian civilian population. Attached to the combat units
of the Russian Army were special officers who can best be de[-]scribed as
"political commissars"; they represented the Communist Party and were
responsible for the political
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indoctrination and morale of the Russian troops. However, they were not
just pep talk boys; they were party of the Russian Army, wore its
uniform, carried arms openly, and fought with conspicuous courage as part
of the army at the front. But by express order of the German military
leaders, laid down at the highest level, these soldiers were not to be
taken prisoner under any circumstances but, like the commando units on
the western front, were to be slaughtered to the last man.
Within the Russian territory overrun by the Wehr[-]macht, all the
saveguards required by the laws of war for the maintenance of order and
the protection of the civilian population were done away with. German
troops were en[-]courage and, indeed, ordered to practice the utmost
brutality in dealing with the Russian population. Ex[-]cept under very
limited circumstances; no German soldier was to be punished for excesses
against the civilian population. As if this were not enough, very special
measures were taken to make sure that all Jews and all political
officials of any importance would be hunted down and murdered as soon as
possible. For this purpose, special SS and Police forces were organized,
furnished and instructed by Himmler. These gangs were to move into Russia
with the German Army, and, with the full admini[-]strative support of the
army, were to carry out their murderous mission.
The horrible purposes which we have just described were discussed
between Hitler and the leading generals more than three months before the
attack in the east was launched. On 17 March 1941, at a conference in
which Hit[-]ler and the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Halder,
participated, Hitler stated:
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"...The intelligentsia working for Stalin must be exterminated.
The hierarchy of the Russian Empire must be crushed. Maximum brutality
must be applied through[-]out the Russian area. The ideological ties of
the Rus[-]sian people are not strong enough. They will break with the
elimination of the functionaries."
Two weeks later, these same views were outlined in greater detail
in a long address by Hitler to a large number of generals on 30 March
1941 in Berlin. After announcing that, after the victory over the Russian
Army, Northern Russia would be annexed to Finland, and that the Baltic
territories, White Russia and the Ukraine would be brought under German
domination as "protectorates", Hitler went on:
"Extermination of the Bolshevist commissars and the Communist
intellectuals. The new states must be Socialist but have no
intelligentsias of their own. The growth of a new intelligentsia must be
prevented. All that is needed here is a primitive Socialist
intelligentsia. The fight must be directed against the poison of
disintegration. That is not a problem for military courts. The officers
with the troops must know what is at stake, and must be leaders in this
fight. Our troops must defend themselves with the weapons with which they
are attacked. Commissars and GPU people are criminals and must be treated
as such. That doesn’t mean that troops must get out of hand. Offi[-]cers
must give the orders in accordance with the spirit of the troops.
"This war will differ greatly from the war in the West. In the East
harshness today means mildness in the future. The officers must accept
the sacrifice of over[-]coming their personal reservations."
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Such is the general background of the several crimi[-]nal orders
the formulation and execution of which we will now describe. As the above
account clearly shows, these orders were in no [‘n’ typed over an ‘s’]
sense issued by way of reprisal for or in retaliation against any actions
of the Soviet [‘o’ typed over something] Army; on the contrary, they were
coldly and deliberately cormu[-]lated months in advance of the actual
invasion.
For these manifold crimes in Western and Eastern Europe, all the
defendants bear responsibility except Sperrle and Blaskowitz, who were
never involved in the Rus[-]sian campaign. The defendant Schniewind was
relieved as Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff (6 June 1941) just
before the attack was launched, but prior to his transfer participated
actively in the planning of the campaign against the Soviet Union, was
present at conferences at which these criminal policies were discussed,
and received and distributed to naval units certain of the criminal
orders mentioned above. The defendants Warlimont, Lehmann and Reinecke,
as leading officers of the OKW, were heavily involved in the formulation
and distribution of these orders.
The remaining eight defendants were all high ranking field
commanders during the Russian campaign; they received these orders from
the OKW and the OKH and passed them down to their subordinate units, and
the orders were executed by troops under his command. The defendant Leeb
was the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North until January 1942, when
he retired from active service at the age of sixty-five. The defendant
Kuechler, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Army at the outset of the
campaign, succeeded Leeb as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group. The
defen[-]dant Hoth, who led a panzer group into Russia, was
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promoted to the command of the Seventeenth army in the Rund[-]stedt’s
Army Group South in October, 1941 and in May 1942 was transferred to the
command of the Fourth Panzer Army. The defendant Reinhardt, at first a
corps commander, secceeded [seceded] to the command of Hoth’s Armored
Group, which was later designated as the Thirds Panzer Army. Reinhardt
was made a full general in 1942, and became the Commander-in-Chief of
Army Group Center in August 1944. The defen[-]dant Salmuth was also
promoted from corps to army command, and became a full general in 1943.
From June 1942 to August 1943 he commanded sucessively [successively] the
Seventeenth, the Fourth and the Second Armies on the eastern front; from
August 1943 to August 1944 he commanded the Fifteenth Army in France. The
defendant von Roques remained an Army Group Rear Area Commander until
December 1942 when he went back into retirement. The defendant Weohler
served as Chief of Staff of the Eleventh Army—first under von Schobert
and later under von Manstein—until February 1943. After a brief period of
service as Chief of Staff of Army Group Center and as a corps com[]mander, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and made
Commander-in-Chief of the Eight Army in Southern Russia in August 1943,
and in December 1944 became the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South.
If it please the Court, Mr. Niederman will now continue with the
reading.
BY MR. NIEDERMAN: Your Honors—
Count Two: Belligerents and Prisoners of War—
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the "Commissar" Order.
On 8 June 1941, two weeks before Russia was attacked, Field Marshal
von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, issued an order
entitled "Directives for the Treatment of Policical [first ‘c’ typed over
a ‘t’] Commissars" to the commanders of the Army groups and Armies then
deployed along the Rus[-]sian border awaiting the word to attack. This
order read in part as follows:
"When fighting Bolshevism one can not count on the enemy acting in
accordance with the principles of humanity or International Law. In
particular it must be expected that the treatment of our prisoners by
the political commissars of all types who are the true pillars of re[]sistance, will be cruel, inhuman and dictated by hate.
[Begin indented block quote] "The troops must realize
[indented] "That in this fight it is wrong to treat such elements
with clemency and consideration in accor[-]dance with International Law.
They are a menace to our own safety and to the rapid pacification of the
conquered territories.
"2) That the originators of the Asiatic barbaric methods of fighting are
the political commissars. They must be dealt with promptly and with the
ut[-]most severity. [end block quote]
"Therefore, if taken while fighting of offering re[-]sistance, they
must, on principle, be shot immediately.
"For the rest, the following instructions will apply:
[Begin block quote] "I. Theatre of Operations. [‘TheatreOperations’ has a dashed underline]
"Political commissars in their capacity of officials attached to
the enemy troops are recog[-]nizable by their special insignia- red star
with
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[begin block quote] "an inwovan golden hammer and sickle on the
sleeves... They are to be segregated at once, i.e. while still on the
battlefield, from the prisoners of war. This is necessary in order to
deprive them of any possibility of influencing the captured soldiers.
These commissars will not be recognized as soldiers [dashed underline];
the protection granted to prisoners of war in accordance with
International Law will not apply to them. After having been segregated
they are to be dealt with." [end block quote]
If there were not other proof to be offired in this proceeding
except that concerning the issuance and execution of this one order, it
would still more than justify the presence in this dock of every
defendant except Sperrle, Blaskowitz, and Schniewind. The Commissar Order
was formulated by the defendants Lehmann and Warli[-]mont, issued by
Warlimont to nineteen different offices of the Wehrmacht including the
OKH, distributed by the OKH to the defendants Leeb, Kuechler, Hoth, and
Woehler, passed on to Reinhardt, Salmuth, Hollidt and Reques, and
executed by units subordinated to them. Reinecke saw to its enforcement
in the prisoner of war camps under his jurisdiction.
The Commissar Order was not the exclusive achieve[-]ment of
any one man. On 6 May 1941, the OKH forwarded to Warlimont a proposed
draft of an order for the treatment of commissars: Warlimont submitted
this draft to the defendant Lehmann in the Legal Department of the OKH.
Lehmann approved the draft with minor changes and returned it to
Warlimont the next day. On 12 May, Warli[-]mont submitted the draft as
approved by the Legal Depart[-]ment to Jodl together with a memorandum in
which he
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Stated:
[begin block quote] "...Military functionaries (commissars) are to be
dealt with according to proposal OKH. They are not recognized

5 February 48-A-BM-18-1-Bratzel (Schaeffer)
Court T-A – Case 12
as prisoners of war and are to be liquidated at the latest in the
transient FW camps and under to no circumstances to be removed to the
rear area. [end block quote]
On 8 June, Warlimont issued the order to the Supreme Commands of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force with instructions that it was to be
distributed in writing to Army and Air Fleet Commanders and orally to
lower commands. Two days later, Brauchitech passed down the order with
the amendment that "Political commissars attached to the troops should be
segregated and dealt with by order of an officer, inconspicuously and
outside the battle zone proper". From army group to army, army to corps,
corps to division, division to regiment – down this order for murder went
until it was well known over the entire Eastern Front.
During the proceedings before the International Military Tribunal,
the veritable parade of German field marshals and generals took the
witness stand and testified under oath that the German army commanders in
Russia refused to pass down the Commissar Order to their troops – or
passed it down with oral instructions to disregard it – and that the
order was never carried out. At the time this testimony was given, most
of the documents relevant to this question were not available to the
prosecution. The evidence to be offered in this proceeding will, we
believe, expose the true nature of the testimony given by the German
generals before the IMT. The Commissar Order was issued to be obeyed, not
to be ignored, and we shall present conclusive evidence that it was
generally distributed and extensively carried out on the Eastern Front.
The minutes of a conference held on 17 June 1941 among generals of
the LVII Corps of Panzer Group 3, then under the command of Hoth, contain
the following notations: "The Fuehrer has ordered that Russian political
Commissars are to be ‘liquidated’. This order is to be disseminated
orally only." The minutes of a meeting of the commanding officers within
the 454th Security Division, subordinated to the defendant Roques,
indicate that by 20 June the order had reached regimental level. At this
meeting, the commanding general lectured his subordinate
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officers on the essential points of the Commissar Order directing them to
report, through channels, on action taken against political commissars.
On the morning of 22 June 1941, the invasion of Soviet Russia
start[-]ed. By the evening of the same day, the XXVIII Corps of the
Sixteenth Army in Army Group North, under the defendant von Leeb, was
already in possession of a report listing executions carried out under
the Commissar Order. One of the divisions in Hoth’s Panzer Group 3
reported to higher headquarters the same evening that one commissar and
one civilian had been killed. In the following weeks and months, the
enforcement of the Commissar Order became routine work in the operations
of the advancing German armies, and references to killings of commissars
constantly occur in the reports from subordinate to higher headquarters.
They make monotonous reading the differ more in the numbers of executed
commissars than in their wording. A report of one of the divisions in
Kuechler’s Eighteenth Army stated on 26 October 1941: "Northing
particular to report. 16 Commissars shot. 61st Infantry Division – 10."
The Commissar Order itself explicitly required the submission of reports
on its execution through regular army channels; whatever those defendants
may conjure up in their defense they can never honestly say that they did
not know that this criminal order was being executed by units
subordinated to them.
As we have just seen, the murder of commissars who were uniformed
members of the Red Army was the task of the German combat troops. The
fate in sore for commissars was soon noised abroad in the Red Army, and
naturally some of the prospective victims went to some pains to conceal
their identity from the Germans in the event of capture. General Haldar
noted in his useful diary on 1 August 1941, with respect to the
"treatment of captured commissars", that they were "for the most part
identified only in prisoner-of-war camps". This possibility the Neh[]rmacht had anticipated. The defendant Reinecke, as Chief of the OKW
department with jurisdiction over prisoner-of-war matters, entered into
an agreement with the notorious Reinhardt Haydrich, Chief of the Security
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Police and Himmler’s right hand man. This agreement covered not only the
apprehension of commissars, but also the weeding cut from Russian
prisoners of certain types of categories regarded as "subversive", which
was to be accomplished by the special SS gangs called "Sinnatz[]gruppen". The first two paragraphs of the Reincke-Haydrich agreement
read:
[begin block quote] The Wahrmacht must immediately free itself of all
those elements among the prisoners of war who must be regarded as
Bolshevist influence. The special situation of the campaign in the East
therefore demands special measures, which have to be carried out in a
spirit free from bureaucratic and administrative influences, and with an
eagerness to assume responsibility.
While the regulations and orders of the prisoner of war system were
hitherto based exclusively on consider[-]ations of a military [underline]
nature, now the political goal must be attained, namely to protect the
German people from Bolshevist agitators and to gain a firm grip on the
occupied territory at the earliest possible moment. [end block quote]
The
elements"
commandos
prisoners

agreement further provided that "suspects" and "intolerable
among the prisoners should be segregated by the Hinentzand surrendered to them by the camp officials. The fate of
selected is made all to clear by Haydrich’s instructions that:

[blocked] Executions must not be carried out in or near the camp.
If the camps are in the government General close to the frontier,
prisoners are to be moved to former Soviet territory, if possible, for
special treatment. [end block]
In execution of this agreement, on 8 September 1941 the defendant
Reinecke issued an order stating that:
[blocke quote] ....Selection according to the political attitude of
the prisoners of war will be carried out by the Ein[-]
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[continue block quote] satzkommandos, which are especially assigned to
this task. Close collaboration with the Hinsatzkommandos is the duty of
case commanders. [end block]
This injunction to murder helpless human beings was distributed to
over two hundred separate agencies including the prisoner of war camps in
Germany and Poland, and to the Armed Forces Commanders in Riga, the
Ukraine, and Norway. Pursuant to these orders, many thousands of Russian
prisoners were shot dead by the Wehrmacht and the Einsatzkommandos.
Other portions of Reinecke’s order of 8 September 1941 stated:
[block quote] The Bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim
to treatment as an honorable opponent, in accordance with the Geneva
Convention *** Anyone carrying out the order who does not use his
weapons, or does so the insufficient energy, is punishable *** No warning
shot must ever be fired *** The use of aros against prisoners of war is
as a rule legal. [end block]
This order, like the "Commando" Order, was reviewed by Admiral Canaris.
In this case, too, Ganaris’ opinion that the order was a flagrant viola[]tion of international law was clearly given:
[block quote] The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners
of war is not binding in the relationship between Germany and the
U.S.S.R. Therefore only the principles of general international law on
the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th century these
have gradually been established along the lines that war captivity is
neither revenge nor punishment. but solely protective custody,
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[ continue block quote] revenge nor punishment, but solely protective
custody, [revenge through custody is repeated] the only purpose of which
is to prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the war.
This principle was developed in accordance with the view held by all
armies that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or injure
helpless people *** The decrees for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of
war enclosed are based on a fundamentally different viewpoint. [end
block]
The order just quoted played on important part in the IHT’s conviction of
General Keitel, who noted on Canaris’ memorandum of protest, "These
objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous warfare. This is
the destruction of an idealogy. Therefore I approve and back the
measure."
Such orders as these inevitably resulted in cruelty and inhumanity
on a wide scale. As the IMT stated in its Judgment: "The treatment of
Soviet prisoners of war as characterized by particular inhumanity.... It
was the result of systematic plans to murder." These "systematic plans"
were embodied in orders from the OKW, prepared by Warlimont and Lehmann;
orders for the transfer of prisoners to concentration canmps, signed by
Reinecke; OKH orders, distributed to field commanders, for the shooting
of Russian soldiers in uniform on the pretext that they were "guerillas";
orders for the killing of escaped prisoners upon recapture, a flagrant
violation of the usages of war; and other similar directives. The crimes
which such orders resulted in are reflected in numerous reports from
combat units under the command of these defendants. Thus:
[blocked] On 16 September 1941 a report by one of the divisions
under the defendant Rogues stated: "Numerous escaped of Rissian prisoners
of war from rail transports have been reported. Guard Battalion 708
captured 18 and shot them." On 13 April 1942 a report from the Rear Area
of Arm Group North, then commanded by Kuechler stated: "Five escaped
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Prisoners of war shot to death."
A Security Division in the Rear Area of the defendant Roeb’s Army Group
reported on 10 October 1941: "In the course of a patrol eleven Red Army
soldiers arrested. Seven of them were shot after detailed interrogation,
four were handed over to the prisoner camps."
A report of 8 October 1943 to the Eight Army, commended by the
defendant Woehler, shows that the principles of the "commando order" were
also applied in the East: "Severn parachutists were captured. Of these,
six destroyed. All members of the Third Airborne Brigada." [end blocvk]
These reports, selected almost at random, show the frighteningly
routine character of these brutalities. What they do not show on their
face is their utter brutalities. What they do not show on their face is
their utter stupidity. It was a cardinal objective of the German
occupation of the Ukraine to "pacify" and "exploit" the land in the
interested of German economy; such open mistreatment and slaughter of
Russian soldiers was bound to frustrate the Germans’ own objectives. A
young German lieutenant on the intelligence staff of Rundstadt’s Army
Group South reported on 8 October 1941 that German occupation policy in
the Ukraine was being seriously obstructed because:
[blocked] prisoners were shot when they could not march any more,
right in the middle of villages and some of the bigger hamlers, and the
corpses were left lying about, and the population saw in these facts that
which they did not understand and which confirmed the worst distortions
of enemy propaganda. [end block]
The fate of enemy soldiers who survived their capture and were
taken to prisoner of war camps under the control of the OKW and the Army
Group and Armies commanded by these defendants were given more appalling.
The defendants will undoubtedly stress the circumstances which prevail[]ed during the campaign in Soviet Russia, and admittedly it is difficult
to handle large masses of prisoners under primitive conditions of
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transportation. But the situation was of the defendants’ making, not the
prisoners’, and even making every allowance, the story is a horrible one.
The reports of disease and death among the Russian prisoners reach such
astronomical figures that it is divvicult [sic] to bear in mind that
human lives are being tabulated. A series of entries in the war diary of
Kuechler’s Eighteenth Army, at that time subordinated to Leeb’s Army
Group North, reveals that on 4 November 1941 about ten prisoners were
dying every night from exhaustion; five days later "the prisoners’
rations are so insufficient that one hundred men will dia daily." On 28
November it was estimated that "all the inmates of Camp East will have
died within six months at the latest", and that "in the camp at Pleskau
out of twenty thousand about one thousand parish weekly from exhaustion."
A report of 21 December 1941 from a prisoner of war district in
Roques’ command, utilizing the percentage of mortality among the
prisoners up to that data, estimated that if those mortality rates
persisted, within a year the percentage of deaths at four camps would be
28%, 87%, 82% and 80% respectively. With prisoner of war camps thus
transmuted into charnel houses it is not surprising that as of 1 May 1944
the Prisoner of War organization of OKW reported that, out of a total of
5,163,381 prisoners taken since the beginning of the war, 845,128 had
died in installations under the control of OKH and 1,136,236 in those
under the OKH. This total of nearly two million did not include prisoners
handed over by the Wehrmacht to the Einsatzgruppen and other
extermination units.
THK PRESIDENT: At this point, as counsel will know, the Tribunal
will take its customary mid-afternoon recess.
(A recess was taken.)
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THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
MR. NIEDERMAN: Your Honors, it is ironical that one of the most
dmning [sic] indictments of German’s treatment of Soviet prisoners was
written by Alfred Rosenberg, a defendant before the IMT and himself
certainly no angel, who on 28 February 1942 in a letter to Koitel,
stated:
The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is .... a
tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3.6 millions of prisoners of war, only
several hundred thousand are still able to work fully. A large part of
them have starved, or died, because of the hazards of the weather.
Thousands also died from typhus. It is understood, of course, that there
are difficulties encountered in the feeding of such a large number of
prisoners of war. Anyhow, with a certain amount of understanding for
goals aimed at by German politics, dying and deterioration could have
been avoided to the extent described. For instance, according to
information on hand, the native population within the Soviet Union are
absolutely willing to put food at the dispo[-]sal of the prisoners of
war. Several understanding camp commanders have successfully chosen this
course. However, in the majority of cases, the camp commanders have
forbidded the civilian population to put food at the disposal of the
prisoners, and they have rather let them starve to death. Even on the
march to the camps, the civi[-]lian population was not allowed to give
the prisoners of war food. In many cases, when prisoners of war could no
longer keep up on the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were
shot before the eyes of the horrified civilian population, and the
corpses were left. In numerous camps, no shelter for prisoners of war was
provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or snow.....
Utterances such as these have been heard: "The more of those prisoners
die, the better it is for us"......
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The prosecution is unable to improve on Rosenberg’s description. If
the Court please, Mr. McHaney will continue reading.
MR. MC HANEY:
Court Three: Civilians – Murder and Ill-treatment Generally
As we mentioned earlier, the Germans had very far-reaching economic
and political designs with respect to the Russian terri[-]tories overrun
by the Wehrmacht. In order to exploit these areas for the benefit of
Germany, it was planned to "pacify" and crush all opposition, to
obliterate the Soviet political system and set up new regional political
administration, and to convert the productive resources of the land to
the uses of the Third Reich. The economic features of this program were
primarily entrusted to civilians agencies, but the Wehrmacht too played
its part. The Germans were most concerned with natural resources and
factories, but they did not overlook making arrangements, under
Rosenberg, for the systematic plunder of valuables and cultural objects.
The Army was directed to assist Rosenberg’s plunder gangs, and the
evidence will show that Reinecke, Woehler, Roques and other defendants
were helpful to the Rosenberg units. We will postpone further discussion
of the evidence estab[-]lishing the Wehrmacht’s participation in plunder,
destruction and devastation in violation of the laws of war until its
actual presen[-]tation in this proceeding.
For, revolting and criminal as were those plundering activities,
and terrible as was their affect on the standard of living – and indeed
on life itself – within the occupied territories, they were as noting
occurred to the outright slaughter of the inhabitants which began as soon
as the German troops set food on Russian soil. The Tribunal should not
assume that the cause of this slaughter was any innate and peculiar
brutality of the German soldiers. True it is that among the troops were
many who had been filled with poisonous Nazi racial ideology and myths,
and who therefore entered
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gladly into the diabolical spirit of the occasion. But the primary
responsibility for these millions of murders rests on the man in this
deck, and on others who, unless dead, might fittingly be sitting there
too. What happened in Russian was deliberately contrived among the
leaders of the Wehrmacht, and was embodied in orders, which were
circulated throughout the Germany Army and which brought about the
carnage that ensued.
Within the limits of available time, we can only sketch the
outlines of this criminal structure. The basic order was issued by the
OKW some five weeks before the invasion, on 15 May 1941, to the
Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force. This order, in
unmistakable terms, legalized the murder of Russian civilians by German
troops. It accomplished this in two ways. Firstly, for the punishment of
Russian civilians suspected of unfriendly acts, the order substituted
summary execution by the troops for action by military courts. After a
sweeping mandate directing the troops to "take ruthless action against
any threat from the enemy population", the order stated:
Until further notice the military courts and the courts martial
will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.......
Likewise all other attacks by enemy civilians on the Armed Forces,
its members and employees, are to be suppressed at once by military,
using the most extreme methods, until the assailants are destroyed.
Where such measures have been neglected or were not at first
possible, persons suspected of criminal action will be brought at once
before an officers. This officer will decide whether they are to be shot.
On the orders of an officefr with the powers of at least a
Battalion Commander, collective despotic measures will be taken without
delay against localities from which cunning or malicious attaks [sic] are
made on the Armed Roces, if circumstances do not permit
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quick identification of individual offenders,.
The second part of the order was even more vicious; it guaranteed
German soldiers against any fear of punishment for crimes committed
against the civilian population, unless such crimes were likely to
undermine the discipline of the Army. This was accomplished as follows:
With regard to offenses committeed against enemy civilians by
members of the Wehrmacht and its employees, prosecution it is not
obligatory even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or
offense.
When judging such offenses, it must be borne in mind, what[-]ever
the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent
sufferings of the German people, and the fight against National
Socialists which cost the blood of innumerable supporters of the
covenant, were caused primarily by Bolshevik influence and that no German
has forgotten this fact.
Therefore the judicial authority will decide in such cases whether
a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal measures are
necessary. In the case of offenses against inhabitants it will order a
court martial only if maintenance of discipline or security of the Forces
call for such a measure.....
Warlimont and Lehmann were in a unique position to know the purpose
of this order – the so-called "Barbarossa jurisdiction order" – inasmuch
as they formulated it. Drafts of the order were prepared vy [sic] them,
and the OKH, as early as April 1941. These drafts were discussed (as his
diary shows ) with the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Halder,
on 6 May; it appears that Halder wished to preserve the jurisdiction of
the military courts over minor offenses [no period] On this suggestion,
the defendant Lehmann commented:
I have objections to those ....now that we have decided to take
this step it has to be done completely, otherwise there is the danger
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That the troops will push off matters uncomfortable to them to the courts
and in that way (and those will be the doubtful cases) the contrary of
that which we want to achieve will occur.
It would have been indeed difficult to have made murder and crime
easier or more praiseworthy to the German soldier. This order, so
terrible in its intent and in its consequences, was distributed by the
defendants Leeb; Kuechler, Hoth, Reinhardt, Salmuth, Hollidt, Schniewind,
Roques and Woehler to unite under their command. The results were, of
course, precisely what was ordered. The diary of the Rear Area of the
Second Army under Salmuth reported:
16 October 1942: A large number of suspects were shot in the
neighboring villages.
4 to 18 October 1942: Several hundred suspects were seized and
liquidated in the localities.
19 October 1942: A great number of suspects were shot in the
mopping up ***
Another report on 19 February 1943 to Reinhardt’s 3rd Penzer Army
described the following action:
In order to keep bands from resettling in this territory***the
population of villages and farms in this area were killed with[-]out
exception to the last baby. All homes were burned down. Cattle and
victuals were confiscated and taken from this area.
Naturally enough, such bestial behavior enraged the Russian
civilian population. No doubt they would have fiercely opposed the German
invaders in any event; but the conduct of the German troops [extra space]
under these orders won thousands of recruits to the Russian par[-]tisan
bands which began to form behind the German lines. The German Army’s
attitude toward those partisans was based on Hitler’s statement of 16
July 1941:
The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind the front.
This partisan warfare has some advantages for us; it enables us to
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Eradicate everyone who opposes us.
It would be futile here even to attempt to enumerate the criminal
orders and atrocities perpetrated in the course of anti-parti[-]san
warfare. The defendants will plead that the partisans, too, committed
atrocities, and will attempt to justify their actions on the basis of
military necessity. They will, no doubt, make involved legal arguments
that the particsan [sic] were not entitled to the rights of belligerants
under the laws of war, despite the fact that a directive issued on 11
November 1942 ny [sic] Warlimont’s office stated:
The partisans are military resources of the opponent organized
before the war and expanded during the war. Nevertheless we do not
recognize them.... They are led by officers and commissars who have been
left military Supreme Command according to uniform plan.
But the true answer to these arguments is much simpler, German
troops, wherever they appeared, by murder and ill treatment of the
civilian population, by conscription to forced labor, by plunder of
property and food, by extermination of Jews, government functionaries,
and the intelligentisia, forced the in habitants of the occupied
countries to defend themselves, For the defendants to say that they were
privileged to slaughter the population in retaliation for measures of
self-protection provoked by their own acts is preposterous. Precisely
analogous is the plea of the burglar that he had to kill the house owner
in self-defense. One will not be heard to defend on the ground that his
circumstances required him to commit a crime when such circumstances were
of his own making. That the resistance of the civilian population was the
inevitable result of the Wehrmacht’s own crimes is put beyond all doubt
that the following report, dated 31 July 1942, on the development of the
partisan movement, directed to the commanders of all army groups and
armies in the East:
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The requisitioning of horses and vehicles by the German Wehrmacht and the
lack of agricultural machines had a very bad effect on the cul[-]tivation
of the land.... The resentment resulting from this, which is forstered by
the Bolshevik agitators, has repeatedly formed de[-]pression in the
utterance: "Stalin at least left us one cow in the shed, but the Germans
even take that"....
....when recruiting for labor allocation in Germany first started,
the most incredible rumors, as already mentioned, were spread about the
fate of the conscripted persons. When it was even said that the former
Red Army soldiers would bne put into prisoner of war camps, masses of
them left their places of work and went into the woods, where they joined
partisan bands. The great number of prisoners of war who died on the
march to the prisoner of war coups, the conditions and the high death
rate in the camps themselves, and not remained a secret, and the former
Red Army soldiers lived in constant fear, therefore, that one day they
would have to suffer the same fate.
The prosecution wishes to stress once more that the German troops were
deliverately incited to commit those atrocities by the defendants and the
other army leaders. There is today hardly a single German general, who,
if willing to talk frankly, will not admit that those orders, quite apart
from being criminal, were a military blunder of the first magnitude. But
blunder or no blunder, there is no difficulty in finding the primary
responsibility for these incredible out[-]rages. That responsibility lies
on the German military leaders who issued orders of which the following
promulgated by the defendant Hoth on 17 November 1941, is a good example:
.....stronger than ever we carry in us our faith in a turning point
of history when the German people have been given the leadership in
Europe on the strength of their superior race and their achievements
lllCompassion [?] and softness towards the population would be completely
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Out of place.... Especially the solders must understand the necessity of
harsh measures against elements alien to our people.
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and our kind.. a sound feeling of hatred is not to be suppressed but must
be strengthened.
It is only too well known that anti-semitism was a cardinal point
of Nazi idealogy Through the early years of the Third Reich, the News of
Germany were subjected to ever more sever restrictions, persecutions and
barbarities, and by 1939 life in Germany was all but intolerable for
them. The war presented Himmler and Heydrich with that, to the, was a
golden opportunity to carry these doctrines to their logical and terrible
conclusion the extermination of all Jews in Germany and the countries
overrun by the Wehrmacht. Deliberate extermination of Polish Jews began
soon after the conquest of that unhappy country. But practical problems
soon cropped up. No one, at least for centuries, had ever tried to
eradicate an entire national or racial group, and it soon became apparent
that such a project was an ambitious undertaking, which required time and
money and manpower and planning. With the invasion of the Soviet Union,
the project was for the first time put on a truly systematic footing.
The triggermen in this gigantic program of slaughter were, for the
most part, the members of the so-called "Einsatzgruppen" of the SS. The
Einsatzgruppen were special purpose units composed of personnel down from
the Security Police, Sicherheitsdienst (SD), Gestapo and other elements
of the SS. Subordinate formations of the Einsatzgruppen were called
Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos. They were formed shortly before the
invasion of Russian to accompany the troops for the express purpose of
exterminating; elements of the population considered "inferior" and "po[]litically or racially undesirable". The chief victims of thos genocidal
program were the Jews, and it can be conservatively estimated that nearly
one million Russian Jews were slaughtered by the Einsatzgruppen. For in[]stance. A report from the higher SS and Police Leader for South Russia
states that in 1942, in the three-month period between September and
December, 363,211 Jews were killed in that area alone. Other "racially
undesirable" and "inferior" peoples include the Gypsies. The
Einsatzgruppen were also entrusted with the mission of dismantling the
existing regional and local
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governmental agencies, in order to make way for the new governmental
administration to be established by the Germans. This "dismantling" was
to be accomplished by killing all "political undesirables" including
Communist Party functionaries and other officials of the local
administration who might conceivably be hostile to the German invaders.
In another courtroom of this building, a trial of these leaders of
the SS murder squads is now drawing to a close, but in this dock sit ten
men who made their work possible – Leeb, Kurchler, Hoth, Reinhardt,
Salmuth, Hollidt, Roques, Reinecke, Warlimont and Woehler. The carnage
spread by the Einsatzgruppen could never have occurred without the
permission and full support of the Wehrmacht. As the IMT found:
Nor did these special units (Einsatzgruppen) operate completely
independently of the German Armed Forces. There is clear evidence of the
Einsatzgruppen obtained the cooperation of the Army Commanders.
It is quite clear to any person with the slightest knowledge of
military matters that the Einsatzgruppen could never have even entered
Russian territory without the permission of the Wehrmacht, and could not
have survived there more than a few hours without its support. They were,
in fact, administratively attached to the Wehrmacht; each of the four
Einsatzgruppen was attached respectively to the three army groups and to
the Eleven Army (which entered Russian from Roumania), and the
subordinate formations of the Einsatzgruppen (called Eintsatzkommandos
and Sonderkommandos) were attached to the subordinate military forma[]tions— the armies and corps. To suggest that the Einsatzgruppen and
their subordinate units could have moved around throughout the opera[]tional area of the army and could have killed over a million human
beings, without the full knowledge of the army commanders, is not only
false but grotesquely false. Yet this was, again, the burden of much
testimony be[-]fore the IMT by numerous German field marshals and
generals. We have come to learn that documentary proof is somewhat more
reliable, and such proof is at hand.
On 23 April, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, Field
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Marshal von Brauchitsch, distributed to all army groups and army
commanders, by whom in turn it was passed down to divisional level, a
directive concern[-]ing the employment of Einsatzgruppen in occupied
Russia. It read in part as follows:
The Commander-in-Chief can prevent the utilization of the special
detachments in those parts of the Army territory where such itikization
[?] would interfere with operations....
The Sonderkommandos of the Security Police (SD) carry out their
missions upon their own authority. They are subordinate to the Armies
with reference to order of march, rations, and quarters. Disciplinary and
legal subordination under the Chief of the Security Police and SD is not
influenced by this. They received their technical instructions from the
Chief of the Security Police and SD, but if occasion should arise, are
subordinated to restrictive order of the Armies with reference to their
activity.
A representative of the Chief of Security Police and of the SD will
be employed in the area of each Army for the central direction of this
detachment. He is required to bring to the attention of the Commander-inChief of the Army, promptly, the instructions sent to him by the Chief of
the Security Police and the SD. The Military Commander is empowered to
issue the representatives instructions that are necessary to avoid an
interruption in operations; they take precedence over all other
instructions.
In the realm of their mission and upon their responsibility the
Sonderkommandos are empowered to take executive measures, concerning the
civilian population. They are required hereby to cooperation with
Intelligence most closely. Measures which could have an effect on Army
operations re[-]quire the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Thus, the Eintsatzgruppen could enter the operational area only by
virtue of agreement with the Army, were to receive their supplies and
transport from the Army commanders and had to report to them before and
after each action, and all of their activities were subject to
restrictive orders by the Army commanders.
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We have previously described the close cooperation between the
Einsatzgruppen and the Army in the murder of political commissars and the
screening and execution of "undesirable" prisoners in the case under the
jurisdiction of Reinecke. The cooperation in the wholesale slaughter of
the Jews was no less close. Here, for example, is a portion of the order
which the defendant Roques, as Rundstedt’s Rear Army Commander, issued on
20 March 1942, with respect to the support which his subordinate units
were to furnish the SD units.
A detachment of the SD...is deployed in the territory of the Rear
Area Army Group South. The detachment has the duty to executive tasks of
a security political nature by direct order of the Reichsfuehrer SS and
on its own responsibility. All authorities are ordered to assist the
detachment in the execution of its duties. (Transportation, billeting,
supply)... Active participation of members of the Armed Forces in execu[]tions is not permitted... Authority to protest against measures of the
SD detachment by subordinate military authorities does not exist.
But the participation of Army in the horrible work of the
Einsatzgruppen went beyond administrative support. Although some
commanders, aware of the bestial character of the work which they were
performing through the Einsatzgruppen, refuse to allow Army troops to
participate in the executions, but this was not the invariable rule;
thus, Einsatzgruppe [Einsatzgruppen ?] A operation under Leeb’s Army
Group North acted in one of its reports; "From estimated figures, about
19,000 partisans and criminals, that is in the majority Jews, were shot
by the Wehrmacht up to December 1941." But even where the Wehrmacht
itself did not participate in the executions, the troops assisted by
arresting the unfortunate Jews, and turning them over to the
Einsatzgruppen to do the dirty work of mass killing. For ex[-]ample, a
teletype of 16 October 1941, the Rear Area of the Eleventh Army, of which
Woehler was Chief of Staff, reported that seventy-five, Jews had been
turned over to the SD.
The report of the Einsatzgruppen make terrible reading. The report
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of Einsatzgruppe A attached to Leeb's army groups, for the first four
months of the war, after reciting that "it must be stressed from the
beginning that cooperation with the Armed Forces was generally good",
proceeds to recite the difficulties which the group encountered in
inducing "native anti-semetic forces....to start pogroms against the
Jews". According to the report, it was recognized that"
....it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an
immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinary
harsh measures were apt to sir even German circles. It had to be shown
to the world that the native population itself took the first action by
way of natural reaction against the suppression of the Jews during
several decades...To our surprise it was not east, at first, to set in
motion an extensive pogrom against the Jews.
Finally, however, the Einsatzgruppen succeeded in persuading a Luthuanian
partisan unit to start a pogram in Kevno (the capital of Lithuania) "in
such a way that no German order or German instigation was noted from the
outside." The report continues:
During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June, the Lithuanian
partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, setting fire to several
synagogues or destroying them by other means and burning down a Jewish
dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following
nights 2,300 Jews were eliminated in a similar way. In other parts of
Lithuania similar actions followed the example of Kovno, though smaller
and extending to the Communists who had been left behind.
These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army authorities,
who had been informed, showed understanding for this procedure.
Such bestalities were not confined to the area under Leeb's command; they
were general over the entire front. Thus an activity report of 31 August
1941, from a subordinate unit of the Third Panzer Army under Reinhardt,
continued the following:
Operation against Jews (east of Panomuno) up to now...resulted
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in the capture of 21 Jews, partly armed, 26 women and 5 Jewish
children...
.....after brief skirmish 19 Jews and one Russian
captured. Simultaneously 24 women and 7 children of Jewish origin
arrested.....
The Jews were turned over to the SD in Jurbarakas.
The ancient Russian city of Kiev had not soon such carnage since its
destruction by the Mongols centuries before. A subordinate unit of
Einsatzgruppe C which was attached to von Rundstedt's Army Group,
reported on 28 September 1941 that it had entered Kiev and that the city
was mined. The report continued:
As has been proved, Jews played a prominent part. Allegedly 150,000 Jews
living here...Execution of at least 50,000 Jews planned. Wehrmacht
welcomes measures and demands drastic procedure.
The story is continued by a report dated 12 October 1942, by the 454th
Security Division, which was subordinated to the defendant Roques as
Rundstedt's Rear Area Commander.
The total population (of Kiev) is estimated at about half the normal
number, i.e., about 400,000.
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The Jews of the city were ordered to present themselves at a certain
place and time for the purpose of numerical registration and housing in a
camp. About 34,000 reported, including women and children. After they
had been made to give up their clothing and valuables, all were killed;
this took several days.
These documents do not make pretty reading, but we are constrained to
quote one more example. Einsatzgruppe D, under the notorious Ohlendorf,
was attached to the Eleventh Army, of which the defendant Woehle was
Chief of Staff. Beginning in September 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Eleventh Army was General (later Field Marshal) von Manstein, who
assured the IMT from the witness-box that he had no knowledge of the
murder of 90,000 Russian Jews by Einsatzgruppe D, to which Ohlendorf had
confessed. We have seen that the Einsatzgruppen were under strict orders
from the Army to keep the Intelligence Division of the Army staff
informed as to their doings; how meticulously they complied with this
directive is shown by the following report, dated 16 April 1942, to the
intelligence officer serving under Woehler on the Staff of the Eleventh
Army:
For your information we beg to report the following about the activities
of Einsatzgruppe D in the Crimea and in the area of Taganrog-Fedorwke,
and about the intended further employment.
I.

Activities since February 1942.

The results of the cleaning of the Crimea during the time covered by this
report in detail as follows:
1) The Crimea is freed of Jews. Only occasionally some small groups are
turning up, especially in the northern areas. In cases where single Jews
could camouflage themselves by means of forged papers, etc. they will,
nevertheless, be recognized sooner or later, as experience has
taught. The population which in the majority has welcomed the measures
taken against the Jews, in assisting in this task by making
denunciations. This is only natural considering the fact that the Crimea
has been a special domain of Jewdom. About the development and the
influence of Jewdom
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on the Crimea a detailed report is attached.
We submit to the Tribunal that there can be no blacker crime than what we
have just described. The evidence of complicity in that crime of ten of
the defendants is conclusive. We regret to add that there is no evidence
that the defendants, at that time, were in the slightest degree ashamed
of what they were doing. On the contrary, they took active steps to
convert their own troops to a frame of mind not only tolerant of but
sympathetic to these incredible mass murders. On 1 October 1941 the
defendant Salmuth, in an order ot [ sic] the day to his corps, stated
that "The battle against Bolshevism requires an energetic and ruthless
attack, especially against Jews, the chief carriers of Bolshevism," and
on 17 November 1941, the defendant Hoth issued the following order to his
troops:
Every trace of active or passive resistance or of any kind of
machinations by Bolshevik-Jewish agitators are to be immediately and
pitilessly rooted out. The necessity of severe measures against elements
foreign to people and kind, must be understood precisely by the
soldiers. These circles are the spiritual pillars of Bolshevism, the
tale bearers of its murder organization, the helpers of the
partisans. It consists of the same Jewish class of people which has done
so much harm to our Fatherland by its activity hostile to the people and
anti-culture, which promotes anti-German currents in the whole world and
which wants to be the bearer of revenge. Their annihilation is the law
of self-preservation. Any soldier criticizing these measures has no
memory for the former demoralizing traitorous activity lasting for years
carried on among our own people by Jewish-marxist elements.
C.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity--Slave Labor.

Under Count Two of the indictment, the defendants are charged with
utilizing prisoners of war held by the Germans as an unrestricted source
of labor for the purposes of forbidden by the laws of war. Under Count
Three of the indictment, they are charged with the deportation and
enslavement of millions of members of the civilian population of the
occupied countries.
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These crimes are recognized as such not only under international law, but
by the ordinary penal laws of all civilized nations. The Hague and
Geneva Conventions contain numerous applicable provisions with respect to
the treatment of prisoners of war and the civilian population of occupied
countries. The definitions of "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity"
in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, specifically proscribe
"murder," ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose, of civilian populations from occupied territories, murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war" and "extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment" and "other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, or persecution on political, racial, or religious
grounds." The evidence under these charges relates primarily to the use
and abuse of prisoners of war, and the enslavement and deportation to
slave labor and mistreatment of many thousands of civilians in and from
the countries occupied by Germany.
The slave labor program of the Third Reich was the revolting offspring of
the aggressive wars which is planned and waged. It was designed to keep
the German war machine rolling at the frightful expense of the freedom
and lives of millions of persons. The tyranny and brutality of Nazi
conquest was felt by them not only in their own homelands of France,
Belgium, Holland, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Denmark. Hundreds
of thousands suffered the additional misery of being torn loose from
homes and families and shipped to Germany into slavery and often to a
miserable and premature death.
In the East, the use of prisoners-of-war and civilians in German armament
production was widespread. As early as 4 July 1941, representatives of
the defendant Reinecke were conferring with other Reich agencies
concerning the utilization of Russian prisoners in war industries. On 31
October 1941, an OKW order drafted by Warlimont pointed out that the lack
of workers was increasingly felt in the armament industry and that this
could be remedied by a large scale use of Russian prisoners. This order
directed that work units were to be used particularly for coastal
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fortifications.
All of the defendants who held field commands in the East made available
large numbers of prisoners for employment in prohibited labor. For
example, on 2 March 1942 Army Group North under Kuechler, in reply to a
request from the rear area for more prisoners, stated:
It is not possible at this time to transfer any more prisoners of war as
requested by telephone since the available prisoners of war able to work
are needed for employment on road construction and in the armament
industry and/or plants in the operational theatre. Requesting agencies
have not been satisfied fully up to this point.
A report of 6 April 1942 to OKH by the Eleventh Army, of which Woehler
was Chief of Staff, said:
For labor in the armament factories at home, 5,529 prisoners of war were
deported to the Prisoner of War Organization of the OKW.
The employment of these prisoners was attended by all manner of illtreatment, but those retained for work in the operational area of these
defendants were particularly unfortunate. In October 1941, Brauchitsch
ordered that mine fields were to be cleared only by Russian prisoners of
war. But the defendants Leeb and Kuechler had been practicing this
flagrant violation of the laws and customs of war for at least two months
prior to the Brauchitsch order. An order of 3 august 1941 by the 217th
Infantry Division in the Eighteenth Army under Kuechler, within Army
Group North commanded by Leeb, stated:
In order to counteract the enemy's malicious manner of fighting in the
mining of roads and rivers, the greatest attention is ordered at the
places mentioned. Prisoners are to be used for removing the mines.
Other such orders were issued by Hoth and Reinhardt. Russian prisoners
were also used in the operational area for the digging of trenches,
construction of fortifications, military highways, railroads and the
loading of ammunition.
The fate of the civilian population in the East was equally harsh.
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On 21 July 1941 the defendant Roques, as commander of the Rear Area of
Army Group South, ordered that Jews be selected for compulsory labor and
that they be required to wear identifying armbands. A similar order was
issued on 11 December 1941 by a corps subordinated to the Eleventh Army,
of which Woehler was Chief of Staff, stating that:
All Jews of both sexes have to identify themselves by wearing a white
armband with the Star of David on both arms...all Jews of both sexes
between 16 and 50 years of age are at the disposal of the head of the
community for performing labor.
This Nazi racial policy, however, did not alone produce sufficient
workers for the German war machine. In order to obtain the required
number of workers, all pretext of voluntary recruitment was abandoned and
labor conscription became progressively more inhumane as the fortunes of
war turned against the Wehrmacht. Thus in October 1942, the defendant
Reinhard as commander of the Third Panzer Army, odered the use of "the
entire able-bodied civilian population" for digging trenches. In March
1943, the defendant Hollidt issued an order stating that:
Russian men and women have to be employed ruthlessly for the construction
of defenses.
By June 1943, over 50,000 civilians were reported to be working on
fortifications in the area of the Sixth Army under Hollidt. In May 1943,
Reinhardt ordered that all men between the ages of 16 and 50 and all
women between 16 and 40 capable of bearing arms and of working to be
rounded up for labor allocation. By August 1943, 17-year-old children
were ordered to be drafted, and by September, in the frenzied search for
workers, the Rear Area commander of Kuechler's Army Group North ordered
seizing all available laborers and driving them on forced marches to the
rear, with only bread for food. The order specified that children over
10 were considered as laborers.
Along with this brutal extension of the slave labor program to include
old men, women and children, the drafting measures also increased
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in harshness. Reinhardt would not permit the granting of short leaves to
laborers for the purpose of packing their belongings for fear of escape,
which he said "must be prevented at all costs". In a Top Secret order of
2 January 1944, to be destroyed after reading, he exhorted his men to act
ruthlessly in the drafting of divilians [sic] and put this pencilled
notation on the order.
Any mreasure [sic] is justified and urgently desirable if it produces a
quick and considerable increase in the number of civilians working for
us.
These documents do not begin to reflect the humand [sic] misery and
degradation involved in this slave traffic. Early in 1944, engineer and
fortress units of Reinhardt's Third Panzer Army reported that many of the
civilians pressed into slave labor by them were escaping. upon inquiry,
one of the subordinate units set forth the reasons why so many of those
miserable laborers sought refuge in flight.
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The high figure of Russian laborers who have escaped from their places of
work....is explained....by the following reasons....
They were partly apprehended in the streets and taken away under the
pretext that they would go on in a 2 or 3 days' job, without winter
clothes, shoes, mess-kit or blankets....Married couples were taken away,
the children being left behind by themselves....
Men and women were allocated by the Labor camp Witebsk who had been unfit
for work for a long time. Among them were 78-year old or blind or
paralyzed people and people suffering from heart disease who collapsed
under the least strain, epileptics, women with child up to the 9th month,
people suffering from severe abscesses with pus running out of their
shoes and some with frozen limbs....
In the West as in the East, prisoners of war and civilians alike were
forced to labor under inhumane conditions for the German war
machine. The defendant Reinecke was one of the principal figures in
obtaining thousands of French prisoners of war to labor in the German
armament industry, especially in aircraft plants. On 17 September 1942,
Warlimont forwarded a Fuehrer decree to the three branches of the
Wehrmacht, the Commander-in-Chief West (Rundstedt), and the military
Commander in Holland, which stated that:
The extensive coastal fortifications, ordered by me (Hitler) for the area
of the Army Group West, require the employment and the greatest exertion
of all labor available in the occupied territory. The allocation, so
far, of indigenous workers is insufficient. In order to increase it I
order for the occupied territories the induction of compulsory service
and the prohibition of changing the assigned place of work without
permission of the competent authority.
The Army cooperated actively with the so-called recruiting commissions of
the Sauckel slave labor organization and the SS in the conscription and
deportation of slave labor to Germany. On 25 January 1943, Rundstedt, as
commander-in-Chief West, ordered all units subordinated to him to support
the work of these commissions. And on 7 June 1943, the defendant
Sperrle, at the time Deputy Commander-in-Chief West, stated in a report
forwarded to the OKW that:
According to a report from the Military Commander in Belgium and Northern
France it has again occurred, in spite of orders to the contrary, that
German agencies without being entitled to, recruit workers within the
area of
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the military commander of Belgium and Northern France....Through such
procedure these workers for the most part were lost to recruitment for
Germany. I shall examine to what extent military authorities are involved
in this prohibited recruiting.
Sperrle's cooperation with the civilian master of the slave labor
program, Fritz Sauckel (who was convicted, and sentenced to hang by the
IMT solely on slave labor charges) was such that Sauckel was moved to say
at a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944 that"....Field
Marshal Sperrle assisted my task with fervor". A few years earlier,
during 1941 and 1942, units of Luftflotte 3, subordinated to Sperrle,
were using Russian prisoners of war in construction work on airfields and
fortifications in the West.
On 1 August 1944, the defendant Blaskowitz, as Commander of Army Group G
in France, issued the following order:
The entire able-bodied male population convicted of cooperating with
bands of the Resistance Organizations...or which may be designated as
suspect and/or sympathizing, is to be sent in a closed body to reception
camps be prepared by the Military Commander in France. From there they
are to be transported to the Reich for labor allocation.
And ten days later, Blaskowitz passed down a further order stating that:
Everywhere that centers of resistance are established or the formation of
guerilla bands is discovered, all male residents, fit for military
service, between the age of 16 and 55, physicians excepted, shall be
arrested, regardless of their present occupation, and made ready for
shipment to Germany..."
General Taylor will conclude the statement.
BY GENERAL TAYLOR:
If it please your HOnors, the wide scope of the subject matter of this
case has made it quite impossible to set forth the evidence in any detail
within the compass of this presentation. We have sought only to outline
the charges. And the same limitations of time and space rule out any
full analysis of the legal matters which the defense will, no doubt
suggest in due course.
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As to the basis for Counts One and Four of the indictment, we wish merely
to make a few brief preliminary observations. That the wars and
invasions, launched by the Third Reich with the participation of these
defendants, were aggressive in character is the law of this case. The
IMT has so held in its Judgment, and Article X of Military Government
Ordinance No. 7, under which this Tribunal is established provides that:
The determinations of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment
of Case No. 1 that invasions, aggressive acts and aggressive wars,
crimes, and atrocities or inhumane acts were planned or occurred, shall
be binding on the tribunals established hereunder and shall not be
questioned except insofar as participation therein or knowledge thereof
of any particular person may be concerned.
Thus, our starting point is that the invasions and wars of aggression
charged in the indictment were planned and did occur in violation of
international law. The only question at issue under Counts One and Four
of the indictment, therefore, is the extent to which the defendants
knowingly participated in these invasions and wars of aggression.
The necessary degree of connection with these crimes in order to
establish the guilt of the defendants is to be determined by Paragraph 2
of Article II of Control Council No. 10, and in the light of recognized
principles of criminal law. Paragraph 2 sets forth that an individual
shall be found guilty of the crimes defined in Law No. 10 if he was (a) a
principal, or (b) an accessory, or if he (c) took a consenting part
therein, or (d) was connected with plans and enterprises involving the
commission of the crime, or (e) was a member of an organization or group
connected with the commission of the crime. A further provision of this
paragraph, applicable only with respect to crimes against peace, states
among other things that the holders of high military (including General
Staff) positions in Germany are deemed to have committed such
crimes. This provision, we believe, is not intended to attach criminal
guilt automatically to all holders of high military positions such as
these defendants. It does require, however, that the fact that a person
hold such a position be
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taken into consideration together with all the other evidence in
determining the extent of his knowledge and participation.
It is the position of the prosecution that Crimes against Peace, as in
the case of most crimes, require knowing participation in the crime; both
an act and a state of mind. The act is the extent of participation of
the defendants in the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging wars
of aggression and invasions. The state of mind is the knowledge on the
part of the defendants of the aggressive aims of Hitler and the other
leaders of the Third Reich, including themselves, towards other
countries. It is not necessary to show that the defendants believed that
military force would necessarily be used to achieve such aims if threats
would suffice. Thus, the IMT said:
The defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor von Fritsch, nor von
Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually meant war, a conviction which the
defendant Raeder claims that he held up to 22 August 1939. The basis of
this conviction was his hope that Hitler would obtain a "political
solution" of Germany's problems. But all that this means, when examined,
is the belief that Germany's position would be so good, and Germany's
armed might so overwhelming that the territory desired could be obtained
without fighting for it.
That crimes against peace are susceptible of commission by military
leaders is established by the specific language of Law No. 10 already
described, and by the weighty precedents of the IMT's convictions of
Keitel, Jodl, Raeder and Doenitz. In its discussion of the General Staff
and High Command, the IMT further set forth that it had heard much
evidence as to the participation of military officers in the planning and
waging of aggressive war, and that "this evidence is as to many of them
clear and convincing."
For the sake of clarity, however, it must be emphasized that those
defendants are not accused on the ground that they are soldiers. They
are not accused merely for doing the usual things a soldier is expected
to such as making military plans and commanding troops. It is, I
suppose, among the normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations
and conferences, to entertain at dinner parties, and to cultivate good
will to-
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ward the government he represents. The leaders of the German Foreign
Office, now on trial before another of these Tribunals, are not indicted
for doing these things. It is an innocent and respectable business to be
a locksmith; but it is none the less a crime, if the locksmith turns his
talents to picking the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. The
accusation in all these cases here in Nurnberg where crimes again peace
are charged is that, in performing the functions of diplomats,
politicians, soldiers, industrialists or whatever the defendants happen
to be, they planned and waged wars of aggression. It is no defense for
those who committed such crimes to plead that they practice a particular
profession.
It is perfectly legal for military men to prepare military plans to meet
national contingencies, and such plans may legally be drawn whether they
are offensive or defensive in a military sense. It is perfectly legal
for military leaders to carry out such plans and engage in war, if in
doing so they do not plan and launch and wage illegal aggressive
wards. There may well be individual cases where drawing the lines
between legal and illegal behavior might involve some difficulties. That
is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But we do not believe
that there is any such doubt or difficulty here.
The military defendants will undoubtedly argue that they are pure
technicians. This amounts to saying that military men are a race a part
from and different from the ordinary run of human beings--men above and
beyond the moral and legal requirements that apply to others, and
incapable of exercising moral judgment on their own behalf.
In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war is
accomplished by agreement and consultation among all types of a nation's
leaders. And if the leaders in any notably important field of activity
stand aside or resist or fail to cooperate, then the criminal program
will at the very least be seriously obstructed. That is why the
principal leaders in all fields of activity share responsibility for the
crime, and military leaders no less than the others. As the IMT stated
in its
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Judgment:
Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to have the
cooperation of statemen, military leaders, deiplomats [sic], and business
men. When they, with knowledge of his aims, gave him their cooperation,
they made themselves parties to the plan he had initated.
The defendants will no doubt object strenuously to the notion that
aggressive war is a crime. Their mentor, General von Seeckt, wrote in
1928 that "the question of war guilt will be asked after each war; it is
the question who started the war which means who attacked first. It will
always be answered according to the point of view of the interested
person and--according to the winner." This comfortable view that it is
impossible to tell who started a war is a very convenient trend of
thought for the German military caste, who have started one war after
another throughout the past century. But it does not square with the
proof available in this case, and it does not square with the view of
international law generally acknowledged to be necessary if civilization
is to be protected against its destruction form within. As an eminent
authority on international law has recently written, in connection with
the Judgment of the IMT:
...the precedent will not stand still. If we do not strengthen it and
move it forward, it will slide backward. Inaction by the whole society
of nations from now on would constitute a repudiation of the precedent
with the consequence that the last state of the world would be worse than
the first. It would constitute an assertion that who is guilty of
endangering the international public repose is not to be treated as a
criminal.
Nor is it any defense to these charges to emphasize, as the defense no
doubt will, that personal relations between Hitler and the generals were
often strained, and in particular that Hitler distrusted the General
Staff and the senior Army officers. No doubt this is quite true.
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Hitler, as well as being a man of unusual, if malignant, capacities, was
an incredibly vain and self-centered man, who could not abide to
acknowledge that other people had abilities which he himself
lacked. Aware of his own lack of military education, he scoffed at those
who possessed it, though he loved nothing better than to play at map
maneuvres with favorite soldiers, such as Rommel. But HItler did not by
any means single out the generals as sole object of his derision; the
other professions fared no better. Hitler had no engineering education,
but was fascinated with construction problems, and delighted to plan
imagined cities and design gigantic buildings with a favored architect,
Albert Speer. But hear him on the subject of engineers as reported by
one who noted down much of Hitler's private conversation:
"Engineers are fools. They have an occasional idea that might be useful
but it becomes madness if it is generalize."
Industrial leaders met with a similar fate at his hands"
"I hall [sic] not be deceived by these captains of industry either;
Captains indeed! I should like to know what ships they navigate! They
are stupid fools who cannot see beyond the waves they peddle! The better
one gets to know them, the less one respects them."
So it is not very meaningful to say that Hitler did not admire the
generals. He did not admire much of anybody except himself. And in any
event, the point is quite irrelevant. The question here is not one of
personal likes and dislikes, but of acts. If these defendants and their
fellows did not give Hitler their trust, they certainly lent him their
active and energetic collaboration and put their talents at his disposal.
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They swore an oath of loyalty to his person. They built him a gigantic
war machine. Under his political leadership, they provided the military
leadership which guided this machine on its course of conquest in
Europe. The used the machine to perpetrate the most catastrophic crimes
in the modern history of the profession of arms.
Indeed, as we sought to stress at the outset, the points of friction
between Hitler and the generals served only to underline their complete
agreement on fundamentals. The most important points of the Nazi Party
program were cardinal objectives of the military leaders long before
Hitler became well known. Points One and Three--"the unification of all
Germans in the Greater Germany" and "land and territory for the
sustenance of our people" were merely a restatement of traditional PanGermanism, of which the German militarists had made great strides long
before Hitler came to power. Point Four excluded the Jews from German
citizenship. But Jews had long been excluded from the officer's corps,
and von Seeckt's official biographer boasted that "the army resisted the
penetration of Jewish blood." Finally, Point Twenty-five of the program
called for "the formation of a strong central government in the
Reich." This was completely in line with the traditional faith of the
officers' corps in authoritarianism, and led logically to dictatorship.
So it is not difficult to understand the reasons which underlay the
alliance between Hitler and the generals, and why the generals made the
Wehrmacht a main pillar of the Third Reich. This alliance was based upon
many opinions and objectives common to both parties, and more than
anything
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else, upon faith in war as a means of attaining one's objectives and,
indeed, as a normal and admirable part of life. This faith has been
repeatedly expressed in the writings of German military leaders for
nearly two centuries. If we listen for the last time today to the words
of von Seeckt on this subject, we hear him remarking with delight in 1928
upon the "relationship between Leonardo de Vinci's sketch book and the
sketches of King Frederick for his maneuvres. The genius at
work!" Eight years later he tells us:
"War is the highest pinnacle of human effort. It is the natural and last
step of evolution in the history of mankind. War is the father of all
things and at the same time the preparer of the end of an epoch, or a
people, in order to become the father of a new development....The war is
born by the will, conducted and elevated to its purest perfection."
And therefore, shocking and incredible as is the evidence in this case,
there is nothing herein that should come as a complete surprise to any
one who understands the history and ideology of the German officers'
corps. Men who believe in war are not likely to take a strong stand in
opposition to invading the neutrality of Belgium, Holland or Norway. An
officers' corps whose military manual scoffs openly at the laws of war is
not likely to take a strong stand in opposition to even the most
outrageous criminal measures called for by their leaders. --profession
which for decades has rigorously excluded Jews has already made progress
towards understanding the reasons for their eradication--no matter how
much they may throw up their hands in feigned horror, they will not be
found ready to risk much in opposition, nor, even, will they be unwilling
to lend it support if what they conceive to be
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"larger objections" so require.
Much of this case is summarized in a single document, consisting of an
order issued by the defendant Kuechler, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Eighteenth Army, on 22 July 1940. The conquest of France, in which the
Eighteenth Army participated, had just been triumphantly concluded a few
weeks prior, and orders had just been given to transfer the Army to
Poland near the Russian frontier. Some very unpleasant things were going
on in Poland at the time, and Kuechler feared that the soldiers might
hear "rumors and false information" concerning the true meaning and
justification of these things. So he wrote in an order to his troops:
"The following reasons for the transfer of the A.O.K. 18 and its
subordinate units to the East from the West will be announced to the
troops:
1.

Protection of the newly acquired living space in the East.

2.

Demonstration of our military strength to the Poles.

3. Preparation for the establishment of peace-time garrisons in the
Eastern territory for army units."
"I should like to stress....the necessity for ensuring that every soldier
of the Army, particularly every officer, refrains from criticizing the
ethnical struggle being carried out in the GENERAL GOUVERNMENT (That is
POland), the treatment of the Polish minorities and of the Jews and the
handling of church matters. The final ethnical solution of the ethnical
struggle which has been raging on the Eastern border for centuries calls
for measures of such harshness and directness
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that one application of them will suffice.
"Certain agencies of the Party and the State have been charged with the
conduct of this ethnical struggle in the East.
"Soldiers must, therefore, remain aloof from these matters, which are the
concern of other agencies. Neither are they to involve themselves in
such matters by criticism."
Many facts of this case are reflected in these few paragraphs--the proud
mention of "living space" which had been acquired by the sword; the
scornful references to Poles and Jews; the indoctrination of the troops
to accept the most brutal treatment of these "inferior" peoples. Already
the seeds are being sown in preparation for the savagery which would be
demanded of the German soldier the next year; already the language is not
of mere war but of "ethnical struggle" which are "raging on the Easter
border". This is not a soldier's order. It is a vicious, foul effort to
brutalize the troops. It points as accusingly as ever a documents can to
where the deepest guilt lies for the crimes that we have rehearsed
today. And so it comes to pass that the only way in which the behavior
of the German troops in the recent war can be made comprehensible as the
behavior of human beings is by a full exposure of the criminal doctrines
and orders which were pressed upon them from above, by these defendants
and others. In that exposure, the German people themselves have the
greatest stake.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, are you advised as tot he Courtroom that we
will have tomorrow? Are you advised as to the Courtroom we will have
tomorrow?
THE MARSHAL: Yes, Courtroom VII; the same as this.
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DR. LATERNSER: (Attorney for the Defendant von LEEB)
May it please the Tribunal, on behalf of the defendants I should like to
make the following statement: General Taylor has just stated that the
legal argument will assume gigantic proportions; that everything that has
been submitted today only consists of indications and hints. We of the
Defense are very much interested in the statement, for the Defense is
hearing today for the first time details of the reproaches and counts and
the charges which the Prosecution wishes to level. Almost the whole of
the World War and its causes are to at issue in this trial. The
indictment which was served on the defendants at the beginning of this
trial is, as the Tribunal will be able to ascertain, made up in such
general terms, that a proper preparation of the defense on the basis of
this indictment was impossible. We of the Defense have no material to go
on with.
Therefore, the Defense has only from today been in a position
theoretically to make its preparation. I use the term theoretical with
intention, because it is not practical at present to prepare a
defense. The Prosecution possesses the exclusive material for this
trial, which they accumulated in all these years in order to build up
their case.
On the basis of these facts I intend to contact the Prosecution so that
the same sources which are available to the Prosecution in order to build
up their case, and the whole of the documentary evidence, be also made
available to the Defense.
Therefore, I move firstly, that in view of this new state of affairs, and
adjournment of at least three weeks be agreed upon for the Defense,
thereby the Defense would have at least as many weeks for preparing their
defense as the
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Prosecution had years to prepare their case.
There is something else I would like to add. The Tribunal has announced
that they will rule on the motion of my colleague Dr. Leverkuehn. I
should like to state in behalf of the Defense that all the Defense
Counsel wish to concur with the second part of the motion. That is what
I would like to submit to the Court today, the motion referred to, is the
motion by Dr. Leverkuehn.
MR. McMANEY: The Prosecution--if the Tribunal please, as I understand
the motion made, it is for a postponement for three weeks. I had some
difficulty following all the reasons as to why this postponement was
needed. There was considerable mention about having the Washington
Document Center moved to Nuernberg apparently, but the Prosecution's
position is that the indictment was filed on the 28th of November; the
arraignment took place late in December. The indictment is, without any
question, one of the most specific and detailed ever filed in any War
Crimes proceeding, not only in Nuernberg, but anywhere else. The matters
charged in that indictment were dealth with at extensive length before
the IMT, and there are very few new crimes which will come up during the
course of this proceeding.
We, therefore, can see no reason whatsoever for any postponement, and the
Prosecution is prepared to proceed with presentation of its evidence
tomorrow morning at 9:30.
DR. LATERNSER: If the Tribunal please, may I shortly reply to this
argument. I can see, of course, that the Prosecution sees no reason for
asking for an adjournment because it had years to preprare their
case. Whatever has been the subject of proceedings before the IMT is of
no interest in this case. The Prosecution and the Defense have

5 February-A-IL-24-8-Sampson (Int. Weber)
Court V-A Case XII
a new case, and in every case the Defense must be afforded an opportunity
to prepare themselves adequately, because only then will the defendants
be afforded a fair chance to defend themselves.
I say that the indictment is written in summary form, and in a way that
any preparation of the Defense was not possible up to now. Today we have
heard the first details, and we have heard the words of General Taylor
that the charges made today were merely limited because of the gigantic
proportions of the issue. The Defense must, therefore, have the
possibility to prepare themselves and the preparation is only feasible if
those sources are made available to us which were also available to the
Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not feel at this time that there is such
a departure, if any, from the charges in the indictment that this motion
should be granted. The defendants at this time are not up to the point
of interposing their defense. At the time the Prosecution's case is
completed, of course, it will be the privilege of the defendants to
request such time as they may desire in order to meet the issues, and at
that time the Court, or the Tribunal, will be in a condition where is can
understand the possible need of such time and intelligently rule on the
application.
For these reasons, briefly, the motion for an adjournment at this time
will be denied.
The Tribunal will reconvene tomorrow morning at 9:30 at which time the
Prosecution may introduce evidence, and that is in Courtroom VII, which,
I understand, is this same courtroom where we are holding the session
this afternoon.
We will take a recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 0930 hours, 6 February 1948).

